Katie Wahlstrom
1112 W 2450 S,
Nibley, UT 84321
Respondent, Pro Se


In the Matter of the Marriage of:

Hearing Requested
Civil No. 204700023
Judge Jennifer Valencia
Commissioner Christina Wilson

Respondent, Katie Wahlstrom, pro se, moves this Court pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. §
60(b) subsections (1), (3), (4) and (5) for an order to set aside the order appointing the Special
Master as well as all orders issued by the Special Master in regard to this case, and for cause
would show this Honorable Court as follows:


On August 23, 2023 Judge Jennifer Valencia signed an Order Resolving Petition to
Modify and Motion to Enforce drafted by Petitioner purportedly based upon certain
agreements reached in a Mediation that was held a year earlier, on August 30, 2022, resolving
the issues a raised in the Petition to modify the parties’ Decree of Divorce, Parenting Plan,
and Holiday and Parent-Time Schedules verified on August 29, 2022 and filed by the
Petitioner (“Petition to Modify”). The Order allegedly incorporated agreements first
memorialized in a Stipulation drafted by Petitioner on August 30, 2022 (the “Stipulation”).”
A review of the sequence of documents shows a mis-match in time, in as much as the
Order Resolving Petition to Modify and Motion to Enforce (the “Order”) was the document
that authorizes the appointment of a Special Master, yet this was not so-ordered until August
23, 2023, despite the filing of six (6) orders prior to that date that were contingent on the
August 23, 2023 Order.

This motion will be decided by the
court commissioner at an
upcoming hearing. If you do not
appear at the hearing, the Court
might make a decision against you
without your input. In addition,
you may file a written response at
least 14 days before the hearing.


Moreover, Respondent never saw the proposed Order or the Stipulation that such
Order was based upon, until this year, at which time she did not approve of their contents and
did not authorize her signature on any of them.
It is for this reason, along with those set forth below, Respondent respectfully
requests the above-listed documents be set aside.


Contractual principles indicate “there can be no contract without a meeting of the
minds.” See Ashby v. Ashby, 2010 UT 7, ¶ 21, 227 P.3d 246. Regarding stipulations
specifically, “it has been said that unless it is clear from the record that the parties assented,
there is no stipulation.” and that “Basic to a valid stipulation is a meeting of the minds of
those involved” Brown v. Brown, 744 P.2d 333 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987).
At no time prior to August 1, 2023, did Respondent ever see the Stipulation she is
alleged to have consented to, on which date she both first saw the Stipulation and Proposed
Order incorporating the provisions of the Stipulation, the latter of which was emailed to to her
for her “approval” which she did not provide.
Nonetheless, Petitioner proceeded to move forward and presented the Proposed Order
to Judge Jennifer Valencia to so-order. Petitioner represented such Proposed Order was on
consent possibly overtly by affirmatively advising the Court as much, and most certainly by
implication, due to the contents of such Order having first been allegedly agreed upon by both
parties due to its nature as a Stipulation. The Proposed Order was signed by Judge Valencia
on August 23, 2023. The misrepresentation that Respondent was in agreement with the
contents of the Order constitute a fraud on this Court. Such Order is eligible to be set aside
pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b), under subsection (1) due to surprise and under subsection
(3) by fraud or “misrepresentation or other misconduct of an opposing party.” The facts
described above implicate both subsections.
As previously stated, on August 1, 2023, Petitioner’s office emailed Respondent
seeking her consent to the Proposed Order that supposedly was based on previously agreed
upon provisions memorialized in the Stipulation. Less then 15 minutes later, Respondent
indicated she would not be providing her consent to enter/so-order the presented Proposed
Order. Respondent provided her proposed changes to the Proposed Order on the following
day by email (see Exhibit “A” annexed hereto) in which she as well expressed her
understanding that she had additional time to object to the Proposed Order pursuant to Utah


