MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF XXX
……………………………………………………………………..X
In re:

Chapter 7

XXX, Case No.: XXX
Debtor.
……………………………………………………………………..X
XXX,
Plaintiff,
v.
DARROW ARONOW, ESQ., HANIN R. SHADOOD, Adv. Pro. No: XXX
COURTNEY R. WILLIAMS, ESQ., FAY SERVICING
LLC, RUSHMORE LOAN MANAGEMENT SERVICES,
INC., MARIANNE DEROSA, THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA, DOES 1-100 INCLUSIVE
Defendants.
……………………………………………………………………..X

MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT

COMES NOW, Plaintiff ASHMEEN MODIKHAN pursuant to F.R.B.P. 9024, and files
this Motion for Relief from Judgment. Plaintiff prays this Court grant her relief from this Court’s
judgment issued on August XX, 2022, and SeptemberXX, 2022, which orders granted the Trustee
XXX wrongful proposed settlement of Debtor’s personal injury lawsuit and granted
the Trustee’s opposition to Debtor’s motion to withdraw from the Chapter 7 proceedings,
Plaintiff states as follows:

GROUNDS FOR RELIEF

1. This Motion for Relief from Judgment will be based on the grounds that there has
been extrinsic fraud, which has impeded the just prosecution of the case. Further, the judgment is
void since it was based on fraud.

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There has been extrinsic fraud
2. Extrinsic fraud means some act or conduct of the prevailing party that prevented a
fair submission of the controversy to the trier of fact. McGary v. Lewis, 119 A.2d at 501; Willets
v. Willets, 96 Pa. Super. 198, 204 and 206 (1929); see also Sallada v. Mock, 277 Pa. 285, 121 A.
54, 55 (1923).
3. “Extrinsic fraud involves the parties’ "opportunity to have a full and fair
hearing,"” In re Ward, 423 B.R. 22, 29 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2010).
4. "A challenger will not prevail by merely showing fraud in the underlying
transaction but must show fraud in the very means by which the judgment was procured." Bell v.
Town Bd. of Pawling, 146 A.D.2d 729, 537 N.Y.S.2d 214, 215 (App.Div.1989).
5. In this case, extrinsic fraud was used to procure the foreclosure judgments, which
in turn affected the prosecution of this case. Notably, Proof of Claims 5.1 and 6.1 were
fraudulently filed to effect the foreclosure judgments. Proof of Claim 5.1 was against the Howard
Beach Property, while Proof of Claim 6.1 targeted Debtor’s residence. Debtor contends that the
there are no identifiable "holders" as per the DOJ sentencing memorandum of June 3rd 2016.
Besides, no party filed and/or presented any fact witness to prove their ownership of the original
note, or chain of possession of the original note.
6. It is also notable that the Pooling and Servicing Agreements do not convey
"ownership" of the assets of the trust. It only conveys the revenue of that trust. Debtor further
asserts that there are no (and there has never been) any "certificates" adduced in court as proof of
possession of the original note. Only ledger entries in a computer were presented. It is also
noteworthy that 99% of all notes were insured and paid off within the 90 days of default.
7. For proof of claim 5.1, Part 1, question 2 of Form 410, of the proof of claim
alleged that the claim had not been acquired from someone else. However, a separate document
disclosed that there was “prior management balance”, which shows that the alleged creditor’s
assertions were wrong. Further, “U.S. Bank National Association as Legal Title Trustees for
Truman 2016 SC6 Title Trust” averred that they are the Creditors. Truman further directed that

