The case of R v Tatton the defense of self-intoxication in the case of arson.

In the case of R v Tatton, the court was tasked with the defense of self-intoxication concerning general intent crimes. In the instant case, the case provided the court with an opportunity to assess and adjudicate over the defense of intoxication. The case made differences between general intent and specific intent offences. Crimes that are classified as general intent are those offenses where the mens rea or the criminal intent that makes the offender criminally liable encompasses very slight thought and cognitive development. In this case even a high degree of intoxication is not likely to excuse the offender from of any criminal liability in his actions. In the case, the analysis was narrowed to specific intent crimes and whether the psychological element involves some complexity of thought. 

The court noted that intoxication would then look into the specifics of specific and general intent crimes. In the courts reasoning and analysis had to look into the classification of crimes based on the specific and general intent criteria. A classification recently disputed in previously cited case law. This would then mean that the court was to the point that intoxication might negate the existence of a guilty state of mind. Whereas the more severe offenses of murder and robbery have been classified as specific intent, the “lesser” offenses of manslaughter and assault are of general intent.

The issue before the Supreme Criminal Court in Tatton was whether arson constituted a specific intent offense, to allow the accused to argue his state of intoxication as a defense to his charge of arson defined under section 434 of the Criminal Code. Therefore, an analysis of the case, in my view, would aid in understanding better the court’s position in terms of the court concerning the defense of self-intoxication. The case is relevant for understanding the defence of intoxication vis a vis the specific and general intent offence.

Facts of the case 

The accused, Paul Tatton, had been staying in the guest room of his ex-girlfriend. Her home was in Brockville. On the night of the offense, Tatton left from his ex-girlfriend’s house, saying he would get a coffee from his friend’s house Tim Horton. From the facts of the case, Tatton and his ex-girlfriend had ended their relationship. However, the accused found it hard coming to terms with the fact that their relationship had ended. On September 24, 2010, his ex-girlfriend informed him that she would visit some of her friends in Kingston. Tatton did not believe this story. He was jealous and upset. This led Tatton to leave a series of agitated and aggressive voice messages after she left. Furthermore, Tatton then drank heavily, leading him to pass out at some point that evening.

When Tatton woke up, he went to the kitchen to prepare some bacon. After putting some oil in a pan, he placed the meat on the stove. According to him, he set the stove on “high,” but at the time, he thought he set it on “low” or “simmer.” After turning the stove on, he went to visit Tim Hortons. He spent about fifteen to twenty minutes. When he came back, he found that the house was on fire. At this point, he called the fire department and reported the fire.

The fire destroyed the house and all the property in it. From their investigations, the investigators concluded that the fire started in the kitchen. It was started by the vegetable oil placed on the pan. This was because there was no evidence of any electrical or power failure or any problem with the stove. From their report, the first fuel ignited in the house was vegetable oil, and that several pieces of furniture had been turned over, toppled, moved around, or broken before the fire started. Based on this report, Tatton was arrested and subsequently charged with arson contrary to section 434 of the Criminal Code.  

The trial in the first instance, Tatton was charged with arson. The accused raised a defense of intoxication. He argued that since he was drunk, he could not have intended to cause the fire. He claimed that he was not in the right state of mind and did not possess the requisite mens rea needed for arson crime, as defined in the criminal code. The presiding trial judge seemed to agree with Tatton. In his ruling, he held that arson was a specific intent offense and was not persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had deliberately or irresponsibly damaged the property. This is because the accused was heavily intoxicated. As a result, the accused could not connect the dots between his actions and the resulting final offense. The accused was hence acquitted, and the prosecution subsequently appealed.

The court at appeal, held in favor of the respondent. In a majority ruling, the court dismissed the appeal and allowed the defense of Tatton. The holding and ratio decidendi of the court shall form the basis of this analysis. 