R. Civ. P. § 74(c), based upon the 21 days moratorium on hearings after the filing of a Notice
to Appear or Appoint Counsel. 1
The next communication from Petitioner’s counsel was received August 10, 2023,
indicating the proposed Order was filed with a Request to Submit. Respondent believed and
believes that Rule 74(c) would bar Petitioner’s counsel from submitting the Proposed Order
until at least August 20, 2023, allowing her time to file her objections to the Order if her
suggestions to change the Stipulation were not incorporated. When Respondent
communicated as much to Petitioner’s counsel, she received in response an email indicating
they were “in full compliance with the rules” (see Exhibit “B” annexed hereto). Respondent
submits that the spirit, if not the letter of Rule 74(c) was violated, making the Order “void
under rule 60(b)(4) if … the judgment was entered without the notice required by due
process.” (Judson v. Wheeler RV Las Vegas, LLC, 2012 UT 6, ¶ 18, 270 P.3d 456).
In any event, as referenced above, Utah R. Civ. P. § 60(b)(3) allows an Order to be
vacated in instances of fraud. Conduct may be found to constitute a fraud on the court, upon
establishing a party engaged in an “intentional act by a party in a divorce action which
prevents the opposing party from making a full defense” (see Kartchner v. Kartchner, 334
P.3d 1, 2014 UT App. 195, 767 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Utah Ct. App. 2014)). By ignoring
Respondent’s clearly expressed objections to the Proposed
Order, and at the least implicitly, if not overtly indicating to the Court that the Proposed Order
was based upon an agreement by the parties that was never reached. As expressed, and as
Petitioner was aware, Respondent would not have consented to the “resolutions” set forth in
the Stipulation over a year ago, had she seen the document at that time, but was never
afforded the opportunity to do so.
The part of the Stipulation that the Respondent takes particular issues with concerns
the submission of issues from the Petition to Modify to the Special Master for resolution. This
provision was added to the Stipulation after seven (7) hours of mediation despite the
Respondent’s having been advised the mediation would take 1-2 hours by counsel, and being
physically absent at the very moment Respondent had to step away to collect their child in
common from school, a regular commitment Petitioner was well aware would occur and what
time it would occur at. Upon Respondent’s return to the mediation, she now was providing
care to an active 6-year-old, in addition to attempting to focus on the mediation. The timing of
the insertion of this provision into the Stipulation supports an inference that Respondent was
fraudulently misled by Petitioner in addition to the conduct referenced above.
When certain issues are addressed without the direct guidance of the Court and
instead negotiated by the parties, such negotiations must be conducted in good faith; “in

1 The Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel was filed on July 30, 2023.


effect, the parties ‘are held to the highest degree of good faith, honesty, and candor’” (Reese
v. Reese, 1999 UT 75, ¶ 24, 984 P.2d 987). The potentially deceptive tactics employed by
Petitioner as described above, certainly depart from any good faith standard.
The facts as well support an inference that any consent to the Stipulation was
obtained under duress. Respondent held a reasonable expectation, as indicated by her
attorney, that the mediation would be a short, 1-2 hour affair. Respondent repeatedly
expressed her concerns and desire to end the mediation but was assured by both attorneys and
the Special Master they were “so close” to a resolution that she should continue. In Brown,
Supra the court found the stipulation at issue therein not
to hold up when Mrs. Brown was silent during an extra-judicial proceeding. Here,
Respondent’s many objections to continuing the mediation were not taken seriously, despite
her being mentally exhausted, physically not present while she was collecting
the party’s daughter, and having a 6-year-old divert her remaining ability to pay attention for
the last 1.5 hours of the mediation. This resulted in the Respondent being even more
unavailable than Mrs. Brown.
While it can be said that Respondent was represented by counsel, she was not
represented by competent counsel, with Ms. Rasch repeatably advising her incorrectly or
imprudently. Respondent was advised that any change of the original decree was not in the
realm of a Special Master’s powers so no agreements reached would be able to disturb the
original decree. Ms. Racsh also assured her that the mediation would be brief, stating “one
hour is plenty for the courts,” in response to Respondent’s concerns.
The Petition to modify the parties’ Decree of Divorce, Parenting Plan, and Holiday and
Parent-Time Schedules was only sent to Respondent the evening prior to the mediation,
careless conduct that shows a pattern of ineffective assistance of counsel culminating in Ms.
Rasch’s providing permission to include Respondent’s signature on the Stipulation that she
had never seen or reviewed. Ms., Rasch was as well unresponsive to calls, emails, and all
attempts to reach her from September 2022 through May 2023, contacting Respondent only
once, to advise her the appointment of the Special Master could not be undone after
Respondent expressed her concerns, and sharing no documents. It was this conduct that led
Respondent to dismiss her as counsel after Respondent learned that the Special Master was
claiming to be able to change the decree on July 25, 2023. This was the first that respondent
heard of this.

