The Fourth Amendment, Privacy Rights and Law Enforcement
The Founding Fathers wrote the Fourth Amendment after their experiences with British officials who would use general warrants and writs of assistance to enter private homes and conduct searches to find evidence of any crime (1). The Fourth Amendment outlaws this practice and requires that search or arrest warrants particularly describe the places to be searched or things being seized, and requires that they be issued by neutral and detached magistrates (2) The United States Supreme Court has asserted that “the most basic constitutional rule in this area is that ‘searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment.” Still, there are exceptions to the idea that warrantless searches are always unreasonable. These exceptions are “jealously and carefully drawn” so that police must always seek a warrant, unless an exception applies (3)
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.’ (). This amendment guarantees to all citizens a personal right of privacy, free from unreasonable governmental searches and invasions. The fourth amendment does not prohibit all searches, only those that are unreasonable’ (). When a search is unreasonable as a matter of law, the exclusionary rule, which precludes the use of illegally obtained evidence, is activated. The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that “searches conducted without the authority of a search warrant are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment subject only to a few specifically established and delineated exceptions.”‘ These specific exceptions are “jealously and carefully drawn.” (). Proof of exigent circumstances or the existence of another exception obviates the warrant requirement.’ (4).
Supreme Court decisions interpreting the application of the search-incident-to-arrest exception have resulted in constantly shifting methods of analysis.’ (8). The Court has been unable to establish a strong precedent for application in cases arising under this exception. This inability has generated criticism focusing on the confusion and unpredictability of the decisions. The groundwork for the search-incident-to-arrest exception may be found in dicta of several Supreme Court decisions (). These dicta became the foundation for the decision in Marron v. United States, which held there is a “right without a warrant contemporaneously to search the place,” (9) in order to find and seize evidence of crime. This new reasoning was subsequently held inapplicable when the circumstances of the arrest allowed the arresting officers to obtain a search warrant (10). The pendulum swung towards further extension of the scope of the search incident to arrest in what were to become the two most influential decisions in this area for almost twenty years. In Harris v. United States, (11) the Court sustained a warrantless search of an entire four-room apartment. The Court noted that “the opinions . . . recognized that the search incident to arrest may, under appropriate circumstances extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises under his immediate control” (12). Finding that Harris commanded exclusive control over the entire four-room apartment, the Court emphasized the reasonableness approach. The Harrzs Court also considered the nature of the objects of the search in concluding that both the intensity and length of the search were reasonable (13). United States v. Rabtnowitz 28 strengthened the Harris principle of reasonableness. This decision upheld the search of a desk, safe, and file cabinets contained in a one-room office where the arrest occurred.
Clash of Interest between Individual’s privacy and Law Enforcement
Fourth amendment cases place constitutionally protected privacy interests against the responsibilities of law enforcement officers to combat crime (). The two interests are positioned in such a manner that the protection of one interest often curtails the other. It is the court’s responsibility to balance the public’s interest in safety against the individual’s right to privacy free from arbitrary interference by police officers. Law enforcement officials’ decisions to search subsequent to a lawful arrest are necessarily swift ad hoc judgments, leaving little room for them to contemplate the legality of their actions (). Therefore, in order for policemen to work within constitutional limitations, the Court must provide guideliness (). Since the fourth amendment regulates law enforcement officials in their daily conduct, its requirements need “to be expressed in terms that are readily applicable by the police” (). Juxtaposed against the duties of law enforcement officials are the personal interests protected by the fourth amendment. Individuals are guaranteed freedom from unreasonable invasions of legitimate privacy interests (). These privacy interests are “indispensable to the full enjoyment of personal security, personal liberty and private property . . . [and] they are to be regarded as the very essence of constitutional liberty” ().
Exclusionary Rule
Seizure of evidence in violation of an individual’s fourth amendment rights invokes the exclusionary rule. The rule bars the prosecution from introducing illegally seized evidence at trial. Currently the major rationale of the rule lies in its potential deterrent effect, () however, the preservation of judicial integrity is another suggested justification (). The trend towards the deterrence rationale as the sole justification for the exclusionary rule has led to the erosion of the rule’s application. There is a growing tendency to find that the harmful consequences of the rule outweigh any deterrent effect, () as well as a tendency to hesitate in applying the rule to anything less than flagrant or willfull violations of fourth amendment rights (). The exclusionary rule has been held inapplicable in grand jury proceedings, impeachment of witnesses, actions under statutes subsequently held invalid, and administrative proceedings (). The criticisms directed at the exclusionary rule, coupled with the current trend by the Court, suggest that modification of the exclusionary rule may be imminent (). Justice White’s dissent in Stone v. Powe1 () proposed barring the rule’s application in those circumstances where the evidence at issue was seized by an officer acting in the good faith belief that his conduct comported with existing law and having reasonable grounds for this belief (). This “good faith” rule is based upon the assumption that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is the deterrence of willful police misconduct. It is argued that when the officer does not know his actions are illegal or he acts under the mistaken assumption that they are legal, the exclusionary rule has no deterrent effect ().
