REBUTTALS TO BRN’S ASSERTIONS

Plaintiff files this surplus document as an Exhibit in further support of her Rebuttal to the Attorney General, who filed an opposition for the BRN. Through this document, Plaintiff seeks to debunk all assertions made by the Attorney General. Plaintiff states as follows:

  1. BRN’S (Attorney General’s) Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions

 

ATTORNEY GENERAL’S ASSERTIONS PLAINTIFF’S REBUTTALS
On September 19, 2022, the Court entered judgment ordering the dismissal of Plaintiff’s action after motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff opposes the Attorney General’s assertion. Contrary to the assertion, Lisa Magorien, the attorney for Defendant, sought to have Plaintiff’s case dismissed based on a procedural technicality, without considering the merits of the case. Lisa filed the Motion for Summary Judgment on April 21, 2022 alleging that Plaintiff had named the wrong Defendant as party in the Complaint. Plaintiff only realized that there was an issue with the Defendant’s name when she received the Motion for Summary Judgment form Lisa Magorien.

 

In making the September 19, 2022 judgment, Judge Kleifield disregarded Code of Civil Procedure § 437(c), which states in pertinent part that, “The motion for summary judgment shall [only] be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Emphasis added). Also, the Judge disregarded the fact that Defendant failed to meet her burden to show that, as a matter of law, Plaintiff could not establish one or more of the elements of each challenged cause of action. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 437c(o)(l), (p)(2); Aguilar v Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.

Subsequently, Plaintiff filed numerous frivolous post-judgment pleadings, which resulted in Plaintiff being deemed a vexatious litigant on December 9, 2022. CCP section 391.3 subdivision (b) provides that a person is deemed vexatious following a hearing on the evidence on the motion. First, Plaintiff asserts that she was never given a fair hearing for the motion to deem her a vexatious litigant.

Next, Plaintiff has not met any of the factors identified in Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 391(b), which may be considered in determining whether a she is a vexatious litigant. Plaintiff’s conduct in the prosecution of the case is nowhere near vexatious and/or frivolous. Notably, in the past seven years, she has never commenced any actions, that have been determined against her. She has also never delayed any action for at least two years.

Undeterred by the Court’s order deeming her a vexatious litigant, Plaintiff filed this baseless and frivolous Motion on February 14, 2023.  Plaintiff’s motion was neither baseless nor frivolous. First, Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions was in full compliance with CA Civ. Pro Code § 2023.040 (2019), which provides guidelines on motions for sanctions. First, Plaintiffs motion had a Notice of Motion, duly notifying the Defendant and the Court that she intended to file a Motion for Sanctions against Defendant. Next, Plaintiff included a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the motion. Next, Plaintiff also included a Declaration setting forth the facts supporting why the Defendant should pay sanctions. Plaintiff also provided a Proposed Order, where she specified the amount of Monetary Sanctions that should be awarded against the Defendant.

Next, Plaintiff asserts that the motion for sanctions was necessary to punish the BRN for abuse of the discovery process. The purpose of discovery sanctions is not to provide a weapon for punishment, forfeiture, and the avoidance of the trial on the merits, but to prevent abuse of the discovery process and correct the problem presented. See California Discovery Citations (TRG 2019) 1:6; citing Parker v. Wolters Kluwer United States, Inc., 149 Cal.App.4th 285, 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d 18 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007)

Plaintiff alleges that the Board’s Executive Officer Loretta Melby filed an Accusation against Plaintiff that was baseless and in bad faith; that the Board failed to investigate Plaintiff’s complaints regarding her nursing manager; and that the Board subjected Plaintiff to discipline without interviewing Plaintiff regarding allegations Kaiser purportedly made against her.  The accusation was baseless and was made in bad faith. Notably, on or about July 2021, the BRN interviewed Plaintiff. BRN then received Plaintiff’s complete medical record on August 3, 2021. Upon receiving Plaintiff’s records, the Board found no issue. Nowhere in Plaintiff’s history of nursing was there any record of bad patient care or any medical errors.

The accusation stated that Plaintiff was subject to disciplinary action for failing to comply with the Section 820 Order compelling her to a mental examination. (EXHIBIT 9- BRN’S order compelling mental exam 07/14/2022; EXHIBIT 10- Response to Rinaldi’s Order to Respondent; EXHIBIT 17- Gillian’s Statement to Respondent; EXHIBIT 15b- Response to Rinaldi’s Order to Respondent; EXHIBIT 15c- Rinaldi’s Additional Order to Respondent; EXHIBIT 18- Default decision and Order; EXHIBIT 18a- Disciplinary Action Records; EXHIBIT 18b- Official Revocation of License; EXHIBIT 18c- Subject Statement and Dispute). accusation was based on false information that was sent to the BRN from Plaintiff’s former employer, regarding the incidence on August 18, 2020, which incidence forms the basis of the instant case.

