IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
FIFTH DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 22-1571

SERBRENA ALSTON,
Appellant,
v.

DENVAL A. GREEN,
Appellee.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Lower Tribunal Case No. 2020-DR-003703-O/2019-DR-01669-O

SERBRENA ALSTON
P.O. Box 691603
Orlando, FL 32869
Petitioner, pro se

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii
INTRODUCTION 1
STATEMENT OF FACTS 1
ARGUMENT 4
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 4
II. APPELLANT WAS DENIED HER RIGHT TO FAIR HEARING 5
i. The Court adopted and relied on forged documents 5
ii. Appellant was denied her right to be heard 6
III. THERE WAS INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 7
CONCLUSION 10
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 11_Toc115065825
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 12

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases
Bolin v. State, 41 So.3d 151, 155 (Fla. 2010) 8
Dobson v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 217 So. 3d 1173, 1174 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) 5
Fleming v. Demps, 918 So. 2d 982, 984 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) 5
Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So.2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986) 8
Pettry v. Pettrey, 706 So. 2d 107, 108 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) 6
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) 7
Walker v. Edel, 727 So. 2d 359 at 360–61 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) 6
Walker v. Edel, 727 So. 2d 359, 360–61 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) 5
Zinger v. Gattis, 382 So. 2d 379, 380 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980) 5

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INTRODUCTION

Appellant appeals the decision of the Circuit Court of the Ninth Judicial
District, Orange County, Florida, which order was issued on June 1, 2022. The said
decision modified the Court’s previous Order granting Appellant’s Petition for
Injunction, by directing that time sharing shall be controlled by the related
dissolution of marriage case, in which case the court issued a judgment based on
falsified documents.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Petitioner and the Respondent were married, and had three children out of
the marriage namely, Najeera lmani Green DOB 12/14/2009; Naima Lee Green DOB
8/6/2014; and Denval Anthony Green II DOB 4/21/2016. In the course of the
marriage, the Petitioner was subjected to violence from the Respondent.
On December 19, 2019, Appellant initiated a Petition for Injunction at the
Circuit Court of the Ninth Judicial District, Orange County, Florida (2019-DR-
01669-O).
On March 30, 2020, Appellee filed a Petition for Dissolution of Marriage with
Minor Children, at Circuit Court of the Ninth Judicial District, Orange County,
Florida (2020-DR-03707-O).
On November 16, 2020, a Marital Settlement Agreement (hereinafter
“Mediation Agreement”) was filed in the Court. Appellant’s previous counsel,
Tichiena Tucker, had signed the agreement without Appellant’s consent.

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On or about February 5, 2021, the Court (for case 2019-DR-01669-O) issued
an Order granting Appellant’s Petition for Injunction, which order directed the
Appellee to, inter alia, to avoid domestic violence against the Appellant; to have no
hostile contact with Appellant; and to surrender all firearms to the sheriff’s
department; the order was a custody order; and the amount and method of payment
of child support or alimony shall be controlled by the related dissolution of marriage
case (2020-DR-03707-O). The Court also granted Appellant to have 100% of the
time-sharing with the parties’ minor children, and have sole decision making
responsibility thereof.
On or about February 12, 2021, the Court (for case 2020-DR-03707-O) issued
an order for dissolution of the marriage. In the said order, the Court ordered inter
alia, that the former marital home be listed for sale; the Appellee pay Appellant
ongoing monthly child support until June 1, 2034; Appellee pay directly to Appellant
durational alimony per month for one (1) year with the option to pay the alimony in
full in a one-time payment; and the parenting plan as attached to the judgment.
On or about February 15, 2021, the Court (for case 2019-DR-01669-O) also
granted Appellant’s motion for Judge Christy C. Collins to be recused. On or about
March 3, 2020, the Court reassigned the case from Judge Christy Collins (Division
44) to Judge Barbra Leach (Division 45). The case was therefore merged with case
2020-DR-03707-O.
On or about March 16, 2021, Appellant filed a Motion to Set Aside the