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any and all payments be directed to Fay Servicing LLC. Debtor avers that Truman is not a
creditor because there was no privity of contract between the Debtor, on one hand, and Fay or
the Howard Beach property servicer on the other hand. Debtor also maintains that Fay and the
Howard Beach Property Servicer are not creditors because they are “bulk debt buyer”’ or “debt
collectors” as opposed to creditors.
8. Regarding Proof of Claim 6.1, “Tiki Series IV Trust” alleged that they were the
creditor, and directed that any and all payments be made to “Rushmore Loan Management
Services LLC.” First, Debtor the alleged creditor failed to prove ownership of the Residential
Property Note. There is also no privity between the Debtor and Tiki or its agents. Besides, the
lender on the Residential Property’s 2005 Note is America’s Wholesale Lender, but that entity
was incorporated in New York in 2008, years after the date of the Residential Property note and
mortgage. It follows; Tiki and the Residential Property Servicer, Rushmore Loan Management
Servicing, committed fraud by filing the Residential Property Proof of Claim without valid
evidence of ownership of the debt and/or note. Furthermore, the substituted counsel for
Rushmore Loan Management, Katherine Heidbrink perpetuated the fraud and, inadvertently,
proved the Debtor’s argument by filing a document titled “Assignment of Mortgage” from
MTGLQ Investors, LP to Tiki Series IV Trust executed on April 20, 2020, four months after the
Proof of Claim was filed. Residential Servicer and its counsel are therefore criminally liable for
filing a false claim under 18 U.S.C. 154(4).
9. It would also suffice noting that the notes presented in the courts were invalid.
The note presented for the residential property was endorsed by David A. Spector, who was
employed by Countrywide Financial Corporation and not Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. or
America’s Wholesale Lender. He therefore lacked authority to endorse the note, and his
signature is a stamped signature instead of a “wet ink” original. Lastly, the residential property
servicer’s counsel has not provided proof that she is retained by Tiki.
10. The note presented for the Howard Beach Property was not properly assigned to
US Bank Trust N.A. as Legal Title Trustee for Truman 2016 SC6 Title Trust (“Truman Trust”)

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and neither “Truman Trust” nor Fay Servicing, are included as Plaintiff in the underlying
foreclosure. The endorsement on the note is also ineffective because it appears to be a stamped
signature (instead of a live signature) of a well-documented “robo-signer” for Countrywide
Home Loans, Michele Sjolander. According to Michele Sjolander’s testimony on January 25,
2012, in Kirby vs Bank of America, N.A. US Southern District of Mississippi, Hattiesburg case
number 09-CV-00182-DCB-JMR, she worked for Recontrust and not Countrywide Home Loans,
Inc. in 20XX.. She further testified there were multiple stamps with her signature on them. She
testified that while she had some sort of power of attorney to allow others to use her stamps, she
did not know who the people using her stamp were, she was never in the same room where the
stamps were being used and did not have the security clearance to be in the room where her
multiple stamps were being used to endorsed notes. Therefore, she had no control of stamps with
her signature or personal knowledge to endorse alleged original notes for a company she wasn’t
even employed by. Further, the redactions on the mortgage assignments and cover sheets are
indicative of an attempt by the creditor’s counsel to conceal identifying markings. Many of the
“assignments” were not cross-referenced under the borrower’s name or address. By redacting
public information, i.e. Control recorder numbers and dates recorded, it would deter many from
finding the actual recorded document for other valuable information.
11. Debtor maintains that all illegally securitized mortgage (as is the case here),
violated the Electronic Signature Act, which act constitutes identity theft. Cumulatively, the
opposing parties’ conducts (since the foreclosure actions) have been in violation of the Corporate
Transparency Act 20XX..
12. This Honorable court therefore seemed to overlook the above incidences of fraud,
which clearly show the opposing parties’ determined efforts to obtain Plaintiff’s properties. The
proceedings were based on constant lies as to the owner of the original note. False evidence was
presented in that the original note was not presented to the court in support of the proof of
claims. Besides, Rosicki, Rosicki & Associates (one of the attorneys in the foreclosure
proceedings), admitted, in an unrelated case, to fraudulent firm practices in presenting