Whether it is perceived as an exception to or modification of the exclusionary rule, the “good faith” standard can be seen as protecting individual rights only when deterrence of illegal police conduct can be effectively achieved (). Although the United States Supreme Court has not yet adopted the good faith standard suggested by Justice White, the Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Williams, () recently proclaimed its acceptance of this change in the exclusionary rule. The Fifth Circuit modified the exclusionary rule to the extent -that evidence is admissible “where it is discovered by officers in the course of actions that are taken in good faith and in the reasonable though mistaken belief that they are authorized”(). This holding, grounded on the belief that that the exclusionary rule’s purpose is to deter only willful or flagrant violations of fourth amendment rights, may have a considerable impact on the status of the exclusionary rule in other jurisdictions ().
Exceptions to Warrant Requirements
Search Incident to Lawful Arrest
Police do not have to have a warrant to conduct a search incident to lawful arrest. When conducting a lawful arrest, police may search the person, any area surrounding her, and any area within her wingspan (). Courts permit such a warrantless search as a protective measure for police safety and to secure evidence that might be destroyed (). Although it’s primarily meant to secure police from the threat of weapons being accessible to the person being arrested, the police may search and seize any contraband they find during such a search. This exception was developed by the United States Supreme Court’s 1969 decision, California v. Chimel (). In that case, police conducted a one-hour search of the defendant’s home after he was arrested for alleged involvement in a coin store burglary (). The search revealed coins, medals and other items that led to his conviction for burglary. While the Court invalidated the search as excessive and unreasonable, it established that police may search the area within immediate reach of a person being arrested. Justice Potter Stewart wrote “When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction” ().
Since Chimel, several cases have analyzed the scope of this exception. In the 2009 cases, Arizona v. Gant, the Court concluded that police may search the vehicle from which a person is being arrested if police reasonably believe that the occupant could access the vehicle at the time of the search, or that the vehicle contains evidence of the offense that led to the arrest (). On the other hand, the exception doesn’t apply to searches of a defendant’s cellphone after his arrest. In Riley v. United States, San Diego police found David Riley in possession of firearms during a search after arresting him for driving on a suspended license (). Police accessed Riley’s cellphone, which was in his pocket, to examine photographs and videos, and saw photographic evidence of gang affiliations. Riley’s attorneys sought suppression of the evidence, arguing that the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights and the Court agreed, prohibiting warrantless cell phone searches in all but exigent circumstances. None of the two justifications for the exception articulated in Chimel, officer safety and destruction of evidence, would justify police searching a cellphone without a warrant ().
Consent
Consent, by definition, waives the Fourth Amendment right against warrantless searches (). The consent exception is important and practical in application. In the last ten years, 90% of warrantless searches are based on consent (). To be valid, consent must be “freely and voluntarily.” However, it’s important to note that police need not inform people of their right to refuse searches. So, for example, at a traffic stop, a police officer may ask for consent to search the vehicle. If the driver agrees, the consent is valid even if the driver had no idea that he had the right to refuse. The government carries the burden of proving that a defendant freely and voluntarily provided consent (). In the 1973 case Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, the Court explained voluntary consent (). There, police stopped an automobile and asked the vehicle occupants if they could search the automobile. The defendant replied, “Sure, go ahead,” and during the subsequent police search, police found three checks that had previously been stolen from a car wash. The Court found that there was no Fourth Amendment violation. Both defendants and the police testified that the interactions between the two parties were congenial and there were no discussions of crime. One of the defendants even attempted to aid in the search. For consent to be nullified, the facts must demonstrate that police used duress or coercion to obtain consent ().
A wrinkle to the consent exception is that police can obtain consent from a person other than the person who owns the property that is being searched. A third party who law enforcement reasonably believes has authority to give such consent can allow police to search another’s property, as in the case of a babysitter who allows police to search the house (). If police reasonably believed that the babysitter was the homeowner, her consent is valid. Determining whether an officer’s belief that a third party may consent on behalf of another is reasonable is a fact-specific evaluation ().
Plain View
Law enforcement officers do not need warrants to seize evidence of criminal activity in plain view if they are legitimately in the locations from which the evidence can be viewed. The Supreme Court explained that a person “generally goes not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in contraband left in the open which is viewed by an officer from a lawful vantage point” ().
