motion to vacate

Where a party obtains a judgment through fraudulent conduct, the only way to overturn that judgment is through a motion to vacate pursuant to federal rule of civil procedure 60(b) (3).

A final judgment can also be overturned by a motion, pursuant to federal rule of civil procedure 60(d) (3). Fraud on the court is generally limited to instances where the integrity of the judicial process has been fraudulently subverted and does not include fraudulent conduct that only affects a party to the action before the court.

Case law

• Smith V Garcia

In this case, the court granted motion to vacate because the trial courts judgment was procured through fraud. This discovery was made after someone by the name Myvester, who operates the website on which the alleged defamatory comments had been posted, revealed that the consent judgment had been obtained through fraud. 

 

2. Max Stevens v. East Alabama Health Care Authority d/b/a East Alabama Medical Center

The Plaintiff brought an action against the defendants alleging fraud upon the court in a prior court proceeding. Stevens requested that, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), the Court vacate its judgment in the case of United States ex rel. Max Stevens v. East Alabama Health Care Authority d/b/a East Alabama Medical Center and Terry Andrus (Case No. 3:95-cv-4461) due to fraud on the part of the defendants and their attorneys in that case.

In the prior action, Stevens, as relator on behalf of himself and the United States, brought suit under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729, against EAMC and Andrus.

Stevens, EAMC’s former Director of Engineering, alleged that the defendants defrauded the United States by obtaining certification to participate in Medicare/Medicaid programs when they had not met the standards for participation in those programs. Stevens voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial and, beginning on April 6, 1998, the action was tried before Judge John H. Moore II. On April 13, 1998, Stevens rested his case and the defendants moved for judgment on partial findings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(c). After considering Stevens’ written response to the motion and hearing oral argument from both sides, the district court made specific findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record supporting judgment for the defendants. On April 14, 1998, judgment was entered in favor of the defendants. On April 15, 1998, Stevens filed a Notice of Appeal with the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (Case No. 98- 6827). The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment on January 21, 1999. Stevens requested a rehearing, which was denied on April 20, 1999. On April 13, 1999, Stevens filed a Motion for Relief under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In his brief in support of the Rule 60(b) motion, he claimed that he was entitled to relief from the judgment because the defendants had presented misleading and inadvertent erroneous evidence at trial. Stevens alleged, among other things, that the defendants misled the district court by stating that they had filed a plan of correction, without differentiating between a state plan, which they had filed, and a federal plan, which they had not filed. On May 11, 1999, the defendants filed their Brief in Opposition to Stevens’ Motion for Relief under Rule 60(b) in which they requested reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses. The district court entered an Order denying Stevens’ Motion for Relief and ordering Stevens’ counsel to pay attorneys’ fees to the defendants in order to “curb further abuse instigated by Stevens’ counsel.” The district court stated that EAHC complains that Stevens’ Rule 60(b) Motion has been brought in bad faith and only for purposes of harassment. The Court has no hesitation in agreeing. Stevens’ Motion is entirely without merit, and is a clear and unwarranted attempt to relitigate an unsuccessful trial. The filing of this frivolous Motion, presented after an unsuccessful appeal to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals and an unsuccessful attempt to obtain rehearing in that Court, has unreasonably and vexaciously multiplied these proceedings to EAHC’s detriment.

Later that July Stevens filed a Notice of Appeal with the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals appealing the district court’s ruling on his 60(b) Motion for Relief. 

As in his Rule 60(b) motion in the prior action, Stevens alleged that the defendants misled the district court by alleging that they had submitted a plan of correction, when in fact they had only submitted a state plan of correction and not a federal one. Furthermore, Stevens alleges that the defendants misrepresented that a federal plan of correction was not required by misquoting 42 C.F.R. § 488.28(a) to the court. In addition, Stevens alleges that the defendants misrepresented the holding of Jackson v. Fort Stanton Hospital and Training School, 757 F. Supp. 1243 (D.N.M. 1990), rev’d in part on other grounds, 946 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1992). Finally, Stevens alleges that several other incidents of fraud occurred during the trial, including submission of an exhibit that did not contain all pages of a certain form and testimony that Stevens characterizes as misleading.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and strike the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), 9(b), and 12(f). 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) requires that, ‘‘in all averments of fraud, the circumstances constituting fraud shall be stated with particularity.” The particularity requirement, however, must be read in conjunction with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), which provides that a complaint need only contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” 

3. Friedlander v. Nims, 755 F.2d 810, 813 n.3 (11th Cir. 1985) stated that a court considering a motion to dismiss for failure to plead fraud with particularity should always be careful to harmonize the directives of rule 9(b) with the broader policy of notice pleading” found in Rule 8). Thus, to comply with Rules 8 and 9(b), “some indicia of reliability must be given in the complaint to support the allegation of fraud”.

Stevens first claimed that the Defendants committed fraud upon the court by misleading the court as to the filing of a federal plan of correction. That is, by referring generally to a plan of correction rather than differentiating between a state plan and a federal plan, Stevens alleges that the Defendants misled the court into believing that both types of plans had been filed. 

Stevens next claims that Defendants misrepresented the law in two different ways. Stevens first claims that by misquoting 42 C.F.R. § 488.28(a) to the court, Defendants misled the court into believing that a federal plan of correction was not required. The regulation states that providers with deficiencies will be certified “only if the facility has submitted an acceptable plan of correction for achieving compliance within a reasonable period of time acceptable to the Secretary.” When citing this regulation to the court, Stevens alleges that the defendants left out the words “only if” and “acceptable to the Secretary.” By omitting these words, Stevens alleges that the defendants misled the court into believing that EAMC could continue to participate in the Medicare/Medicaid programs even if a federal plan of correction was not filed. Second, Stevens alleges that the defendants misrepresented the holding of Jackson v. Fort Stanton Hospital and Training School. 

Stevens claims that the attorneys in the prior action (who are defendants in the present action) were aware of the perjury. While perjury in which an attorney participates may be considered fraud on the court sufficient to relieve a party from a prior judgment, 

Stevens had presented no evidence of attorney involvement in the alleged perjury. Stevens basically argued for a rule that permits the court to relieve a party from a prior judgment if that party simply makes a bare allegation of attorney involvement in perjury without any support for such allegation. 

Stevens claims were dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and the defendants motion to dismiss was granted. 

4. Metlyn Realty Corp. v. Esmark, Inc., 763 F.2d 826, 832 (7th Cir. 1985) 

Made the holding that a Rule 60(b)(3) motion allows a party to overturn a final judgment based upon “fraud” so long as it is filed within one year from the date of judgment.

5. Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332, 1338 (5th Cir. 1978) 

Made the holding that fraud on the court only includes actions such as bribery of a judge or members of a jury, or the fabrication of evidence by a party in which an attorney is implicated

 

Notes

Finding cases specific to your threshold is difficult because most of those cases are not documented or are not yet concluded. However, the various rules and laws are relevant in determining when a motion to vacate may be granted or not. 

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