IN THE DISTRICT COURT
HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
JUDICIAL DISTRICT
MARTIESA SMITH §
Plaintiff, §
§
v. § Cause No.: 4:21-cv-03134
§
HARRIS HEALTH SYSTEM; and §
PRECIOUS ONYEWUENYI §
Defendants. §
PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED PETITION AND REQUEST FOR DISCLOSURES
Plaintiff, Martiesa C. Smith proceeding pro se, brings this action pursuant to Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e et. seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981a, the
Civil Service Reform Act, 29 USC § 621, et. seq., to remedy acts of employment discrimination
perpetrated against her by Precious Onyewuenyi, a Harris Health System Employee.
Plaintiff contends that Precious (Nigerian) discriminated against her by speaking in her native
language with another employee about her then speaking in English calling her a black girl
because of her race (African American) and age (over 40). Plaintiff further asserts that
management did nothing upon her making her first complaint against Precious for making a
discriminatory statement. Precious was then allowed to perform a second count of discrimination
towards the plaintiff by speaking in her native language with a patient of the hospital and then
speaking in English by calling her the American. Plaintiff being discriminated against created a
hostile working environment for her, caused her to suffer mental anguish, failed to provide
reasonable accommodation, and finally, terminated her Federal service employment when the
discrimination caused her incapacity.
PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT AND REQUEST FOR DISCLOSURES 2
I. DISCOVERY LEVEL
1. Pursuant to Rule 15.017, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, this is a level 3 case.
II. REQUEST FOR DISCLOSURES
2. Pursuant to Rule 42, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, you are requested to disclose,
within 50 days of service of this request, all information required by these Rules.
III. PARTIES
3. Plaintiff is an individual who resides in Matagorda County, Texas.
4. Defendant is an entity that does business and resides in Harris County, Texas.
IV. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
5. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this civil action pursuant to Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Venue is proper in this judicial
district under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3; as Plaintiff was employed by Harris Health System in
Houston, Texas at the time of discrimination, and decisions adverse to Plaintiff’s
employment that are the subject of this civil action were made in this judicial district. The
damages claimed in this complaint do not exceed the jurisdictional limits of this Court.
V. FACTS ALLEGED
6. On or around October 7, 2020 the defendant Precious Onyewuenyi a Harris health
System employee discriminated against the plaintiff Martiesa Smith by calling her a
PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT AND REQUEST FOR DISCLOSURES 3
black girl in English after speaking with another co-worker in her native language
(Nigerian).
7. On or around October 8, 2020, the plaintiff Martiesa Smith emailed upper management
Robyn Williams (Nurse Manager) and Marguerite Adeltunji about the discrimination
statement informing them this is not the first time of her hearing Precious Onyewuenyi
making discriminatory statements towards her.
8. On or around October 13, 2020, the defendant Precious Onyewuenyi a Harris Health
System employee discriminated against the plaintiff Martiesa Smith by calling her the
American after speaking in her native language (Nigerian) with a patient of the hospital.
9. On or around October 14, 2020, the plaintiff Martiesa Smith emailed upper management
Robyn Williams (Nurse Manager) about the second discrimination statement informing
her that this time included a patient at the hospital.
10. On or around November 28, 2020, the plaintiff Martiesa Smith was forced to resign due
to being discriminated against and Harris Health System not honoring their policy that it
states an employee shall not be discriminated against based on race, color, religion, sex
(including sexual orientation, gender identity, or pregnancy), national origin, older age
(beginning at age 40), disability, or genetic information (including family medical
history). Employment discrimination that violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).
VI. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:
PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT AND REQUEST FOR DISCLOSURES 4
(Racial Discrimination in Violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC
2000e et. seq.)
11. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all prior allegations in this Petition as if fully set
forth here.
12. Courts recognize two types of Title VII employment discrimination cases, each requiring
different elements of proof. The first type is the "pretext" case, in which the plaintiff’s
ultimate goal is to show that the employer’s stated reason for the adverse action was a
pretext for discrimination. Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
256, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 802-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).
13. The plaintiff can usually provide sufficient evidence of discriminatory intent by showing
that the employer’s proffered reason for the adverse action is false. Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141-149, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2106-2109, 147 L.Ed.2d
105 (2000).
14. The second type of case is the "mixed-motive" case, in which the plaintiff has direct
evidence of discriminatory animus. This direct evidence shifts the burden of proof to the
employer to show that legitimate reasons would have led to the same decision regardless
of any discriminatory motives. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244-45, 109
S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989); Starceski v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 54 F.3d
1089, 1095-99 (3rd Cir.1995).