The correct version of facts for the August 28, 2020, incidence is that she was engaged in a casual conversation with Mr. Edwards, a previous co-worker, when she mentioned that she had been harassed by two males within the last year at another job she held before. At that time, Plaintiff considered Mr. Edwards to be a friend since they often worked in the same shift as nurses. It is after this incidence that Mr. Edwards started making negative remarks about her to the hospital’s patients and staff, in an effort to discredit her and make her appear as incompetent and incapable of performing her duties as a nurse. Plaintiff sent Sarah Poetter, her nursing manager, an email detailing her bullying. Plaintiff then met with the HR, where she discussed her concerns regarding Mr. Edwards.

The staff and management of Kaiser then started making the false allegations against Plaintiff, that she is not mentally capable of fulfilling her duties.

Sarah Poetter then sent the BRN the false report that initiated the BRN’s oppression of Plaintiff.

Plaintiff emphasizes that Sarah Poetter received all of plaintiff’s clearance notes, which showed that there was nothing wrong with Plaintiff. (EXHIBIT 3- Acacia Mental Health director Kerri Cole’s Request for Authorization to Release Mental Health Records to BRN; EXHIBIT 4- Acacia Mental Health follow-up Request for Authorization to Release Mental Health Records to BRN; EXHIBIT 5- Acacia Mental Health Communication regarding authorization for release of mental health records to BRN; EXHIBIT 6- Plaintiff’s authorization for Acacia Mental Health to release mental health records to BRN; EXHIBIT 7- Acacia mental health director confirms all mental health clearance notes requested by Kaiser were faxed to Kaiser; EXHIBIT 8- Acacia mental health director confirms all mental health records requested by Kaiser were faxed to BRN; EXHIBIT 13- Exhibit 13- BRN Psychiatrist- August 2022; EXHIBIT 13a- Psychiatrist Appointment set for September 8, 2022). The psychologist’s notes showed clearly that Plaintiff’s fear of black magic was valid and was based on her cultural/religious belief, harassment, abuse at work, and her unexplainable car accident. The psychologist further stated that Plaintiff’s thought process was within the normal limits, and that her reaction was normal based on the circumstances that she was subjected to.

Plaintiff maintains that the BRN’s resort to subjecting her to the examination was an unduly intrusive means of determining her mental condition.  First, Kaiser’s fitness for duty policy provides that there must be evidence for the inability to perform the requirements of the job. If there is no such evidence, there is no basis for a fitness for duty examination. Besides, the BRN withheld a copy of the report that was made against Plaintiff, despite Plaintiff’s incessant efforts to get access to the report. (EXHIBIT 2a- Email Request to Cristina for Copy of Report sent by Sarah Poetter that was provided to Review During interview; EXHIBIT 2b- Christina Vazquez Subpoena- 07/15/21; EXHIBIT 2e- BRN Authorization for release of Mental Health Records; EXHIBIT 2f- Authorization for Release (Annexture)).

The BRN opposed Plaintiff’s subpoena requests, yet the requests sought disclosure of pertinent information that would establish facts in support of Plaintiff’s position. (EXHIBIT 2c- Christina Vazquez Objection to Subpoena Request- 07/15/21; EXHIBIT 2d- Plaintiff’s response to Christina Vazquez’s Objection to Subpoena Request; EXHIBIT 16- Gillian’s Objection to Deposition Subpoena; EXHIBIT 17- Gillian and Armando Objections)

Next, as Plaintiff already stated, the BRN had already interviewed her, and accessed her medical records, but never found any issue with Plaintiff’s record. Nowhere in Respondent’s history of nursing was there any record of bad patient care or any medical errors. Besides, Plaintiff attests that the Board made no attempt to ascertain the veracity of the allegations made against her. Instead, the Board’s first step was to order Plaintiff to a Section 820 examination. (EXHIBIT 9- BRN’S order compelling mental exam 07/14/2022; EXHIBIT 10- Response to Rinaldi’s Order to Respondent; EXHIBIT 11- Proof of Service that Opposition to Order compelling mental exam was served to the AG and received; EXHIBIT 12- Kevin Narine- BRN Exam Notice; EXHIBIT 12a- Thomas Rinaldi- BRN Exam Notice; EXHIBIT 12b- Response to Thomas Rinaldi Exam Notice; EXHIBIT 12c- Kevin Narine Exam Notice- 7/27/22).

Section 820 examinations “are permissible if there is a showing of good cause.” See Kees v. Medical Board, 7 Cal. App. 4th 1801 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) It is Plaintiff’s assertion that Loretta made the accusation without ascertaining the presence of good cause to make said accusation. At least, Loretta should have examined the veracity of the false report that was sent to the BRN.

Next, one should only be subjected to a mental examination if such an examination is the least intrusive means of determining a physician’s mental condition.  See Kees v. Medical Board, 7 Cal. App. 4th 1801 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992). In this case, the BRN failed to consider other means of ascertaining Plaintiff’s mental capacity. Nowhere in Plaintiff’s history of nursing was there any record of bad patient care or any medical errors. It therefore beats logic why Gillian kept insisting that Plaintiff subjects to a mental examination, yet all records show that she was not mentally incompetent at all.