Issues raised in the case

• Specific intent and general intent crimes

This classification is essential when looking at cases such as this. The court was categorical in stating that the classification of offenses into general or specific intent has significant penalties for the respondent. This is because it is a general rule that law does not permit offenders to rely on self-induced drunkenness falling short of automatism as a defense to general intent offenses. The breakdown of whether an offense is one of general intent or specific intent must determine the mental element of the offense. Here the court engaged in statutory interpretation of the term arson. It is not a factual question. Having construed and interpreted the provisions, it is critical to assess whether the alleged arson in Tatton’s case was one of general or specific intent. 

In this regard, the court cited and relied on the case of Daviault. Here, the court noted that the physical act that causes the damage must be the accused’s voluntary act. Conviction of a criminal offense for an act which is not a voluntary act. Therefore, the crime category depends on how the court would interpret the provisions of the statute. In the present case, the actus reus was the destruction of possessions by fire. The mens rea here is the intentional or irresponsible performance to destroy property by the fire.

The court stated that the statute does not require additional knowledge or intent. Furthermore, the court noted that there is no need for intricate thought or cognitive processes are required. It is difficult to see how intoxication short of automatism would avoid an accused from foreknowing the risk of causing destruction to someone else’s possessions by fire.  The court hence held that it is a general intent crime. Further, the prosecution had to prove first that the act instigating injury by fire or explosion was the voluntary act of the accused, Secondly, the accused either planned to cause injury by fire or explosion or was irresponsible about whether damage by fire or explosion would occur. The crime the respondent was charged with did not require special intent. Therefore, his defense of self-intoxication could be admissible.

This view seems to contrast the holding in Benard. Here the court had stated that where the defendant claims to be drunk, he cannot argue this as a defense to crimes. In this case, Benard was accused of sexually assaulting the victim. Whereas the accused claimed to have perpetrated the act, he denied having the men rea as he was heavily intoxicated. The court held that first, self-intoxication general sense is not a “true defense” to a criminal act. However, the defense may apply in a specific intent offense when the accused is so drunk that he cannot form the specific intent required to commit the crime. The defense does not apply in offenses of general intent. This decision was criticized in the Tatton case.

• Admissibility of self-intoxication as a defense.

A key issue addressed by the court was the admissibility of self-intoxication in the case of arson. In the case of crimes, defenses seek to show that either actus reus were unintended or the consequences of the actus reus were not planned or foreseen. For self-intoxication to be admissible as a defense, the court cited decisions in George and Leary. In both cases, the court considered the issue of mens rea in the case of arson. Here it made a discrepancy is to be made between the intention to do acts concerning their intention as functional to actions measured apart from their intent. In general intent offenses, simple commission of an act is, the accused’s intent essential to establish the crime. However, in other cases, there must be specific intent in addition to that general intent. 

However, in these cases, the issue was assault and sexual offenses. In the current case, the court assessed arson as a general intent offense. Here the court assessed the case concerning its circumstance and facts. The court held that it would not necessarily follow that the person intended to set fire to their home or predicted that a fire would result from his actions. The arson’s offense required that the prosecution show that the respondent possessed the subjective intent to burn down the house and all that wa in it (This is the statutory requirement for arson under section 434). Furthermore, the respondent could be held guilty of arson by negligence under section 436, where his behavior amounted to an apparent withdrawal from the conduct anticipated of a reasonable person, and the other requirements of that section were met.

When assessed by the court in the case, the words “intentionally or recklessly causes damage” were interpreted to mean that the accused’s individual state of mind is in the issue. The court noted that where one is intoxicated, like the respondent, in this case, affected his actual state of mind, and is consequently a pertinent aspect when defining the accused had the required mental state to be found guilty of arson under section 434. The court, through this analysis, was dismissed the appeal. 