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Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage with Dependent Children on the grounds that
she did not sign the mediated parenting plan and marital settlement agreement;
Appellant tried to object to the mediated parenting plan and marital settlement
agreement; Appellant had filed a motion to throw out the Mediation Agreement; the
Ninth Circuit denied the motion to throw out the mediation agreement without
granting a hearing of the matter; Appellant’s counsel withdrew her services a week
before the hearing on the dissolution of marriage, without seeking continuance of the
hearing; and there was newly discovered evidence.
Appellant filed a motion for a temporary order allowing relocation with minor
children on April 6, 2021 because the former marital home was to be sold on April 9,
2021, which caused an emergency situation for Appellant and her children.
On or about March 30, 2021, the Appellant filed a motion to continue the
temporary relocation hearing scheduled on April 6, 2021. In the motion, Appellant,
through counsel, raised various concerns namely, the ruling on the Motion to Set
Aside the dissolution of marriage was done without an evidentiary hearing;
Appellant never gave permission to her former counsel to sign the Marital Settlement
Agreement; Appellant’s former attorney appeared in the hearing on the dissolution of
marriage as an adverse witness; Appellant’s counsel attempts to depose the opposing
attorney and former Appellant’s attorney were not meant to harass the attorney but to
legitimately investigate fraud; and the Appellant’s former attorney’s motion for
protective order as to the subpoena for deposition should be heard at an evidentiary

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hearing before the motion to temporarily relocate;.
On or about June 1, 2022, the Court entered a Nunc Pro Tunc order modifying
the decision issued on February 5, 2021, which decision granted Appellant’s Petition
for Injunction. In the order, the Court inter alia, that time sharing shall be controlled
by the related dissolution of marriage case (2020DR03707-O).
On or about June 29, 2022, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal of the decision
entered on June 1, 2022.
On July 1, 2022, the Fifth District Court of Appeal (Case No. 5D22-1571)
issued an order directing Appellant to file an Amended Notice of Appeal by
attaching the June 1, 2022 order to the Notice of Appeal.
On or about August 22, 2022, the Appellant filed a Motion for extension of
time to file an Initial Brief.
Appellant hereby files the instant Appeal Brief.
ARGUMENT

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The de novo standard of review generally applies to a trial court’s non-
evidentiary post-judgment decisions, excessively delayed orders, due process
violations, factual findings thereunder, and challenges on the need for an evidentiary
hearing. Dobson v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 217 So. 3d 1173, 1174 (Fla. 5th DCA
2017) (whether a trial court violated due process rights is subject to de novo review).
II. APPELLANT WAS DENIED HER RIGHT TO FAIR HEARING

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Constitutional due process requires every trial court to provide every person
with certain fairness and procedural safeguards throughout a court proceeding. Due
process requires that a trial court shall not turn evidence on its head through the
misapplication of law, misinterpreting its legal effect. See Zinger v. Gattis, 382 So.
2d 379, 380 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980) (reversing where ruling was contrary to the legal
effect of the evidence). Due process also requires that a trial court shall not make
decisions without giving parties an opportunity to be heard, call witnesses in their
favor, and question witnesses speaking against them. See Walker v. Edel, 727 So. 2d
359, 360–61 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (reversing on error that trial court did not provide
full evidentiary hearing on all issues).
Further, in almost any matter, “[d]ue process requires that a party be given the
opportunity to be heard and to testify and call witnesses on his [or her] behalf, and
the denial of this right is fundamental error.” Fleming v. Demps, 918 So. 2d 982, 984
(Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (quoting Pettry v. Pettrey, 706 So. 2d 107, 108 (Fla. 5th DCA
1998)); Walker v. Edel, 727 So. 2d 359 at 360–61 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (reversing on
fundamental error that trial court did not have evidentiary hearing and substantial
competent evidence on family law issues).
i. The Court adopted and relied on forged documents
Tichiena Tucker (hereinafter “Ms. Tucker”), Appellant’s former counsel,
forged the mediation agreement and parenting plan, which were submitted to court
and adopted. Joseph Knape, Appellee’s counsel, came up with the parenting time