Plaintiff seeks sanctions pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5, in which the court “may order a party, the party’s attorney, or both, to pay the reasonable expenses … incurred by another party as a result of actions or tactics, made in bath faith, that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 128.5, subd. (a) [emphasis added].)

However, section 128.5 does not authorize sanctions against a nonparty. (Rabbit v. Vincente (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 170, 174; Capotosto v. Collins (1991) 235 Cal. App. 3d 1439, 1442, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 470, 471.)

As the Board is a nonparty to this action, it cannot be subject to sanctions under section 128.5.

The Court should thus dismiss the Motion on this basis alone without further consideration of the merits.

 The testimony of a witness in California may be taken by deposition when the witness is the only one who can establish facts or a fact material to the issue. See Code Civ. Proc., sec. 2021.

The foregoing provision clearly states the obligation of a person possessing discoverable information to be subpoenaed for deposition, if they are the entities that can establish facts pertinent to the case. This position therefore creates a liability for a party who attempts to evade deposition by claiming they are a non-party.

Even assuming arguendo that the Court can consider Plaintiff’s Motion on its merits under section 128.5, the Motion fails to meet the rigorous burden of proof required by the statute. Plaintiff duly met her burden of proof. She clearly pointed out the bad faith tactics and/or actions of the Board. Plaintiff asserts that it is the Board that has failed to meet its burden to counter Plaintiff’s factual assertions. As it can be seen from the AG’s response, the Board only relies on procedural technicalities and frivolous arguments to oppose Plaintiff’s motion. The Court should note that the AG has made no factual assertion in response to Plaintiff’s motion.
Plaintiff must show the opposing party’s actions were “made in bad faith, that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 128.5, subd. (a).) “Frivolous” means “totally and completely without merit or for the sole purpose of harassing an opposing party. (Code Civ. Proc., § 128.5, subd. (b)(2).)  The Bad faith is seen where the AG opposes an application that is properly filed, and in compliance with the applicable law. The AG’s objections are therefore made in bad faith, to harass and/or oppress the Plaintiff. It is also notable that the AG sent two officers to Plaintiff’s house. The officers showed up at Plaintiff’s door and flashed their badges. Plaintiff filed a police report. (EXHIBIT 15- Harassment by Gillian Friedman; EXHIBIT 15a- Police Report- Photos).
The standard applied in section 128.5 is a subjective bad faith standard. (Marriage of Sahafzadeh-Taeb & Taeb (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 124, 134-135.)  The actions of the Board are clearly in bad faith, which fact meets the threshold for an Order for sanctions against the Board.
Sanctions under these standards should be used “most sparingly to deter only the most egregious conduct” and only in the “clearest of cases.” (Luke v. Baldwin-United Corp. (1985) 167 Cal. App. 3d 664, 668-669.). The Board’s conduct fell among sanctionable conduct. Section 2023.010 provides a “non-exhaustive list” of conduct that constitutes a “‘misuse of the discovery process.’” See Kwan Software Engineering, Inc. v. Hennings (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 57, 74.) Also, Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 128.5(a) authorizes the court to issue an order for sanctions to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by another party as a result of actions or tactics, made in bad faith, that are frivolous.
Here, Plaintiff fails to offer any credible evidence that the Board acted in bad faith, frivolously, or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay. Based solely on conjecture, speculation, and personal opinion, Plaintiff alleges the following claims:

(1) the Board’s Executive Officer Loretta Melby filed a baseless Accusation against Plaintiff;

The AG is lying, and should be punished for misleading the Court. The California Rules of Professional Conduct provide that in presenting a matter to a court `an attorney must employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to the attorney, only those means consistent with truth. See Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 5-200(A). Thus, an attorney must not do any of the following: [¶] . . . Seek to mislead the judge, judicial officer, or jury by an artifice or false statement of fact or law. See Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 5-200(B); see also 1 Witkin, Cal. Procedure ([5th ed. 2008]) Attorneys, [§ 461, p. 576].

 

Plaintiff has sufficiently demonstrated how the Board made frivolous objections to Plaintiff’s subpoenas in an attempt to stifle Plaintiff’s intention to have the truth laid bare in Court.

 

Next, Plaintiff has demonstrated how Loretta Melby made a baseless accusation against Plaintiff. Loretta ignored pertinent records in the BRN’s possession, which show that Plaintiff has no mental illness, contrary to the accusations made against her. Notably, Loretta Melby has access to Plaintiff’s RN case file (21-16709-rn) used by Cristina Vazquez, the BRN investigator, to request the psychologist notes from Acacia. Those notes explain from a psychologist standpoint that Plaintiff’s reaction was valid and there is no mental issues precluding Plaintiff from being able to work.

