Business Law

February 6, 2023


Motors Liquidation Co. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank

Students Name 





Part 1

The court ruled that the termination notice took effect following the “Del Law” In the Code Ann.tit.69-509, it is sufficient for the guarantor to approve the registration because this is all the content contained in the “Case Code.” in a case heard by the Bar Association, the court held that although JP Morgan never intended to terminate the related UCC-1 term loan, the request to terminate UCC-3 is valid. There is evidence that JPMorgan Chase and Simpson Thatcher (attorneys for JPMorgan Chase) knew that Meyer Brown wanted to submit a termination letter with the prior termination date after the composite lease was signed, and JPMorgan Chase reviewed and accepted the submission for the application Application. 

In October 2001, General Motors signed a synthetic lease financing agreement that included JPMorgan Chase Bank, N. (“JPMorgan”) is a consortium of lenders that has received approximately US$300 million in funding. General Motors pledged 12 properties to guarantee the obligation to pay the compound lease. JPMorgan acts as the management agent for Synthetic Leasing and is a guaranteed party in the UCC-1 financial statements. Five years later, GM signed a separate fixed-term loan agreement. The term loan has nothing to do with Synthetic Leasing, which provided approximately $1.5 billion in funding to General Motors from another group of lenders (Brian & Jeff, 2015). To obtain the loan, the lender guaranteed shares in various GM assets in 42 locations in the United States, including all GM equipment and accessories. 

When Leasing was about to expire, General Motors contacted Mayer Brown LLP, Happiness Leasing’s legal counsel, and stated that it planned to repay the amount owed. Release shares held by GM creditors (Delawalla, 2015). The third is UCC-1, numbered 6416808 4, which is a designated period loan. When Mayer Brown created the final list of steps required to deploy the lease, he determined the UCC-1 master term loan to be canceled and the actual collateral to be cancelled. When Mayer Brown drafted the UCC-3 statement to cancel the three interest rate guarantees in the final list, he drafted the UCC-3 statement to cancel the principal of UCC-1 and the principal related to the synthetic lease. The loophole was not noticed until GM went bankrupt in 2009.

 In Chapter 11 of the reorganization, JPMorgan Chase notified the Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the “Committee”) that the UCC-3 termination petition related to term loans was inadvertently filed in October 2008. On July 31, 2009, the committee filed a lawsuit against JPMorgan Chase in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in the Southern Administrative District of New York (Brian & Jeff, 2015). The committee hopes to find that, despite the error, the cancellation of UCC-3 effectively eliminated the security interest in term loans and made JPMorgan Chase an unsecured lender, just like other unsecured lenders at General Motors.It was unauthorized and therefore invalid because no one works in JPMorgan Chase, General Motors, or the law firm that intends to stop paying interest on fixed-term loan guarantees. It is not authorized and therefore cannot effectively terminate the security interest in the term loan.

Part 2

In an appeal case filed by the Chase Bank against the second circuit court decision, I would argue in favor of Chase Bank. The lender and the borrower reached an agreement to repay and release the loan in September 2008, which included the termination of certain UCC-1 transactions in favor of the lender. An experienced lawyer was hired to record the transaction. THE BORROWER’S LAWYER WRITTEN the UCC-3 termination notice and contains links to three funding applications to be canceled. One of the financial statements mentioned was incorrectly included: the parties did not intend to terminate the financial statement. Crucially, the compulsory collateral is the “most important” collateral, and it has received a separate $1.5 billion loan support from the lender (Brian & Jeff, 2015). However, UCC-3 was sent, and neither party noticed the error. The loan term has also been changed. In June 2009, the borrower filed for bankruptcy protection. It seems that during the loan revision process in March and the alleged large-scale pre-bankruptcy negotiations under the mortgage terms, the lenders once again ignored UCC-3. On the contrary, the lender discovered an error in UCC-3 after bankruptcy and brought it to the attention of the Unsecured Lenders Committee to invalidate UCC-3. The bankruptcy court ruled that UCC-3 did work as claimed.