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foreclosure cases between 2009-2018 and were penalized by the court (in United States ex rel.
Grubea v. Rosicki, Rosicki & Assocs., 12-cv-7199).
13. It is further notable that the judge was carried away by the fraud that he failed to
grant Plaintiff’s request for accounting; and to acknowledge that the Trustee had breached her
fiduciary duties.
14. The two fraudulent and illegal foreclosures has led Debtor into filing three
bankruptcy causing her and her children years of financial, emotional and mental distress.
The judgment is void
15. Rule 60(b)(4) permits a court to grant relief from a final judgment where "the
judgment is void" for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Beller Keller v. Tyler 120 F.3d at
23.
16. A void judgment is one that has been procured by extrinsic or collateral fraud or
entered by a court that did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties. Rook v.
Rook, 233 Va. 92, 95, 353 S.E.2d 756, 758 (1987).
17. "A void judgment is one which, from its inception was a complete nullity and
without legal effect." Lubben v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 27, 453 F.2d 645, 649 (1st Cir.
1972). Also, a judgment is void “if the court that rendered it lacked jurisdiction of the subject
matter, or of the parties, or if it acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law.” Grace v.
Bank Leumi Trust Co. of New York, 443 F.3d 180, 193 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Kalb v.
Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 438 (1939) (a judgment is void only if it is totally beyond a court’s
power to render).
18. A motion to set aside a judgment as void for lack of jurisdiction is not subject to
the time limitations of Rule 60(b). See Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288 (Utah 1986). Also, there
is only an immaterial procedural difference between the relief sought pursuant to Rule 60(b) and
the relief sought in an independent action. Hadden v. Rumsey Prods., 196 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1952);
7 Moore’s Federal Practice, § 60.38(3) (2d ed. 1971)).

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19. A judgment is void, and therefore subject to relief under Rule 60(b)(4), only if the
court that rendered judgment lacked jurisdiction or in circumstances in which the court’s action
amounts to a plain usurpation of power constituting a violation of due process. United States v.
Boch Oldsmobile, Inc., 909 F.2d 657, 661 (1st Cir. 1990)
20. Where Rule 60(b)(4) is properly invoked on the basis that the underlying
judgment is void, "’relief is not a discretionary matter; it is mandatory.’" Orner v. Shalala, 30
F.3d 1307, 1310 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting V.T.A., Inc. v. Airco, Inc., 597 F.2d 220, 224 n.8 (10th
Cir. 1979)).
21. In this case, the fraudulent proofs of claim denied this court subject matter
jurisdiction. As discussed above, the Court turned a blind eye to the fraud, amidst Debtor’s
unrelenting filings, which tried to bring the Court’s attention to the fraud.
22. Debtor further attempted to bring the attention of the court how the Trustee failed
to address the fraud and challenge it, in protection of Debtor’s estate.
23. The court’s denial of this motion for relief would only further the abuse that
Plaintiff has been subjected to since the start of the foreclosure actions to this time. There is no
other way Plaintiff would seek the interests of justice, and let it be known that her property has
been fraudulently taken from her. Indeed, as the Supreme Court has held, without proper
jurisdiction, a court cannot proceed at all, but can only note the jurisdictional defect and dismiss
the suit. See Capron v. Van Noorden, 2 Cranch 126; Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona,
520 U.S. 43; National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Assn. of Railroad Passengers, 414
U.S. 453, 465, n. 13; Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 524, 531; Secretary of Navy v. Avrech, 418
U.S. 676 , 678 (per curiam); United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348 ; Philbrook v. Glodgett,
421 U.S. 707, 721; and Chandler v. Judicial Council of Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 86—88,
distinguished. For a court to pronounce upon a law’s meaning or constitutionality when it has no
jurisdiction to do so is, by very definition, an ultra vires act. Pp. 8—17.
24. The only other remedy available to the Plaintiff to remedy this injustice is the
filing an appeal of the judgment, which is the required diligence of the plaintiff in order to

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protect his right to appeal an adverse judgment. See Dunn v. Cockrell, 302 F.3d 491, 492-494
(5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). Plaintiff acknowledges that (Rule 60(b) is not a substitute for a
proper and timely appeal. Accordingly, Plaintiff has already filed a Notice of Appeal at the
United States District Court, Eastern District of New York.
There was a conflict of interest
25. According to Rule 1.7 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct:
“a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent
conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if: (1) the
representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or (2)
there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be
materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former
client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.”
26. When a trial court is "sufficiently apprised of even the possibility of a conflict of
interest," the court has an inquiry obligation. See United States v. Levy, 25 F.3d 146, 153 (2d Cir.
1994). "The court must investigate the facts and details of the attorney’s interests to determine
whether the attorney in fact suffers from an actual conflict, a potential conflict, or no genuine
conflict at all." Id.
27. Frank Cassisi, Debtor’s former counsel, abandoned Debtor, and became counsel
for Trustee Alan Nisselson. Notably, Plaintiff had filed a personal injury and Worker’s
Compensation matter on or about June 8, 2015, at the Superior Court of New York, Queens
County (Ashmeen Modikhan v. Golden Touch Transportation, Case No. 706339/2015). Debtor
had sustained injury while working for American Airlines. Accordingly, Debtor hired attorney
Frank Cassisi to help in the case.
28. However, Cassisi appeared to collude with the Trustee in interfering with
Debtor’s case. For instance, on Saturday June 25, 2022, Debtor received via US Postal Mail a
motion from the Trustee Alan Nisselson in the Bankruptcy Proceeding filed on June 22, 2022