(2) the Board has Plaintiff’s psychiatric records showing she is without mental illness; Plaintiff vehemently opposes the stated averment. The BRN has no proof that Plaintiff was impaired.

Notably, Plaintiff sent her supervisor, Sarah Poetter an email detailing her bullying. Plaintiff then met with the HR, where she discussed her concerns regarding Mr. Edwards. The staff and management of Kaiser then started making the false allegations against Plaintiff, that she is not mentally capable of fulfilling her duties.  

Further, on or about July 2021, the BRN interviewed Plaintiff. BRN then received Plaintiff’s complete medical record on August 3, 2021. Upon receiving Plaintiff’s records, the Board found no issue. Nowhere in Plaintiff’s history of nursing was there any record of bad patient care or any medical errors.

Besides, it is worth noting that Plaintiff has a recommendation letter sent by Julie Bonsack, Plaintiff’s travel nurse recruiter on July 22, 2022. In the letter, Julie stated that Plaintiff received a good recommendation from supervisor Jennifer Ty. Julie further quoted Jennifer Ty, who stated expressed their thrill to have Plaintiff work with them, and that they would love to keep or have her come back as the need arises.

Plaintiff also received a letter on July 25, 2022 from Cheyenne Haggard, her recruiter. In the letter, Cheyenne acknowledged that Plaintiff had worked with her as a travel nurse at Clovis Community Medical Center, Clovis, CA. She further noted that Plaintiff had received good recommendations from her supervisor Jennifer Tyo, Laura Benesch at Palmdale Regional, and Natalie P, a Charge RN at Clovis Community Medical Center. The said individuals were excited to work with Plaintiff.

On March 11, 2021, Jennifer Tyo, Plaintiff’s supervisor at Providence Little Company of Mary San Pedro, noted that Plaintiff has been able to maintain a composed demeanor, even working in stressful situations. Also, on March 21, 2023, Plaintiff received a verification of employment from Danelle Manderfeld. In the letter, Danelle stated that Plaintiff met the requirements for her job and qualified for rehire with Atlas Medstaff.

Further, on April 27, 2022, Tina Griffith wrote a recommendation letter, where she noted that Plaintiff was a self-starter, reliable, and excelled under pressure.

(3) the Accusation was filed in bad faith;  Loretta Melby’s accusation was in bad faith, and was without justification. She waited one year from the BRN interview in July 2021, to order Plaintiff’s 820 examination in July 2022, based on hearsay for an incident that happened almost two years prior.
(4) the Board failed to investigate Plaintiff’s complaints regarding her nursing manager at Kaiser; Plaintiff lodged a report to BRN against Sarah Portter for gross negligence. BRN’s response was to request an interview with Plaintiff for alleged mental illness. (EXHIBIT 1- Plaintiff lodged a report to BRN against Sarah Poetter for gross negligence. BRN’s response was to request interview with Plaintiff for alleged mental illness).

Clearly, the Board did not probe the veracity of the report that was presented to the Board by Sarah Poetter. The Board also failed to probe how the employees at Kaiser falsely accused Plaintiff, and subjected her to unfair treatment.

During the meeting on November 6, 2020, Plaintiff received a suspension letter indicating that Plaintiff was placed on an unpaid investigatory suspension to pave the way for an investigation against me. There was no mention of the dismissal on August 28, 2020, or any form of acknowledgment of the clearance note submitted on September 4, 2020. Much to Plaintiff’s dismay, she was instead placed on suspension for a Level Two medication error for improper disposal of a medication vial. As a nurse with over ten years’ experience, Plaintiff asserts that there was no actual medication error. This is a clear act of perjury on Kaiser and an act of malicious intent to cover up the illegal suspension on August 28, 2020. Plaintiff knows this because a level 2 medication error standardly does not carry a suspension disciplinary action.

Further, in a subsequent meeting on November 10th, there was no mention of the August 28, 2020, incident. During that November 10th meeting, the management focused on getting Plaintiff to sign the suspension letter, or ultimately face escalating disciplinary actions that would lead to immediate termination. Knowing that their actions were wrong both legally and morally, Plaintiff continued to refuse to sign any suspension letters, as it was evident this was a sly cover-up for the verbal dismissal on August 28, 2020. Plaintiff’s suspension letter was then increased to level 3. (Despite being pressured, bullied, intimidated and being the recipient of intense fear tactics to sign the suspension letter during the November 10th meeting, Plaintiff still refused. Due to this, the management had targeted and effectively terminated Plaintiff’s employment as of November 10, 2020.

On or about September 9, 2020, an EEOC investigator, Lourdes Keppel, contacted Plaintiff and advised her that she was investigating her complaint and would reach out to her shortly. In the meantime, Plaintiff continued to receive phone calls from a few of her co- workers advising her that Xavier Edwards was continuing to spread rumors about her, claiming that she was psychotic and that she was mentally unstable.