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schedule, in which he gave Appellee Friday night through Sunday night
unsupervised visitation, and used a blank signature page. The counsel could therefore
have attached any schedule that he wanted because he had that blank signature page
with Appellant’s fraudulent/forged signature on it. Accordingly, Appellant avers that
the counsel gave Appellee an opportunity to pick an unsupervised visitation
schedule. Appellant had never signed any of these documents and had never agreed
to the terms of the said documents. It is also instrumental to note that Ms. Tucker and
Mr. Knape went to the same law school.
Appellant had given Ms. Tucker a list of what she expected on her divorce.
This is the reason why during mediation, the parties could not agree because none of
the things that were on the list that Appellant gave to Ms. Tucker were in the
proposed agreement. Ms. Tucker was then frustrated with Appellant because she
(Appellant) would not bend on what she wanted out of the divorce. Consequently,
Appellant only learnt that the mediation agreement was submitted to the court on
November 16, 2020, without her knowledge or consent. The mediation agreement
had the effect of inter alia, cutting Appellee’s child support obligations to $338.72.
Ms. Tucker also submitted a parenting agreement, which gave the Appellee (a
confessed domestic barterer) unsupervised visitation every Friday-Sunday, which
parenting agreement Appellant did not sign.
Further, Mr Knape, Appellee’s counsel, proposed that Appellant’s injunction
be changed to non-hostile in his last minute parenting plan. A judge did not write

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that in an order until after Mr. Knape submitted the parenting plan to the court
months after two signatures were forged onto the “blank signature page”.
Appellant attempted to notify the court that she had neither given her consent
nor signed the Mediation Agreement and the Parenting Agreement. However, the
Court still adopted the forged documents.
It follows; this Court’s adoption and reliance on the forged documents abused
Appellant’s due process right to a fair hearing.
ii. Appellant was denied her right to be heard
Appellant’s counsel withdrew her services a week before the hearing on the
dissolution of marriage, without seeking continuance of the hearing. The Court
therefore proceeded with the hearing for the dissolution of the marriage without
Appellant having an attorney to protect her rights.
It is also noteworthy that Ms. Tucker, who was Appellant’s former attorney,
appeared in the hearing on the dissolution of marriage as an adverse witness. Ms.
Tucker lied to the court (and the court adopted Ms. Tucker’s lies), that Appellant had
signed the Marital Agreement and the Parenting Agreement, which documents
Appellant never signed since she did not agree to the terms thereof.
III. THERE WAS INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), courts in Florida have explained that
the following two factors must be established in order to prevail on ineffective

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assistance of counsel claims: First, the claimant must identify particular acts or
omissions of the lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably
competent performance under prevailing professional standards. Second, the clear,
substantial deficiency shown must further be demonstrated to have so affected the
fairness and reliability of the proceeding that confidence in the outcome is
undermined. Bolin v. State, 41 So.3d 151, 155 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Maxwell v.
Wainwright, 490 So.2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986)).
Under Florida law, the courts have found a strong presumption that trial
counsel’s performance was not deficient. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct.
2052. “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made
to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of
counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s
perspective at the time.” Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
In the instant action, Appellant was referred to Ms. Tucker on or about January
of 2020. Appellant signed a retainer with the said counsel. Consequently, the counsel
frequently talked to Appellant by phone about her case. She also told Appellant to
give her a list of what she expected from her divorce, which Appellant did. Ms.
Tucker then contacted Appellant with a mediation date and time.
On the day of mediation, there were technical issues, which the mediator was
aware of. During mediation, the parties could not agree because none of the things
that were on the list that Appellant gave to Ms. Tucker was in the proposed