Throughout the mediation process leading to the Stipulation and the subsequent
Proposed Order, Respondent was denied a fair opportunity for full disclosure and meaningful
participation. Petitioner’s actions, from presenting the Stipulation to the Court’s signing of the


Proposed Order, were marked by misrepresentation, lack of transparency, and alleged
misconduct, all of which run counter to the principles of fairness and justice that underpin our
legal system.
Until August 1, 2023, Respondent had never seen the Stipulation to which she is
alleged to have consented. On this date, she first encountered the Stipulation and the Proposed
Order, both presented simultaneously. Crucially, Respondent did not approve the Proposed
Order. Notwithstanding her lack of approval, Petitioner proceeded to present the Proposed
Order to Judge Jennifer Valencia for approval. This presentation was represented as a
consensual agreement, potentially overtly affirmed by Petitioner’s advisors. This
misrepresentation of Respondent’s agreement constitutes a significant legal error.
The misrepresentation of Respondent’s consent carries substantial implications for the
validity of the Proposed Order, making it susceptible to being set aside under Utah R. Civ. P.
60(b), especially under subsection (1) due to surprise and subsection (3) for fraud or
"misrepresentation or other misconduct of an opposing party."
The outlined facts reveal a substantial element of surprise. Respondent was taken
aback by the presentation of the Proposed Order as if it were a consensual agreement, despite
her clear disapproval. The element of surprise is exacerbated by the rapidity with which
Petitioner sought to finalize the Order after Respondent’s objections became clear.
Petitioner’s conduct in this case meets the criteria for fraud under Utah R. Civ. P.
60(b)(3). Fraud on the court involves "an intentional act by a party in a divorce action that
prevents the opposing party from making a full defense" (Kartchner v. Kartchner, 334 P.3d 1,
2014 UT App. 195, 767 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, Utah Ct. App. 2014). Petitioner’s actions, as
detailed earlier, squarely fit this definition.
Moreover, there are concerns about compliance with due process principles in this
case. Respondent’s objections and lack of consent to the Proposed Order were not adequately
addressed, and the Order was entered without the proper notice and opportunity to be heard.
This raises questions about whether the judgment was entered with the notice required by due
The sequence of events leading up to the presentation of the Proposed Order is worth
noting. On August 1, 2023, Petitioner’s office emailed Respondent seeking her consent to the
Proposed Order, supposedly based on previously agreed-upon provisions memorialized in the
Stipulation. In less than 15 minutes, Respondent indicated she would not provide her consent
to enter/so-order the Proposed Order.
Respondent, acting in good faith, believed that Rule 74(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure would prevent Petitioner’s counsel from submitting the Proposed Order until at
least August 20, 2023, allowing her time to file objections if her proposed changes to the


Stipulation were not incorporated. When Respondent conveyed this to Petitioner’s counsel,
she received an email asserting they were "in full compliance with the rules."

Misrepresentation in legal proceedings involves making false statements or
concealing material information to deceive or mislead parties or the court, which is a serious
ethical and legal violation undermining judicial integrity. It can take various forms, including
false statements, written misrepresentations, or omissions of vital facts.
Here, the Petitioner engaged in misrepresentation by falsely asserting that the
Respondent agreed with the Proposed Order’s contents, creating the appearance of consent
when none existed. The Respondent had never seen the Stipulation she allegedly consented to
before August 1, 2023, when she first saw both the Stipulation and the Proposed Order but
did not approve the latter, presented to the Court as if on consent.
The Petitioner misrepresented by implying that the Proposed Order was on consent,
reinforced by alleging prior agreement due to its nature as a Stipulation. Judge Jennifer
Valencia signed the Order on August 23, 2023, relying on this assertion.
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) allows challenging final judgments or orders, with subsection
(3) permitting relief based on fraud, misrepresentation, or opposing party misconduct, which
applies here. Misrepresentation under Rule 60(b)(3) necessitates showing intentional acts
preventing a full defense, squarely aligning with the Petitioner’s misrepresentation regarding
Misrepresentation in legal proceedings can rise to a fraud on the court, seriously
undermining judicial integrity. The Respondent argues the Petitioner’s conduct meets the
fraud on the court threshold, ignoring her objections to the Proposed Order and implying an
agreement never reached.
Misrepresentation hinges on failing to disclose material information. The Respondent
asserts the Petitioner concealed her lack of consent when presenting the Proposed Order to the
Court, a fundamental misrepresentation.
Misrepresentation can also occur through implication, as in this case, where the
Petitioner’s actions and alleged prior agreement created a strong implication of consent.
However, the Respondent did not approve, and this implied consent was based on false
Given these misrepresentations, the Respondent respectfully requests the Court
consider setting aside the Stipulation and Order.