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claiming jurisdiction over this case. Consequently, Debtor terminated Cassisi as Debtor’s
counsel on August 5, 2022.
29. Interestingly, after terminating the service to Debtor, Cassisi was hired by Alan
Nisselson, the Trustee in this case.
30. It is Debtor’s contention that the former and current representations of Cassisi are
adverse and substantially related.
31. Further, on June 25, 2022, Frank Cassisi’s law firm presented falsified retainer
agreements in support of their erroneous, malicious and/or frivolous allegations against Debtor.
Debtor had a copy of the retainer with only her signature. In June of 2021, she requested a copy
with their signature and the date and she was sent Doc # 1. What was filed in the court on June
25, 2022 does not have a date, the signature is not the same and from the State Court Filings
Matthew Maloney signatures are totally different. Notably, Matthew Maloney, of Frank Cassisi
had appended his signatures on the Court Filings in the State Supreme Court. However, Mathew
Maloney’s signatures in the Court filings are materially different from his signatures in the three
Retainer Agreements.
32. It is also notable that Matthew Maloney was not employed by Cassisi & Cassisi in
April 2015, when the retainer dated April 16, 2015 was signed.
33. The fact on the third page of the retainer the information of Georger Crozier was
CROSSED out, altered also Frank Cassisi is now claiming expenses when in fact page two
indicated client is not responsible for expenses and Judge Jil Mazer Marino and the Trustee
approve this Settlement.
34. Frank Cassisi knew that the signatures in the Retainer Agreements were false
and/or forged. The forged signatures were made with the intent to defraud Debtor into entering

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the settlement agreement(s) in the State Court. Debtor reasonably relied on the said
representation, and ended up suffering damages to wit, costs and fees in challenging the
attorney(s) actions and/or inactions.
35. In light of the foregoing, the conflict of interest caused by Frank Cassisi, who was
Debtor’s previous attorney, impeded the application of justice in this case. This itself warrants a
relief of the Debtor from this Court’s judgments.
The Plaintiffs in the foreclosure actions are in violation of debt collection laws
36. In Kimber v. Federal Financial Corp., 668 F. Supp. 1480 (M.D. Ala. 1987), the
court held that debt buyers that seek to recover on debts that were in default when the debt
buyers acquired them are debt collectors for purposes of the FDCPA; see also McKinney v.
Cadleway Props., Inc., 548 F.3d 496, 501 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he purchaser of a debt in default
is a debt collector for purposes of the FDCPA even though it owns the debt and is collecting for
itself.”); FTC v. Check Investors, Inc., 502 F.3d 159, 170-74 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[A]n assignee may
be deemed a ‘debt collector’ if the obligation is already in default when it is assigned.”) (quoting
Pollice v. Nat’l Tax Funding, L.P., 225 F.3d 379, 403-04 (3d Cir. 2000)); Schlosser v. Fairbanks
Capital Corp., 323 F.3d 534, 536 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he Act treats assignees as debt collectors
if the debt sought to be collected was in default when acquired by the assignee, and as creditors
if it was not.”).
37. In addition to the FDCPA, debt buyers and other debt collectors are governed by
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce.” See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006). An act or practice is
“unfair” under Section 5 if it “causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which