Section 363 is the basic tool for maximizing the value of the bankruptcy property, and the requirements of the sales notice are well implemented. First, everyone agrees that only sellers have notification requirements; there are no buyers. Based on this alone, the fact that the decision to impose sanctions on the buyer in good faith for violation of the seller’s notice has serious flaws and violates applicable laws. However, since the old General Motors did not violate the notice, the following solutions are even unreasonable. Based on a basic misunderstanding of the role of Section 363 in bankruptcy, the Second Circuit reached a different conclusion (Delawalla, 2015). The verdict is wrong as it was found that the notice required by the Constitution was far beyond the scope stipulated in the bankruptcy rules; not only should attention be paid to the sale under Article 363, but also the claims of potential creditors on the debtor. The conclusion is incorrect. The second district ignores the role of Article 363 in the Code structure.

In contrast to other bankruptcy proceedings, sales under section 363 will not be terminated at creditors’ request. The lender can ask for the proceeds of the sale and receive more proceeds than would have been possible if the transaction did not happen and the government’s fate continued to deteriorate. Congress even passed the extraordinary step in restricting direct appeals against sales’ effectiveness to maximize sales revenue and maximize the benefits of lenders.

In the opinion overturned by the bankruptcy court, the second circuit ruled that the submitted UCC-3 can effectively reverse the forcibly added UCC-1 because the creditor and his lawyer have expressed the creditor’s “consent” to the creditor. According to Article 9-509(d)(1), the UCC-3 termination notice is only valid if “the protected part of the recording is allowed to be registered.” UCC-3 is governed by the laws of the State of Delaware, and readers will remember that District II previously asked the Supreme Court of Delaware to answer the meaning of “approving” the UCC-3 application. In response, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled that the Section 9 termination notice should take effect? The Delaware 510 UCC does not require the protected party to authorize the application to have subjective intent or otherwise understand the effect of its simple terms.

Therefore, whether the creditor “approves” the UCC-3 submission is made by the Second Circuit Court. The lender argued that it did not authorize the submitted UCC-3 because (i) it only authorized the borrower to cancel the proposed UCC-1s, (ii) instructed its lawyers and the borrower’s lawyers to act only for this purpose, and (iii) the lawyers exceeded their authority when submitting an overly comprehensive UCC-3. The court rejected the creditor’s argument and made a distinction between “what the creditor did,” and the creditor is authorized to act on his own behalf”. To determine what the creditors approved, the court reviewed the document exchanges and correspondence between lawyers that led to UCC-3 submissions. Specifically, when the borrower’s lawyer submitted the UCC-3 draft and final list to the lender, the lender’s lawyer replied: “Good track record. The only thing I want to say is that if I don’t miss anything, I’m right [ All references by the lender should not be “targeted at investors.” “When the borrower’s lawyer distributed the escrow agreement, the lender’s lawyer also stated that the arrangement was “ok” and signed it. The court concluded that these reports are creditors’ understanding, consideration, and consent to UCC-3 and “do nothing.” Because we found that the error in UCC-3 may be caused by the lack of communication or lack of communication within the borrower’s law firm, but this fact has nothing to do with the court’s analysis because this form of external expression intention trumps actual intention.

Although General Motors quickly went bankrupt at the end of 2008 after the transaction resulted in erroneous bail, records show that at least two vigilant training/restructuring professionals can understand the problem. The loan was revised in late March 2009, followed by negotiations on the use of collateral before filing for bankruptcy. If the borrower is about to file for bankruptcy, the lender must assume that its mortgage lien is under review. A complex committee of lenders/trust professionals with fiduciary responsibilities to find alternatives to allocate to unsecured lenders. A comprehensive excellence check should be conducted as soon as possible so that the lender can fill your excellence gap with their restructuring/salary restructuring professionals before starting a bankruptcy case.





Brian D and Jeff C (2015) A $1.5 Billion (Un)Secured Loan, Bank Bryan Cave

Delawalla,F. (2015) A Look At Committee v. JP Morgan. Retrieved 11 May 2021, from

At Legal writing experts, we would be happy to assist in preparing any legal document you need. We are international lawyers and attorneys with significant experience in legal drafting, Commercial-Corporate practice and consulting. In the last few years, we have successfully undertaken similar assignments for clients from different jurisdictions. If given this opportunity, we will be able to prepare the legal document within the shortest time possible.