Mediation, a vital alternative dispute resolution method, relies on fundamental
principles of fairness, transparency, and good faith negotiation. These principles are not only
essential for mediation’s success but are also enshrined in mediation rules. Unfortunately, the
Petitioner has violated these rules, undermining the essence of mediation and rendering the
mediated agreement voidable.
One core tenet of mediation is the principle of full disclosure, where parties must
provide complete and honest information for informed decision-making. However, the
Petitioner failed in this duty.
Prior to August 1, 2023, the Respondent had never seen the Stipulation to which she
is alleged to have consented. This lack of prior access to the Stipulation violates the principle
of full disclosure.
Furthermore, the Respondent objected to the Proposed Order shortly after its
presentation, indicating a lack of mutual assent. Despite this, the Petitioner presented the
Proposed Order to the Court as if on consent, constituting a breach of good faith negotiation
and disclosure.
This misrepresentation by the Petitioner, asserting the Respondent’s agreement with
the Order’s contents, goes beyond mediation rules; it constitutes fraud on this Court. Under
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b), a judgment or order may be set aside for fraud or misrepresentation,
clearly applicable here.
Such fraudulent conduct intentionally obstructed the Respondent’s ability to make a
full defense, underscoring the need for corrective action.
Concerns about duress and lack of voluntariness arise from the Respondent’s
participation in mediation. Repeatedly expressing her desire to end mediation, she felt
compelled to continue due to assurances of an imminent agreement and the expectation of a
brief mediation.
Additionally, her caregiving responsibilities during mediation further hindered her
effective participation, raising questions about the voluntariness of her consent to the
In light of these violations, this Court must take remedial action to address these
breaches of fairness and integrity:
i. Set Aside the Mediated Agreement: Given the mediation rule violations, the mediated
agreement in the Proposed Order should be set aside, as the Respondent did not provide full
and informed consent.
ii. Reevaluate the Mediation Process: This Court should reevaluate the mediation process,
ensuring future mediations adhere strictly to mediation rules and guidelines, potentially
appointing a new mediator and overseeing the process.


iii. Sanctions: Consider appropriate sanctions against the Petitioner for violating mediation
rules and misrepresentation to deter future misconduct.

The right to effective assistance of counsel is a constitutional cornerstone of our
justice system, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This
right extends to civil matters, especially when fundamental rights and substantial interests are
at stake. As the Supreme Court held in Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 (2011), the "right to be
heard by counsel" is crucial for a fair legal process.
To evaluate whether the Respondent’s constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel was violated, the Court applies the two-pronged test from Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984), requiring proof of both deficient performance by counsel and resulting
Examining the conduct of the Respondent’s attorney, Tamara Rasch, reveals multiple
instances of deficient performance in this case. Diligent preparation is a fundamental aspect
of effective representation. However, Rasch displayed a lack of diligence and thoroughness
throughout the proceedings, failing to meet the standard of reasonable investigation or
One glaring omission was Rasch’s failure to share the final stipulation and settlement
agreement, filed by opposing counsel on August 30, 2022, with the Respondent. The
Respondent only received this crucial document on August 1, 2023, via email from opposing
counsel. This omission deprived the Respondent of the opportunity to review and understand
the terms of the agreement, a clear violation of the duty to keep the client informed.
The Respondent sought clarification from her attorney regarding the agreement’s
wording, particularly concerning the Special Master’s powers. Instead of addressing her
concerns and providing guidance, Rasch inaccurately confirmed that the Special Master could
not change the decree. This misleading information compounded the Respondent’s confusion.
Effective communication between an attorney and their client is essential, yet Rasch
failed to maintain open lines of communication and respond promptly to the client’s inquiries.
The Respondent’s attempts to contact her attorney through numerous emails and phone calls
during October and November 2022 went unanswered.
During this period of unresponsiveness, opposing counsel took significant steps,
including sending a draft of the order on October 24, 2022, and filing a request/notice to
submit along with the proposed order on November 1, 2022. Verification shows that Rasch
received electronic notifications on her behalf but failed to relay this vital information to the
Respondent. The Respondent remained unaware of these developments until she became self-