On January 29, 2021, Plaintiff was denied her accommodation request. On February 11, 2021, a Clarification Note was sent to the HR. The note stated that Plaintiff had no specific functional limitations that would preclude her from performing her nursing duties. The foregoing notwithstanding, the HR still maintained that they would engage a third-party healthcare to perform a medical assessment on Plaintiff. The HR further stated that Plaintiff would further remain on unpaid medical leave.

(5) and the Board subjected Plaintiff to discipline without interviewing her regarding allegations Kaiser purportedly made against her. (Mot. pp. 4-5.)  The Board had an obligation to probe the veracity of the allegations made against Plaintiff. There were all evidence showing that the allegations were ill-founded. At least, the Board had interviewed Plaintiff on or about July 14, 2021. The interview showed that Plaintiff has no record of negligent patient care.
Notably, Plaintiff’s claims in this Motion relate solely to the Board’s administrative actions in a separate administrative case, and thus reach outside the limits of the instant civil action. This Court is not the proper forum for these claims.  The Board’s actions fall squarely within the jurisdiction of this Court. Notably, the Plaintiff asserts that the BRN is part of the entities that have contributed to her suffering and oppression in this case. The Board is the sole reason why Plaintiff’s license got revoked, thus rendering Plaintiff unable to work as a Registered Nurse.
Additionally, the Board’s administrative actions relating to Plaintiff’s license are well within its statutory authority and discretion.  The Board’s actions, whether administrative or not, were ultra vires.
Significantly, public protection is the Board’s highest priority in exercising its licensing, regulatory, and disciplinary functions. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 2708.1.)  Plaintiff does not dispute the role of the Board in protecting the public. However, the law expressly lays out guidelines to be followed by the Board with regards to Section 820 examinations. The Board blatantly violated the guidelines.
The Board may order any licensee to be examined by a physician or psychologist, “whenever it appears that [the licensee] may be unable to practice [their] profession safely because the licentiate’s ability to practice is impaired due to mental illness.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 820.)  The BRN ignored pertinent records in the BRN’s possession, which show that Plaintiff has no mental illness, contrary to the accusations made against her. Notably, Loretta Melby has access to Plaintiff’s RN case file (21-16709-rn) used by Cristina Vazquez, the BRN investigator, to request the psychologist notes from Acacia. Those notes explain from a psychologist standpoint that Plaintiff’s reaction was valid and there is no mental issues precluding Plaintiff from being able to work.
No part of section 820 allows for a licensee to dictate or limit the areas and boundaries of the Board’s inquiry under this statute.  Contrary to the AG’s assertions, a section 820 is only valid if ” there is a showing of good cause.” See Kees v. Medical Board, 7 Cal. App. 4th 1801 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)
If the licensee fails to comply with the Board’s order issued under section 820, the failure “shall constitute grounds for the suspension or revocation of the [license].” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 821.)  It is trite law that administrative orders are void when rendered without fundamental jurisdiction. See City and County of San Francisco v. Ang (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 673, 677-679 [159 Cal.Rptr. 56], or in excess of the agency’s statutory powers, also referred to as in excess of its jurisdiction. See Aylward v. State Board etc. Examiners (1948) 31 Cal.2d 833, 839 [192 P.2d 929
Upon service of the Board’s Accusation on the licensee, and the licensee’s failure to file a timely notice of defense, the Board is entitled to issue a default decision and order revoking the license. (Gov. Code, §§ 11505(c), 11506(c), 11520(a).)  Plaintiff submitted her resignation and surrendered her license out of frustration. The Board’s Order compelling her to a Section 820 examination, coupled with her case in Court, have occasioned Respondent extensive emotional and/or mental harm and suffering. It is also notable that the Board had threatened to, and indeed revoked Plaintiff’s license. (EXHIBIT 14- Gillian Stipulated License Surrender).
In accordance with these statutory provisions, on or about July 14, 2022, the Board served Plaintiff with an order under section 820 compelling a mental and/or physical examination by a physician or psychologist. (Decl. of Armando Zambrano [Decl.] ¶ 3.) Plaintiff does not dispute that she failed to comply with the order. (Mot. p. 3; Decl. ¶ 3.) The BRN has no jurisdiction to compelling Plaintiff to a mental examination without good case and/or compelling reason. It is trite law that administrative orders are void when rendered without fundamental jurisdiction. See City and County of San Francisco v. Ang (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 673, 677-679 [159 Cal.Rptr. 56], or in excess of the agency’s statutory powers, also referred to as in excess of its jurisdiction. See Aylward v. State Board etc. Examiners (1948) 31 Cal.2d 833, 839 [192 P.2d 929]; B.W. v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 219, 234 [ 215 Cal.Rptr. 130]. As Plaintiff has already stated, the BRN was bound to first resort to less intrusive means, before subjecting Plaintiff to Section 820 examination. Also, the BRN should have first verified the allegations made against Plaintiff, before subject her to a mental examination.
On or about November 16, 2022, Plaintiff was served Accusation Case No. 4002021005658, filed by the Board’s Executive Officer pursuant to the Board’s authority and discretion under Business and Professions Code section 821. (Decl. ¶ 4, Exh. A.) The sole basis of the Accusation was Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the section 820 order.  Again, Plaintiff emphasizes that one cannot be compelled to subject to a mental examination without good cause. Notably, Section 820 examinations “are permissible if there is a showing of good cause.” See Kees v. Medical Board, 7 Cal. App. 4th 1801 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (Emphasis added). Also, one should only be subjected to a mental examination if such an examination is the least intrusive means of determining a physician’s mental condition.  See Kees v. Medical Board, 7 Cal. App. 4th 1801 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).