In the seminal case, Horton v. California, the defendant and an accomplice were suspected of having used a machine gun and a “stun gun” to steal cash and jewelry. The search warrant only allowed police to search for the stolen property and did not include authorization to search for the weapons (). When police executed the warrant, they didn’t find any stolen property, but did find guns in plain view (). The search was permissible. Three requirements must exist for the exception to apply. First, police must be in the area legally. Second, police must observe the item of criminality in plain view. Finally, the incriminating nature of the evidence must be immediately apparent, meaning that there needs to be a connection between the viewed object and illegal conduct (). The plain view exception also applies to allow police to seize contraband that is visible from public places, such as drug paraphernalia visible from the street through an open window.
Automobile Exception
Another exception to the warrant requirement is the automobile exception. Police do not need to get a warrant to search a vehicle if they have probable cause to believe that there is evidence of a crime, contraband, or fruits of a crime inside the vehicle. The Supreme Court, in Carroll v. United States, explained that it wasn’t practical for police to obtain a search warrant prior to searching a vehicle for contraband or other evidence of a crime because a vehicle is mobile and can easily be moved from the “locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.” So long as police have probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime is in the car or that a vehicle is connected to a criminal act, then they can conduct a warrantless search ().
Probable cause is a fairly high standard to meet. Merely being pulled over for speeding or even behaving nervously or suspiciously after being pulled over does not give officers probable cause to search the car. Probable cause requires something more, such as, for example, a witnesses’ tip that there is contraband in the car or a statement of one of the occupants to that effect. In a 2005 case, Illinois v. Caballes (), the Supreme Court ruled that drug-sniffing dogs indicating the presence of marijuana in a car was sufficient to establish probable cause and allow a search of the car. The breadth of the automobile exception has been expanded to cover vehicles other than automobiles. In United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, law enforcement boarded a private boat to inspect the owner’s documents, but then began to search the entire boat when they smelled marijuana (). They found marijuana during the search. The Court permitted the warrantless search, finding that it was reasonable because the government has an interest in inspecting vessels in the open seas without a warrant (). They, too, are mobile, and can be moved during the process of seeking the warrant.
Exigent Circumstances
Finally, there is an exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. If police have reason to believe that there is a bona fide emergency, they may enter premises to investigate and remedy. For example, if police officers passing by house hear someone scream from the inside, they may enter the house to determine if anybody’s in danger. If, while in the house, they see illegal weapons or drugs in plain view, they may seize those drugs under the plain view exception ().
Exigent circumstances can also apply when there is a probability that evidence can be destroyed or moved before a neutral and detached magistrate can issue a warrant. Law enforcement can then search property or seize evidence without one (). This, of course, is also the rationale behind the automobile exception (). Ancillary to the “exigent circumstances” rule is the “hot pursuit” rule. This is, if a fleeing criminal enters a private home, police in hot pursuit may also enter the home to effectuate a lawful arrest. While there, any contraband that is seen also falls under the plain view exception to the warrant requirement.
Law enforcement carries the burden of proving that exigent circumstances exist. In a 2011 Supreme Court case, Kentucky v. King, the Court shed light on the scope of the exception’s application. There, Lexington police knocked on the door of an apartment from which emanated a marijuana smell (). After loudly identifying themselves, police heard movement inside and a toilet flush. Fearing the destruction of evidence, police entered the apartment and found Hollis King smoking marijuana and found other illegal drugs in the apartment. King was convicted of drug trafficking and related offenses.
The Kentucky Supreme Court held that police violated King’s Fourth Amendment rights and that the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not apply (). The United States Supreme Court disagreed, holding that no warrant was required to go into King’s apartment and conduct a search because the officers faced an emergency situation where it was reasonable to conclude that the apartment’s residents were destroying evidence.
Federal Expectations for Automobile Exception
In the early days of the automobile, the Court created an exception for searches of vehicles, holding in Carroll v. United States1 that vehicles may be searched without warrants if the officer undertaking the search has probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband. The Court explained that the mobility of vehicles would allow them to be quickly moved from the jurisdiction if time were taken to obtain a warrant (). Initially, the Court limited Carroll’s reach, holding impermissible the warrantless seizure of a parked automobile merely because it is movable, and indicating that vehicles may be stopped only while moving or reasonably contemporaneously with movement (). The Court also ruled that the search must be reasonably contemporaneous with the stop, so that it was not permissible to remove the vehicle to the station house for a warrantless search at the convenience of the police ().