Finally, on December 6, 2022, Rasch reached out to the Respondent, sending a copy
of the proposed order appointing a Special Master. Despite this belated communication,
Rasch still failed to respond to opposing counsel or make changes to the order to clarify its
terms and protect the decree, as she continued to provide inaccurate advice about the Special
Master’s powers.
Throughout the case, Rasch repeatedly assured the Respondent that the Special
Master could not change the decree, despite evidence to the contrary and the agreement’s
wording. These unwarranted reassurances influenced the Respondent’s decisions during
mediation and the acceptance of provisions in the Stipulation.
These instances collectively depict legal representation falling short of constitutional
and ethical standards, creating a detrimental environment that prejudiced the Respondent’s
rights and interests.
The Constitution mandates competent representation to ensure fairness and justice. In
this case, counsel’s failures compromised the Respondent’s ability to make informed
decisions, participate effectively in mediation, and protect her interests.
Given the extensive evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel, this Honorable
Court should recognize these violations and rectify the injustices suffered by the Respondent.
Notably, before August 1, 2023, counsel did not ensure that the Respondent had the
opportunity to review the Stipulation. It was only on this date that the Respondent first saw
the Stipulation and the Proposed Order incorporating its provisions. This omission represents
deficient performance, as "counsel has a duty to be well-informed about the facts of the case."
Rasch demonstrated an inadequate understanding of procedural rules, leading to an
erroneous belief that the Respondent had more time to object to the Order than she actually
Legal representation encompasses not only understanding the law but also providing
accurate guidance. Unfortunately, Rasch failed to provide accurate advice on multiple
occasions, leading to misguided actions by the Respondent.
Rasch incorrectly advised the Respondent that any changes to the original divorce
decree were beyond the Special Master’s authority. This misrepresentation influenced her
decisions during mediation.
Rasch provided unwarranted assurances about the brevity of the mediation process,
discouraging the Respondent from asserting her objections forcefully.
Effective communication between an attorney and a client is vital, yet Rasch was
unresponsive to calls, emails, and attempts to reach her between September 2022 and May
Moreover, Rasch failed to share essential documents with the Respondent, further
impeding her understanding of the proceedings.


In Strickland, the Supreme Court noted that prejudice can be demonstrated when
"there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different."
The deficiencies in counsel’s performance significantly impacted the mediation
process and the subsequent Stipulation and Order. Had counsel performed competently, the
outcome might have been different.
Counsel’s misrepresentation regarding the Special Master’s powers and the duration
of mediation discouraged the Respondent from fully asserting her objections, resulting in
missed opportunities for negotiation.
The failure to provide the Respondent with the Stipulation before August 1, 2023,
deprived her of the opportunity to make informed decisions about its content.
The lack of diligence and understanding of procedural rules by counsel had a
detrimental impact on the Respondent’s ability to navigate the legal process effectively.
Counsel’s misunderstanding of procedural rules also hindered the Respondent’s ability
to invoke Rule 60(b)(4) effectively to challenge the validity of the Order based on due process
These deficiencies in counsel’s performance have had a profound and lasting impact
on the outcome of this case, prejudicing her interests and denying her fair representation, as
constitutionally entitled.