15. Thus, how a case will be classified depends entirely upon the presence or absence of
direct evidence. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 276, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (to qualify for mixed-motive treatment, a plaintiff "must show by direct
PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT AND REQUEST FOR DISCLOSURES 5
evidence that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the decision"); Starceski,
54 F.3d at 1097 ("[T]he distinction between a Price Waterhouse and a McDonnell
Douglas/Burdine case lies in the kind of proof the employee produces on the issue of
bias.").
16. If the plaintiff has only circumstantial evidence of discrimination, it will be classified as a
pretext case regardless of how many motives the employer had. Starceski, 54 F.3d at
1097-98; Mooney v. Aramco Servs. Co., 54 F.3d 1207, 1216 (5th Cir.1995).
17. The Supreme Court defined the order and allocation of proof for a pretext case in
McDonnell Douglas and Burdine. Initially, the complainant must establish a prima facie
case of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817.
18. Although the precise elements of this showing will vary depending on the allegations, id.,
the plaintiff’s burden at this stage of the case "is not onerous." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253,
101 S.Ct. 1089.
19. The burden of going forward then shifts to the employer to "articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection." McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at
802, 93 S.Ct. 1817.
20. The offer of a legitimate reason eliminates the presumption of discrimination created by
the plaintiff’s prima facie showing. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089.
21. The burden then shifts back to the complainant to show that the employer’s stated reason
was a pretext for discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805-07, 93 S.Ct. 1817;
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089.
22. Under the original Civil Rights Act of 1964, federal courts required the complainant in a
pretext case to prove that "but for" the impermissible discrimination, the employer would
PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT AND REQUEST FOR DISCLOSURES 6
not have taken the action against the complainant. See, e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282 n. 10, 96 S.Ct. 2574, 49 L.Ed.2d 493 (1976) (employing
the "but for" test in dicta); Kauffman v. Sidereal Corp., 695 F.2d 343, 345 (9th Cir.1982);
Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1112 (4th Cir.1981).
23. But when the Supreme Court first recognized mixed-motive cases under the 1964 Act, it
decided to apply a different causal standard. In a mixed-motive case, the Court held, a
plaintiff needed only to establish that the employer’s discriminatory intent was "a
motivating part" in the employment decision. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-45, 109
S.Ct. 1775.
24. The Defendant’s conduct as alleged at length herein constitutes discrimination based on
race in violation of Title VII. The stated reasons for the Defendant’s conduct were not the
true reasons, but instead were pretext to hide the Defendant’s discriminatory animus.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION:
(Age Discrimination in Violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29
USC 621)
25. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all prior allegations in this Petition as if fully set
forth here.
26. The Defendant’s conduct as alleged above constitutes age discrimination against the
Plaintiff because she engaged in activities protected by Title VII and ADEA. The stated
reasons for the Defendant’s conduct were not the true reasons, but instead were pretext to
hide the Defendant’s retaliatory animus.
PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT AND REQUEST FOR DISCLOSURES 7
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION:
(Reprisal for Engaging in Protected Activities)
27. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all prior allegations in this Petition as if fully set
forth here.
28. The Defendant’s conduct as alleged above constitutes retaliation against the Plaintiff
because she engaged in activities protected by Title VII and ADEA. The stated reasons
for the Defendant’s conduct were not the true reasons, but instead were pretext to hide the
Defendant’s retaliatory animus.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION:
(Hostile and Abusive Working Environment)
29. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all prior allegations in this Petition as if fully set
forth here.
30. The Defendant’s conduct as alleged above constitutes hostile and abusive working
environment against the Plaintiff because she engaged in activities protected by Title VII
and ADEA. The stated reasons for the Defendant’s conduct were not the true reasons, but
instead were pretext to hide the Defendant’s discriminatory animus.
VII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests the following relief:
(a) The sum of $300,000 in compensatory damages suffered because of the discrimination.
(b) An award of post-judgment interest on any money damages awarded at the current
statutory rate.
PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT AND REQUEST FOR DISCLOSURES 8
(c) Plaintiff’s reasonable costs and disbursements for bringing this action.
(d) Any and all other relief the Court deems just and reasonable under the circumstances.
(e) Costs and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred with this lawsuit with interest thereon; and
(f) Other damages and relief as deemed just.
VIII. JURY DEMAND
The Plaintiff requests trial by jury.
Dated this ____ day of October, 2022.
Respectfully Submitted,
___________________________________
Martiesa Smith
P.O. Box 268
Bay City, TX 77414
979-479-6193
mardiee@yahoo.com
Plaintiff, pro se
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