Esther Tendo Atam
13621 Arcturus Ave.
Gardena, CA 90249
Plaintiff in Pro Per
| SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
|
I ESTHER ATAM, declare the following:
- I am the Plaintiff in this case.
- I am over eighteen years old.
- I am of sound mind.
- I am therefore competent to swear on the matters said herein.
- I write this declaration in response to Judge Small’s Minute Order dated 7/13/23.
- The Defendant based their Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Post Security, on the wrong citation of the law. No noticed motion was ever filed to dismiss this case.They are therefore not entitled to any of their prayers in their motion, and the case must continue.
- Code of Civil Procedure Section 391.3 provides for an Order requiring plaintiff to furnish security; order dismissing litigation. Besides, Code of civ code 391.3 (b) is an order NOT A REQUEST, to dismiss the case.
- On the other hand, 391.3 (a) is an order NOT REQUEST to furnish security.
- Further, Section 391.1 provides for a Motion for order requiring plaintiff furnish security or dismissal of litigation.
- In light of the foregoing, the court cannot possibly find under section 391.3 (a) that I have no reasonable possibility of prevailing in the litigation against defendant because, again, no request was made to dismiss litigation or furnish security. Kaiser has no jurisdiction to issue orders, and the judge is carrying out those orders.
- The Defendant should have cited 391.1, which is the noticed motionfor plaintiff to furnish security or dismissal of litigation.
- It follows; because no noticed motion pursuant to 391.1 was ever filed, Judge Small cannot rest his conclusion on a noticed motion 391.1, that was never filed.
- Judge Small cannot write any orders pursuant to 391.3 (b), or 391.3 (a), nor can he dismiss the litigation pursuant to 391.4 as a result of “failure to post security”.
- Even if Kaiser were to bring a noticed motion pursuant to 391.1, the judge will have to write an order pursuant to 391.3 (b) or 391.3 (a) or 391.4. And as earlier discussed, 391.3 (b) does not apply to my case and subsequently 391.3 (a) and 391.4 cannot be applied.
- I am not mandated and/or obligated to comply with an order that is biased. The Security Order is void because the Defendant never proceeded under the appropriate civil code. The Court is therefore taking the position of a litigant, by imputing on Kaiser, a code that Kaiser never cited in their application.
- It beats logic for the Court to demand me to pay the security deposit yet Defendant cited the wrong law. Notably, the court cannot possibly rest its conclusion on 391.1, which section was not specified by Kaiser in their application.
- By resting its conclusion on Section 391.1, the Court appears to assist the Defendant in making their case. This shows how the Court is biased. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that “the right to an impartial judge [is] among those ‘constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error.'” See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967). “A biased decision maker is constitutionally unacceptable,” Withrow v. Larkin (1975) 421 U.S. 35 [ 43 L.Ed.2d 712, 95 S.Ct. 1456]. It follows; upholding the Court’s decision in these circumstances flies in the face of constitutional guarantees to a fair process.
- In the Minute Order, the Court erroneously relied on Singh v. Lipworth, 227 Cal.App.4th 813, 816 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014). Notably, Singh is different from the instant case. The facts of the instant case are completely different from the facts in Further, the Court in Singh found Singh to be a vexatious client because he had “no reasonable probability of prevailing in the litigation because the lawsuit amounted to an impermissible collateral attack on a prior final judgment and post-judgment orders”.
- I have not engaged in any collateral attack on any judgment. Besides, none of my cases have ever been determined based on their merits.
- The Court also misapplied In re Marriage of Rifkin & Carty (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1345. Notably, the facts in said case are wholly different from the facts of the instant case. First, In re Marriage of Rifkin, is a family law case while the instant case is an ordinary civil case. Next, the Court in said case held the father to be a vexatious litigant because the father threatened the mother and continuously warned the mother that unless she agreed to his terms for child custody and removal of the restraining order, he would, as the court put it, “grind her down.”
- The foregoing shows how Judge Small is incredibly incompetent and was already disqualified from this case.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.
Dated: ___________
__________________________
ESTHER TENDO ATAM
Plaintiff, in Pro Per
State of California County of _______________
Subscribed and sworn to (or affirmed) before me on this ______ day of _____________, 20___, by _______________________ ___________________________________________________, proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the person(s) who appeared before me.
(Seal) Signature______________________
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