When determining if an agreement is unconscionable as a matter of law, a court may
consider a variety of factors including:
(1) whether each party had a reasonable opportunity to understand
the terms and conditions of the agreement, (2) whether there was a
lack of opportunity for meaningful negotiation, (3) whether the
agreement was printed on a duplicate or boilerplate form drafted solely
by the party in the strongest bargaining position, (4) whether the
terms of the agreement were explained to the weaker party, (5) whether
the aggrieved party had a meaningful choice or instead felt compelled to
accept the terms of the agreement, and (6) whether the stronger party
employed deceptive practices to obscure key contractual provisions.
(internal citations omitted) Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357 (Utah 1996)
The first two factors, as well as the fourth and fifth factors above, are relevant herein
as Respondent was physically absent and/or under duress, during key moments of the
mediation that resulted in the Stipulation. Respondent was forced to continue the mediation,


despite her frequent protests, based upon the assurances of the attorneys that the mediation
was almost over and the parties were “so close” to reaching an agreement.
Factor (6) is relevant based upon the fraudulent tactics or “deceptive practices”
Petitioner used as described previously. Factor (3) is implicated as the actual drafting of the
Stipulation was performed by opposing counsel and she was never shown the result until over
a year later. Petitioner cannot consent to that which she is unaware of, and “An
unconscionable agreement is not enforceable. Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455,
459-62 (Utah 1983).
The Stipulation (and Order) should as well be set aside as the Stipulation allows for
determinations to be made by the Special Master on issues that exceed the scope of her
The Petition to Modify seeks to modify the parties’ Decree of Divorce, Parenting
Plan, and Holiday and Parent-Time Schedules. The Stipulation indicates in ¶ 3 “[t]he parties
shall submit the issue regarding the exchange point for parent-time exchanges, as well as any
issues raised in the Petition to Modify to the special master for final resolution.”
Many issues are raised in the Petition to Modify, some raised due on the basis they
are in the best interests of the child; some requested modifications remain unidentified at “this
pleading stage of litigation” (see ¶ 34 of Petition to Modify).
The unspecific, blanket language used as referenced above, when read together,
potentially opens a loophole by which the Special Master can Modify the parties’ Decree of
Divorce, Parenting Plan, and Holiday and Parent-Time Schedules, despite the limitations set
forth in the Special Master Agreement which specifically states, “[t]he Special Master is not
able to make decisions modifying court orders” (see ¶ 1 of Special Master Agreement). Utah
R. Civ. P. § 53 allows for the limitation of powers of a Special Master by the parties. As the
parties have determined that the Special Master cannot modify court orders, there is a conflict
of authority necessitating the setting aside of the Stipulation.
Moreover, Utah R. Civ. P. § 53(b) sets forth the referral of issues to a Special Master
“be the exception and not the rule.” However, adherence to the Stipulation and Order would
make such the rule and not the exception, with the Special Master having made six (6)
decisions in two (2) months, including those that materially alter the Decree issued by this

Rule § 60(b)(5) allows for relief when “a prior judgment upon which it is based has
been reversed or vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application.” The Order (and Stipulation upon which it is based) sought to be set


aside contains the provision whereby the submission of certain issues to a Special Master and
their appointment is set forth. Therefore it stands to reason the granting of the main relief
requested herein requires that all subsequent orders and agreements be vacated as well, as
fruit from the poisonous tree.

This motion is being filed within a reasonable time in that the Respondent is seeking
the motion to be set aside for justifiable reasons as stated above. Also, Rule 60(b) requires
that a motion under the rule be filed within ninety (90) days after entry of the order, which in
this case would be by or before November 21, 2023, as the order was signed by Judge
Jennifer Valencia on August 23, 2023.
The Respondent’s Motion to Set Aside So-Ordered Stipulation was filed and served
upon all interested parties on September 12, 2023.


For the reasons set forth above pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. § 60(b) and principles set forth in
equity, Respondent respectfully requests an order set aside the order appointing the Special
Master as well as all orders issued by the Special Master in regard to this case.

Dated this 12 th day of September, 2023.

Respectfully Submitted,

Katie Wahlstrom,
Respondent in pro per


I declare under criminal penalty under the law of Utah that everything stated in this document
is true.

Signed at ________________________________________, UTAH.

Respectfully Submitted

KATIE WAHLSTROM, Respondent Pro Se


I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 12th day of September 2023, I filed a copy of a true and
accurate copy of Respondent’s Motion to Set Aside So Ordered Stipulation and via email
served a copy on petitioner, Nathan Wahlstrom, through his counsel of record, Kaitlyn Gibbs
at kaitlyn@dolowitzhunnicutt.com.
Dated: ____________

Katie Wahlstrom, Respondent Pro Se

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