“The only guideline set forth in section 820 is simply “[w]henever it appears that . . . the licentiate’s ability to practice is impaired due to mental illness…”” Alexander D. v. State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 231 Cal.App.3d 92, 98 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).

(Decl. ¶ 4, Exh. A.) Despite Plaintiff’s contention that she filed a timely notice of defense, of which she has offered no evidence, no such notice of defense was ever received. (Mot. p. 3; Decl. ¶ 5.)  This is another of AG’s attempts to use any argument at his disposal to frivolously object to Plaintiff’s motion. Plaintiff duly served all documents sufficient to notify the BRN of Plaintiff’s position in this case.
On or about January 6, 2023, the Board issued its default decision and order revoking Plaintiff’s license, pursuant to its authority and discretion under Gov. Code sections 11505(c), 11506(c), and 11520(a). (Decl. ¶ 6, Exh. B.) The Board lacked jurisdiction to issue the said order. It is trite law that administrative orders are void when rendered without fundamental jurisdiction. See City and County of San Francisco v. Ang (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 673, 677-679 [159 Cal.Rptr. 56], or in excess of the agency’s statutory powers, also referred to as in excess of its jurisdiction. See Aylward v. State Board etc. Examiners (1948) 31 Cal.2d 833, 839 [192 P.2d 929]; B.W. v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 219, 234 [ 215 Cal.Rptr. 130]. As Plaintiff has already stated, the BRN was bound to first resort to less intrusive means, before subjecting Plaintiff to Section 820 examination. Also, the BRN should have first verified the allegations made against Plaintiff, before subject her to a mental examination.
Given the wide discretion and authority granted to the Board to perform its administrative duties, Plaintiff’s claims of bad faith and frivolous conduct are unsubstantiated and meritless. The Court should thus deny the Motion on the merits as well. The BRN acted ultra vires, since its actions were made in violation of the law. See B.W. v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 219, 234 [ 215 Cal.Rptr. 130].
None of Plaintiff’s claims of sanctionable conduct are related to discovery. (Mot. pp. 4-5.) Abuse of the discovery process is a sanctionable conduct. The AG is lying.
Despite this, Plaintiff inexplicably cites not only to section 128.5 (which applies only to non[1]discovery sanctions), but also to California Code of Civil Procedure sections 2023.030 and 2023.040, which apply only to discovery sanctions under the Civil Discovery Act. (Mot. p. 1-2; Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2023.030 et seq.) The AG’s argument is irrelevant and baseless. Nothing precludes the Plaintiff from citing all laws violated by the BRN. The AG’s argument therefore shows the AG’s ill intention to oppose all of Plaintiff’s attempts to seek justice.
A party bringing a motion for sanctions must not only include the specific basis for the motion, but also a concise statement of the applicable law. (Cal. Rules of Court 3.1113; People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal. 4th 119, 129; Childs v. PaineWebber Inc., 29 Cal. App. 4th 982, 996.)  Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions was in full compliance with CA Civ. Pro Code § 2023.040 (2019), which provides guidelines on motions for sanctions. First, Plaintiffs motion had a Notice of Motion, duly notifying the Defendant and the Court that she intended to file a Motion for Sanctions against Defendant. Next, Plaintiff included a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the motion. Next, Plaintiff also included a Declaration setting forth the facts supporting why the Defendant should pay sanctions. Plaintiff also provided a Proposed Order, where she specified the amount of Monetary Sanctions that should be awarded against the Defendant.
Additionally, a pro per litigant “is held to the same restrictive rules of procedure as an attorney.” (Burnete v. La Casa Dana Apartments (2007) 148 Cal. App. 4th 1262, 1267, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 437, 441; County of Orange v. Smith (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1434, 1444.)  The AG’s argument here is irrelevant. Plaintiff is entitled to make the motion for sanctions, for the BRN to be held liable for their sanctionable conduct.
Here, because Plaintiff has failed to raise any claims related to discovery, sections 2023.030 and 2023.040 are inapplicable. Plaintiff’s Motion must therefore be denied, as Plaintiff has failed to cite to any proper legal authority in support of her demand for sanctions.  Plaintiff has cited proper authority to support her case for motion for sanctions. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 128.5(a) authorizes the court to issue an order for sanctions to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by another party as a result of actions or tactics, made in bad faith, that are frivolous.
Even assuming arguendo that the Court can consider Plaintiff’s Motion under sections 2023.030 and 2023.040 of the Civil Discovery Act, the Motion fails to meet the most basic procedural requirements under this statutory scheme.  Plaintiff’s motion meets the procedural requirements of the law. First, Plaintiffs motion had a Notice of Motion, duly notifying the Defendant and the Court that she intended to file a Motion for Sanctions against Defendant. Next, Plaintiff included a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the motion. Next, Plaintiff also included a Declaration setting forth the facts supporting why the Defendant should pay sanctions. Plaintiff also provided a Proposed Order, where she specified the amount of Monetary Sanctions that should be awarded against the Defendant.
First, and most significantly, Plaintiff is not entitled to discovery sanctions, because there is no triable pending action before this Court. On September 19, 2022, the Court entered judgment ordering the dismissal of Plaintiff’s action after granting defendant Kaiser’s motion for summary judgment.  This case is not closed. The Court had set the hearing for Plaintiff’s motion for March 28, 2023. Also, the Court docket showed other matters scheduled for hearings on future dates. It is further notable that Defendant in the case had also filed applications, which were duly admitted and scheduled for determination. Clearly, the case was not closed.
The Civil Discovery Act limits discovery to that which “is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . .”

(Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.)

The “existence of a pending action is a condition precedent to application of the [Civil Discovery] Act. (Dep’t of Fair Emp. & Hous. v. Superior Ct. (1990) 225 Cal. App. 3d 728, 730.).

Because there is no triable pending action here, Plaintiff is not entitled to discovery and cannot issue subpoenas, or have them enforced, to obtain discovery. It logically follows that under these circumstances, Plaintiff is not entitled to discovery sanctions under the Civil Discovery Act.

Plaintiff vehemently opposes the AG’s assertions. Notably, the fact that the hearing date for the motion was set for March 28, 2023, is evidence that the matter was still triable before this Court. As further proof that the matter was still active, the Court docket showed other matters scheduled for hearing in this case. For instance, the Court Docket showed two matters scheduled to be heard on August 9, 2023 (hearing for motion for sanctions and hearing on Motion for Order on Motion for Reconsideration). Further, a Notice of Related Cases was filed in Plaintiffs related case {Esther Tendo Atam v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (SCPMG), 22STCV37929). The Minute Order issued in said case on March 9, 2023, stated that the matter would be heard in the instant court.

 

It is Plaintiff’s assertion that the fact that a matter is scheduled on the Court docket is sufficient to show that the case is not closed.

Second, a party seeking sanctions under the Civil Discovery Act “shall, in the notice of motion, identify every person, party, and attorney against whom the sanction is sought, and specify the type of sanction sought.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.040.) Because Plaintiff has erroneously conflated two different statutory schemes—non-discovery sanctions under section 128.5 and discovery sanctions under section 2023.030—she has failed to properly specify the type of sanction sought. Additionally, Plaintiff has failed to file a declaration with facts sufficiently supporting the amount of monetary sanctions sought. (Id.) The AG is lying blatantly. Plaintiffs motion had a Notice of Motion, which duly notified the Defendant and the Court that she intended to file a Motion for Sanctions against Defendant. The sanctions were directed to the BRN. The subpoenas were targeted at employees of the BRN, who, by virtue of their offices in the BRN, had authority to produce the subpoenaed discoverable information on behalf of the BRN. Next, Plaintiff included a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the motion. Next, Plaintiff also included a Declaration setting forth the facts supporting why the Defendant should pay sanctions. Clearly, the AG is lying when he states that Plaintiff “has failed to file a declaration with facts sufficiently supporting the amount of monetary sanctions sought”. Lastly, the Plaintiff provided a Proposed Order, where she specified the amount of Monetary Sanctions that should be awarded against the Defendant. For emphasis, Plaintiff asserts that she specified that she demanded monetary sanctions.
Third, Plaintiff has failed to meet and confer prior to filing her Motion pursuant to sections 2023.030 and 2023.040. (Decl. ¶ 7.) A party must accompany a motion with a meet and confer declaration containing facts that show a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.300(b); 2016.040.) Plaintiff has failed to meet this pre- filing requirement.  The BRN is already in violation of the laws regarding deposition, by filing frivolous objections to the subpoenas. The BRN is aware that the Plaintiff is entitled to deposition, as a matter of right. The BRN’s conduct therefore evidences its hostility and its determined effort to oppose Plaintiff’s intention to have the subpoenaed individuals produce pertinent evidence in Court. It follows; it was not possible to meet an confer in the said circumstances where the BRN has been openly hostile to Plaintiff.
Fourth, Plaintiff served on the Board just the Motion and declaration in support of her Motion, but failed to serve the exhibits included in the filed copy of her Motion. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1300(a); Decl. ¶ 8, Exh. C.)  The AG is lying blatantly. Plaintiff served all documents needed to sufficiently inform the BRN of Plaintiff’s intention to seek sanctions against the BRN for abusing the discovery process.
Finally, Plaintiff’s Motion references 4 subpoenas Plaintiff issued to the Board and the Board’s counsel after judgment and after Plaintiff was deemed a vexatious litigant. (Mot. p. 3-4.) The most recent 2 subpoenas were issued under a completely different case number (22STCV37929), which is a second action Plaintiff has filed.  Nothing precludes the individuals targeted in the subpoenas to attend and/or appear for deposition. This response from the AG clearly shows their intention to oppress Plaintiff and to impede all her attempts to seek legal redress for the wrongs done against her.
