APPELLANTS BRIEF

IN THE DISTRICT OF COLOMBIA
COURT OF APPEALS
No: _____________

MONIQUE HEADLEY,
Appellant

AND

SECOND NORTHWEST COOPERATIVE HOMES ASSOCIATION, INC.,

Appellee

On Appeal from the the Superior Court
For the District of Columbia Civil Division

APPELLANT’S BRIEF

MONIQUE HEADLEY
[ENTER YOUR ADDRESS]
Appellant, Pro Se

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 2

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE & FACTS 4

ISSUE PRESENTED 5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 5

ARGUMENTS 5
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 5

B. THE APPELLANT RAISED GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT IN THE
COMPLAINT AND MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER. 6

C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING APPELLANT’S CASE FOR
ALLEGED FAILURE TO STATE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT. 7

CONCLUSION 8

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 9

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248 (1986), 106 S.Ct. at 2510. 5
Atkins v. Industrial Telecommunications Ass’n, 660 A.2d 885, 887 (D.C. 1995). 5
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 514 n. 31, 104 S.Ct.
1949, 1967 n. 31, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984); 5
Davis v. United States, 564 A.2d 31, 35 (D.C. 1989 5
Fraser v. Gottfried, 636 A.2d 430, 432 n. 5 (D.C. 1994) 5
Johnson-El v. District of Columbia, 579 A.2d 163, 166 (D.C. 1990 5
Lee v. Jones, 632 A.2d 113, 115 (D.C. 1993) 5
Nader v. de Toledano, 408 A.2d 31, 41-42 (D.C. 1979), 6
Smith v. WMATA, 631 A.2d 387, 390 (D.C. 1993 5
Souci v. William C. Smith & Co., 763 A.2d 96, 100 (D.C. 2000). 7
United States v. Felder, 548 A.2d 57, 61 (D.C. 1988). 5
Statutes
12G DCMR 100.2 6
12G DCMR 704.2 6

STATEMENT OF THE CASE & FACTS

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On or about December 7, 2021, the Appellant filed a Complaint to enforce the Housing
Code Regulations on the Appellee. (See Complaint), and a Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order. (See Motion for Temporary Restraining Order). In the said Complaint, the Appellant
pointed out different problems with the Appellee’s house. Notably, the ceiling was moist, water
leaked from the bathroom vent (when it rained, water leaked through the ceiling above the toilet
and dripped on the floor and bathroom), black water stains appeared to be leaking from the
bathroom ceiling; there were animal sounds and movements in the ceiling, and there was foul
odor. (See Photos of the condition of the Property). There were also cracks on the ceiling.
Further, the Appellee’s children had been exposed to bugs that bit them, as a result of the
condition of the house. For instance, on or about July 6, 2020, the Appellee’s daughter was bitten
by the bugs and developed an allergic reaction. She had to be taken to the ER. The bugs caused
further harm and/or damage on Appellee’s clothes and furniture.
On or about December 20, 2020, the Appellee filed a Motion to Dismiss Appellant’s
Complaint and Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. (See Appellee’s Motion to Dismiss).
In the said Motion, the Appellee alleged inter alia, that the Appellant incorrectly referred to
herself as a tenant and the Appellee as her Landlord. In that regard, the Appellee argued that it is
not subject to the District of Columbia Housing Regulations or the DC Property Maintenance
Code. In sum, the Appellant argued that the Appellant’s Complaint and Motion failed to raise a
cause of action upon which relief can be granted, because the Appellee was not a Landlord and
the Appellant was not the Appellee’s tenant in that regard.
The Court considered the Appellee’s Motion to Dismiss, and granted the Appellee’s
prayers therein. Accordingly, the Appellant’s Complaint and Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order were dismissed.
Appellant herein appeals the said Order.

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ISSUE PRESENTED

  1. Whether the Appellant raised genuine issues of material fact in the Appellant’s
    Complaint and Motion for Temporary Restraining Order.
  2. Whether the Trial Court erred when it dismissed Appellant’s case for alleged failure to
    state genuine issues of material fact.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

  1. The Appellant raised genuine issues of material fact in the Complaint and Motion for
    Temporary Restraining Order.
  2. The Court erred in dismissing Appellant’s case for alleged failure to state genuine issues
    of material fact.

ARGUMENTS

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The sufficiency of a complaint presents a question of law; therefore, our standard of
review is de novo. Davis v. United States, 564 A.2d 31, 35 (D.C. 1989); United States v. Felder,
548 A.2d 57, 61 (D.C. 1988). De novo review requires us to make an original review of the
record and from that review to reach an independent judgment. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union
of the United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 514 n. 31, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 1967 n. 31, 80 L.Ed.2d 502
(1984); Felder, supra, 548 A.2d at 61.
In reviewing the grant of a 12 (b)(6) motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a
claim, this court applies the same standard as the trial judge, i.e. “we accept the allegations of the
complaint as true, and construe all facts and inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Atkins v.
Industrial Telecommunications Ass’n, 660 A.2d 885, 887 (D.C. 1995). “Because a motion to
dismiss a complaint under Rule 12 (b)(6) `presents questions of law, our standard of review for

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dismissal for failure to state a claim is de novo.'” Fraser v. Gottfried, 636 A.2d 430, 432 n. 5
(D.C. 1994) (quoting Johnson-El v. District of Columbia, 579 A.2d 163, 166 (D.C. 1990)).