Analysis of the Gouge J.A.’s dissenting opinion

As earlier stated, the appeal was dismissed on a majority decision. There was only one dissenting opinion by Gouge J.A. He firsts stated that the crime of arson as criminalised under Section 434. He admitted that the trial court had erred in classifying the offense as a specific intent crime. However, the judge refused to hold that self-intoxication as a defense would be admissible in the case of a general intent crime.  He argued that the actions of the Respondent on 24 September did lead to the fire and that was not in dispute. His conduct was directly responsible for the fie. The issue was the intent. Whether Tatton recklessly or intentionally set the building and its property on fire. 

On this, the judge identified and assessed two errors in law made by the trial judge. On the first error he argued that the judge had made wrongly interpreted the statute. The judge stated that the issue in the case was on statutory interpretation. While relying on the holding of Sopinka J in Daviault, stating that the interpretation of the crime under section 434 was not a general intent crime. The crime was one that any amount of drunkenness could not excuse the liability of the accused. The second error Gouge J.A. identified was that the court failed to take into account the analysis laid in Daviault. The judge argued that the distinction had been made between general and specific intent crimes. He defined a specific intent crime as one which requires wilful, clear and well thought out deliberation. The accused needs to have appreciated both the consequence of the action. He/she needs to have knowledge that his actions will lead to the resulting offense.

He argued that the crime in the present case required a mens rea was intentional or reckless setting on fire of property. This in his opinion made arson a general intent crime and self-intoxication would not be admissible as a defence to the crime. In his opinion the requirement of the men rea was subjective and not objective.  

Commentary on the case 

In my view the court was divided on the opinion of statutory interpretation. The dissenting opinion of Gouge J.A. focused on the mischief rule. He analysed the social need to punish and deter crime. Both sides in the judgment were agreed on the fact that the crime of arson was a general and not a specific intent case. The court ordered for a new trial with the appreciation the crime was of a general intent and not specific intent.

The trial court did err in law by holding that arson was a specific intent crime. It did not require a heightened state of mental awareness. In truth it differs from murder and manslaughter. The respondent in the case was heavily intoxicated to the extent that he did not know whether the stive was on high, simmer or low. Furthermore, the defense of intoxication in my view could not be applied in this case. Tatton’s mental state and appreciation of the situation. The crime did not require complex thought process. It also did not need the respondent to have a well thought out understanding of the crime and its consequences.

In my opinion the court was afforded an opportunity to further jurisprudence on the defense of self-intoxication with regard to arson. The court in my view could have in the first instance rejected the defence of intoxication and convicted the Respondent as argued by Gouge J.A. Also, the case of self-intoxication and intoxication in general depends on a case by case basis. It depends on the evidence collected and the circumstances of each case. This means that the case of mental capacity and men rea was relative to the circumstances of the case. In this case the court was faced with arson, a crime that did not involve a complex thought process. The evidence in the case was in my view a clear sign of recklessness and would fit the mens rea required for the case of arson as defined by statute. In my view as was held in Daviault did not require the court to require a high standard of men rea.

Conclusion

The case of Tatton is relevant in the Canadian Criminal Jurisprudence. This is because the case shed light and gave insight on the issue of intoxication as a defense. It settled a long-disputed position on general and specific intent crimes. The intent is central to all crimes. The state of mind of the accused must be in such a fashion that he/she can appreciate the action or have the foresight of the resulting circumstances. Intoxication seems to blur one’s understanding of these two circumstances. When drunk, as seen in Tatton, the accused may not foresee his actions leading to damage or injury. Where one cannot appreciate or understand this, then criminal law would fail to retribute and punish the offender. One needs to be aware of his/her actions, aware of the consequences, and in a way, aware of punishment and why it is passed.

In Tatton, the court criticized the view in Benard, which remains a long-standing decision. This was evident in the dissenting opinions of St. Goudge J.A., who supported the views of McIntyre J. in Benard. The court sought to use the opportunity to give its views and establish a rule. However, as some argue, without a concrete and rational criterion for determining the general or specific intent distinction. However, the court’s decision has been criticized for missing an occasion to provide some cogent basis for the general or specific distinction. “Instead, the Court merely perpetuated a legal fiction as opposed to a precise one.”

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