10

is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing
benefits to consumers or to competition.” Id. § 45(n).
38. Further, a practice is considered “deceptive” if “there is a representation, omission
or practice that is likely to mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the
consumer’s detriment.” See Federal Trade Commission Policy Statement on Deception,
appended to In re Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 174–83 (1984) (“Deception Policy
Statement”). The FDCPA also prohibits the use of deception in the debt-collection process as
follows:
“A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading
representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Without
limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a
violation of this section: … (10) The use of any false representation or
deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain
information concerning a consumer.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.
39. In light of the foregoing, the Plaintiffs in the foreclosure actions are debt
collectors. These Plaintiffs violated FDCPA when they engaged in deceptive practices by
prosecuting the foreclosure cases without providing any evidence of a chain of possession of the
original note.
40. Specifically, the notes presented in the foreclosure courts were invalid. The note
presented for the residential property was endorsed by David A. Spector, who was employed by
Countrywide Financial Corporation and not Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. or America’s
Wholesale Lender. He therefore lacked authority to endorse the note, and his signature is a
stamped signature instead of a “wet ink” original. Lastly, the residential property servicer’s
counsel has not provided proof that she is retained by Tiki.
41. The note presented for the Howard Beach Property was not properly assigned to
US Bank Trust N.A. as Legal Title Trustee for Truman 2016 SC6 Title Trust (“Truman Trust”)

11

and neither “Truman Trust” nor Fay Servicing, are included as Plaintiff in the underlying
foreclosure. The endorsement on the note is also ineffective because it appears to be a stamped
signature (instead of a live signature) of a well-documented “robo-signer” for Countrywide
Home Loans, Michele Sjolander. According to Michele Sjolander’s testimony on January 25,
2012, in Kirby vs Bank of America, N.A. US Southern District of Mississippi, Hattiesburg case
number 09-CV-00182-DCB-JMR, she worked for Recontrust and not Countrywide Home Loans,
Inc. in 2007. She further testified there were multiple stamps with her signature on them. She
testified that while she had some sort of power of attorney to allow others to use her stamps, she
did not know who the people using her stamp were, she was never in the same room where the
stamps were being used and did not have the security clearance to be in the room where her
multiple stamps were being used to endorsed notes. Therefore, she had no control of stamps with
her signature or personal knowledge to endorse alleged original notes for a company she wasn’t
even employed by. Further, the redactions on the mortgage assignments and cover sheets are
indicative of an attempt by the creditor’s counsel to conceal identifying markings. Many of the
“assignments” were not cross-referenced under the borrower’s name or address. By redacting
public information, i.e. Control recorder numbers and dates recorded, it would deter many from
finding the actual recorded document for other valuable information.
42. It follows; therefore, the Debtor is entitled to a relief from judgment because the
foreclosure judgments were fraudulently acquired by the Plaintiffs thereof, who violated
FDCPA.

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, Plaintiff prays that this Court should issue an Order reversing its
previous judgment issued on August 25, 2022, and September 1, 2022, which orders granted the

12

Trustee Alan Nisselson’s wrongful proposed settlement of Debtor’s personal injury lawsuit and
granted the Trustee’s opposition to Debtor’s motion to withdraw from the Chapter 7 proceedings.
Plaintiff further prays that this Court issues any other order it deems just.

Date: _________________

XXX
XXX, Unit 1B
XXX, NY XXX
Pro Se Debtor

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of this Motion for Relief from Judgment was served on [ENTER DATE] to
the Defendants in this action at the following addresses:
Courtney R. Williams
XXX, LLC
1775 XXX, Ste 100
XXX, NY XXX
Pro Se Defendant
Marianne DeRosa
Office of the Chapter 13 Trustee
XXX, Ste 127
XXX, NY XXX
Pro Se Defendant
Darren Aronow
Aronow Law Firm P.C.
XXX, Ste 115
Woodbury, NY XXX
Pro Se Defendant
Steven Amshen
Petroff Amshen, LLP
1795 Coney Island Ave, 3rd Floor
Brooklyn, NY 11230
Counsel for Hanin Shadood
Andrea M Roberts
Blank Rome LLP
1271 Avenue of Americas
New York, NY XXX
XXX, LLC
Krista M Preuss
Krista M. Preuss XXX XXXe, Ste 127
XX NY XXX
Pro Se Defendant
XXX
J. Robbin Law PLLC

14
200 Business Park Drive, Ste 103
Armonk, NY XXX
XXX, Inc.

DATE:

XXX
XXX Court, Unit 1B
XXX, NY XXX
Pro Se Debtor

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