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agreement. Appellant avers that Ms. Tucker was frustrated with her because she
would not bend on what she wanted out of the divorce.
Later on, Appellant was sent the mediation agreement, which Appellant read
and immediately told Ms. Tucker that she was NOT signing it. As already discussed
above, the agreement was then filed in court without Appellant’s knowledge or
consent.
A few months later a parenting plan was submitted and accepted to the courts
without Appellant’s signature since Appellant had refused to sign the documents.
Thereafter, Ms. Tucker advised Appellant to sell her home. Ms. Tucker went on to
state that most courts would not give the wife the house forever. Accordingly,
Appellant felt like she had no choice but to go along with the Appellee and his
counsel in selling the home.
After Appellant’s refusal to sign the mediation agreement, Ms. Tucker stopped
talking to Appellant. Appellant tried contacting Ms. Tucker and her assistant for
weeks then in early December 2020 Ms. Tucker called Appellant asking if she had
listed her house for sale. She went on to state that Appellee’s counsel was filing a
motion for contempt on Appellant that day and that she (Appellant) would have to
explain to the Judge why she did not list the property in the hearing for the contempt
that was being filed on Appellant that day.
Ms. Tucker never gave Appellant a notice of the contempt hearing nor did she
give Appellant the virtual login information for the hearing. Appellant therefore had

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to email the Judge’s assistant to get information on the hearing.
In the hearing, the presiding judge said that she would subpoena Ms. Tucker
since Appellant told Judge Collins that she (Appellant) did not sign that mediation
agreement. Ms. Tucker testified against Appellant at the motion for contempt hearing
on February 05, 2021. She also presented Judge Collins, her assistant, and opposing
counsel emails that were protected under the attorney-client privilege. Ms. Tucker
then lied to the court that Appellant had appended her signature on the mediation
agreement.
Further, Ms. Tucker testified against Appellant again at Appellant’s relocation
hearing April 2021. She said that Appellant signed a parenting agreement giving the
Appellee (a confessed domestic barterer) unsupervised visitation every Friday-
Sunday, which parenting agreement Appellant did not sign.
Ms. Tucker has also refused to give-Appellant a copy of her file, and has
demanded exorbitant fees, yet Ms. Tucker assisted Appellant in filing her indigent
forms.
Appellant notes that Ms. Tucker has since been fired by Legal Aid and has not
worked in any other law firm, which further proves her incompetence. Also, Judge
Collins was rescued from Appellant’s case then went back on it a year later and
signed an order against Appellant after Appellant made a complaint against the Judge
complaining of the retaliation on her part.
As a result of the Trial Court’s adopting the forged documents filed by Ms.

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Tucker, and relying on Ms. Tucker’s lies to the Court, Appellant’s children have
been diagnosed with extreme PTSD and are homeless. Appellant borrows money just
to get by day to day The Court’s failure to find fault with Ms. Tucker, and the court’s
further reliance on Ms. Tucker’s representation denied Appellant justice. This
Honorable Court should reverse the Court’s Order in that regard.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the lower court decision
and remand with appropriate directions. The Court should also issue any other order
it deems just.

Respectively submitted this day of __________ 2022:

____________________________
SERBRENA ALSTON
P.O. Box 691603
Orlando, FL 32869
Petitioner, pro se

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that this brief complies with the font requirements set
forth in Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.210(a)(2) by using Times New
Roman 14-point font.

____________________________
SERBRENA ALSTON
P.O. Box 691603
Orlando, FL 32869
Petitioner, pro se

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, SERBRENA ALSTON, do hereby affirm that I placed a copy of the
foregoing document in the United States Postal Service for mailing to the entity
named below on this day of , 2022.

[ENTER RESPONDENT’S ADDRESS]

____________________________
SERBRENA ALSTON
P.O. Box 691603
Orlando, FL 32869
Petitioner, pro se

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