While Plaintiff has not raised any claims as to these 4 subpoenas, it is worth noting that the Board has served relevant objections on Plaintiff for each subpoena. (Decl. ¶ 9; Exh. D.)  Plaintiff has established how the BRN acted in bad faith. First, the BRN cannot revoke Plaintiffs license for an accusation based on the events of August 28, 2020, yet Kaiser cannot answer the Request for Admission of Facts. Besides, the Judge stayed discovery, and a Motion to Deem Facts Admitted was filed for July 2023. This shows that they lied. Further, the AG files frivolous objections to Plaintiff’s deposition subpoenas, which are sent as a matter of right.
As Plaintiff is not entitled discovery or discovery sanctions under section 2023.030, the Court should deny the Motion outright on this basis. Furthermore, as Plaintiff has not met even the most basic procedural requirements to seek discovery sanctions, the Court should deny the Motion on this basis as well. Every party to an action is entitled to disovery as a matter of right. See Greyhound v. Superior Court (1961), 56 Cal.2d 355, 388. Plaintiff has also met the procedural requirement to seek discovery sanctions.  Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions was in full compliance with CA Civ. Pro Code § 2023.040 (2019), which provides guidelines on motions for sanctions. First, Plaintiffs motion had a Notice of Motion, duly notifying the Defendant and the Court that she intended to file a Motion for Sanctions against Defendant. Next, Plaintiff included a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the motion. Next, Plaintiff also included a Declaration setting forth the facts supporting why the Defendant should pay sanctions. Plaintiff also provided a Proposed Order, where she specified the amount of Monetary Sanctions that should be awarded against the Defendant.
As neither section 128.5 nor section 2023.030 is applicable here, Plaintiff’s Motion for sanctions is unsupported by any legal authority and must be denied. Plaintiff also fails to meet the most basic procedural requirements for seeking sanctions under either statutory scheme. Even on the merits, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that any of the Board’s actions are sanctionable.  Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions was in full compliance with CA Civ. Pro Code § 2023.040 (2019), which provides guidelines on motions for sanctions. First, Plaintiffs motion had a Notice of Motion, duly notifying the Defendant and the Court that she intended to file a Motion for Sanctions against Defendant. Next, Plaintiff included a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the motion. Next, Plaintiff also included a Declaration setting forth the facts supporting why the Defendant should pay sanctions. Plaintiff also provided a Proposed Order, where she specified the amount of Monetary Sanctions that should be awarded against the Defendant.
Notably, it is Plaintiff’s own actions—in bringing this baseless Motion and repeatedly issuing frivolous subpoenas to the Board when she is not entitled to discovery—that fit the very bill for sanctionable conduct.  Contrary to the AG’s assertion, Plaintiff’s motion is not baseless. The subpoenas are also not frivolous. It is trite law that every party to an action may take depositions as a matter of right. See Greyhound v. Superior Court (1961), 56 Cal.2d 355, 388; see also Kramer v. Superior Court (1965), 237 Cal.App.2d 753, 755; and Goodman v. Citizens Life & Cas. Ins. Co. (1967), 253 Cal.App.2d 807, 819. It follows; it is Plaintiff’s right to send the deposition subpoenas.
A motion for sanctions brought under section 128.5 “primarily for an improper purpose, such as to harass or cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation may itself be subject to a sanctions motion.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 128.5, subd. (g).) Plaintiff’s motion was never meant to harass the BRN or cause unnecessary delay. Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030 authorizes a trial court to impose monetary sanctions, issue sanctions, evidence sanctions, or terminating sanctions against “anyone engaging in conduct that is a misuse of the discovery process.” See Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 991.
Furthermore, the court “may impose . . . sanctions against anyone engaging in conduct that is a misuse of the discovery process.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030.) For the above reasons, the Board respectfully requests the Court to deny Plaintiff’s Motion with prejudice. Contrary to the AG’s assertion, it is the BRN that should be sanctioned for misusing the discovery process. Notably, Plaintiff sent a Subpoena to Christina Vasquez and Ryan Marcroft. Plaintiff also filed a Declaration of Due Diligence acknowledging the process server’s futile attempts to serve Christina Vasquez. However, the AG sent frivolous objections to the deposition subpoenas, in an attempt to stifle Plaintiff’s intention to have the truth laid bare in Court.

 

 

 

 

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