B. THE APPELLANT RAISED GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT IN THE
COMPLAINT AND MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER.
A fact is material because it is a fact that has direct and uncontestable bearing on the
outcome of the case. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248 (1986), 106 S.Ct. at 2510.
Further, the requisite showing of a genuine issue for trial is predicated upon the existence of a
legal theory which remains viable under the asserted version of the facts.'” Lee v. Jones, 632
A.2d 113, 115 (D.C. 1993) (quoting Smith v. WMATA, 631 A.2d 387, 390 (D.C. 1993)).
There is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party
for a jury to return a verdict for that party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 249,
106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); see also Nader v. de Toledano, 408 A.2d 31, 41-
42 (D.C. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078, 100 S.Ct. 1028, 62 L.Ed.2d 761 (1980).
Appellant avers that the Appellee owed a duty of special care to the Appellant. For
instance, the mission statement of the Appellee raises several obligations of the Appellee.
Notably, the mission statement provides thus: “to maintain buildings and property that are safe,
secure, accessible, and affordable; to upgrade when necessary the existing units,
buildings/building systems, grounds and appliances.” (See Appellee’s Mission, Vision, and
Value Statement, p.1). The mission also provides that the Appellee shall “improve the quality
of the business operation”. Id. Further, the Appellee commits itself to “respond to concerns of
staff and members and deal with them in a reasonable time frame”. Id. According to 12G DCMR
704.2 et seq., all residential buildings should be fitted with smoke detectors. 12G DCMR 305.3

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further provides that all cracks should be repaired. Appellant therefore avers that the Appellee
has a duty to work on the faults in Appellant’s house.
Instead, the Appellee gave the Appellant possession of the house, with the full knowledge
that there were cracks and there were no smoke detectors.
In light of the foregoing, the Appellant has successfully raised genuine issues of material
fact to warrant her prayers in the dismissed Complaint and Motion for Temporary Injunction.

C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING APPELLANT’S CASE FOR
ALLEGED FAILURE TO STATE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT.
12G DCMR 100.2 provides that the Property Maintenance Code applies to all residential
and non-residential premises, and that it provides standards for administration, and penalties
thereof. It can therefore be said that the said provision creates relations, rights, and obligations
between the lessee and the property owner. It is in that regard that courts have held that the
relationship between a cooperative and a member owning a property lease is that of landlord and
tenant. See Souci v. William C. Smith & Co., 763 A.2d 96, 100 (D.C. 2000).
In the instant action, the Appellee is subject to the District of Columbia’s Housing
Regulations. Notably, the Appellee’s “Second Northwest New Member’s Orientation
Information Material” provides expressly that “the individual is both a tenant because of their
lease with the corporation, and an owner because of their stock ownership and participation in
group governance.” (See Second Northwest New Member’s Orientation Information
Material- Exhibit B). Further, the Appellee ’s Handbook provides expressly that the Occupancy
Agreement is “similar to a rental lease.” (See Cooperative Handbook, p. 9).
Further, Article VIII of the Appellee ’s By-Laws provides that the Appellee is subject to
the rights, powers, and privileges of HUD. (See By-Laws Second Northwest Cooperative

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Homes Association). Further, under Section 8 of Article XI , the Appellee committed itself to
monitor the services it offers by the Professional Management Agent of the housing
development. Id.
It can therefore be observed that the Judge erred when the Judge failed to acknowledge
the fact that the Appellee was subject to the Housing Regulations. Accordingly, the Appellant
was mandated to carry out the repairs in Appellant’s house.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should hold that the Appellant’s Complaint and
Motion for Temporary Injunction raised genuine issues of material fact. The Court should also
hold that the Appellee is subject to the Housing Regulations. Therefore, the Trial Court erred in
granting the Appellee’s Motion to Dismiss.
In that regard, Appellant respectfully requests this Honorable Court reverses the Trial
Court’s Order, and dismisses the Appellee’s Motion to Dismiss. Appellant also prays this Court
grant any other relief this Court deems just.

Respectfully Submitted,

Dated: _

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE


MONIQUE HEADLEY
[ENTER YOUR ADDRESS]
Appellant, Pro Se

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The undersigned hereby certifies that he served a copy of the foregoing brief on counsel
for the Appellee by mail, email/e-filing or personal delivery a copy of the same to the Appellee,
addressed as follows:

Dated: _
Jessica Blumberg, Esquire
Daniel M. Costello, Esquire
Costello P.C.
1328 R Street NW
Washington, D.C. 20009
Attorney for Appellee


MONIQUE HEADLEY
[ENTER YOUR ADDRESS]
Appellant, Pro Se

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