The Court next developed a reduced privacy rationale to supplement the mobility rationale, explaining that “the configuration, use, and regulation of automobiles often may dilute the reasonable expectation of privacy that exists with respect to differently situated property.” (). “One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one’s residence or as the repository of personal effects. It travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain view’ (). Although motor homes serve as residences and as repositories for personal effects, and their contents are often shielded from public view, the Court extended the automobile exception to them as well, holding that there is a diminished expectation of privacy in a mobile home parked in a parking lot and licensed for vehicular travel, hence “readily mobile” (). The Court has stated, however, that the automobile exception “does not permit an officer without a warrant to enter a home or its curtilage in order to search a vehicle therein” () This limit to the exception exists because “the scope of the automobile exception extends no further than the automobile itself” (). To search a vehicle under the automobile exception, an officer “must have a lawful right of access” to that vehicle,10 and generally, law enforcement officers have no right to enter a home or its curtilage without express or implied permission or without a warrant ().
The reduced expectancy concept has broadened police powers to conduct automobile searches without warrants, but they still must have probable cause to search a vehicle and they may not make random stops of vehicles on the roads, but instead must base stops of individual vehicles on probable cause or some “articulable and reasonable suspicion” () of traffic or safety violation or some other criminal activity (). If police stop a vehicle, then the vehicle’s passengers as well as its driver are deemed to have been seized from the moment the car comes to a halt, and the passengers as well as the driver may challenge the constitutionality of the stop (). A driver with lawful possession and control of a rental car may also be able to challenge the constitutionality of a stop, even if that driver is not listed as an authorized driver on the rental agreement (). Likewise, a police officer may frisk (pat down for weapons) both the driver and any passengers whom he reasonably concludes “might be armed and presently dangerous” ().
By contrast, fixed-checkpoint stops in the absence of any individualized suspicion have been upheld for purposes of promoting highway safety () or policing the international border (), but not for more generalized law enforcement purposes (). Once police have validly stopped a vehicle, they may also, based on articulable facts warranting a reasonable belief that weapons may be present, conduct a Terry-type protective search of those portions of the passenger compartment in which a weapon could be placed or hidden (). And, in the absence of such reasonable suspicion as to weapons, police may seize contraband and suspicious items “in plain view” inside the passenger compartment (). (A canine sniff around the perimeter of a car following a routine traffic stop does not offend the Fourth Amendment if the duration of the stop is justified by the traffic offense) with Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1613, 1614–15 (2015) (finding that the stop in question had been prolonged for seven to eight minutes beyond the time needed to resolve the traffic offense in order to conduct a canine sniff).
Although officers who have stopped a car to issue a routine traffic citation may conduct a Terry-type search, even including a pat-down of driver and passengers if there is reasonable suspicion that they are armed and dangerous, they may not conduct a full-blown search of the car () unless they exercise their discretion to arrest the driver instead of issuing a citation (). And once police have probable cause to believe there is contraband in a vehicle, they may remove the vehicle from the scene to the station house in order to conduct a search, without thereby being required to obtain a warrant (). “The justification to conduct such a warrantless search does not vanish once the car has been immobilized; nor does it depend upon a reviewing court’s assessment of the likelihood in each particular case that the car would have been driven away, or that its contents would have been tampered with, during the period required for the police to obtain a warrant” (). Because of the lessened expectation of privacy, inventory searches of impounded automobiles are justifiable in order to protect public safety and the owner’s property, and any evidence of criminal activity discovered in the course of the inventories is admissible in court (). The Justices were evenly divided, however, on the propriety of warrantless seizure of an arrestee’s automobile from a public parking lot several hours after his arrest, its transportation to a police impoundment lot, and the taking of tire casts and exterior paint scrapings ().
Police in undertaking a warrantless search of an automobile may not extend the search to the persons of the passengers therein29 unless there is a reasonable suspicion that the passengers are armed and dangerous, in which case a Terry patdown is permissible (), or unless there is individualized suspicion of criminal activity by the passengers (). But because passengers in an automobile have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the interior area of the car, a warrantless search of the glove compartment and the spaces under the seats, which turned up evidence implicating the passengers, invaded no Fourth Amendment interest of the passengers (). Luggage and other closed containers found in automobiles may also be subjected to warrantless searches based on probable cause, regardless of whether the luggage or containers belong to the driver or to a passenger, and regardless of whether it is the driver or a passenger who is under suspicion (). The same rule now applies whether the police have probable cause to search only the containers or whether they have probable cause to search the automobile for something capable of being held in the container ().
Search Incident to Lawful Arrest (Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S 332)
After Rodney Gant was arrested for driving with a suspended license, handcuffed, and locked in the back of a patrol car, police officers searched his car and discovered cocaine in the pocket of a jacket on the backseat. Because Gant could not have accessed his car to retrieve weapons or evidence at the time of the search, the Arizona Supreme Court held that the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, as defined in Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 (1969), and applied to vehicle searches in New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454 (1981), did not justify the search in this case. Under Chimel, police may search incident to arrest only the space within an arrestee’s “‘immediate control,’” meaning “the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.” 395 U. S., at 763. The safety and evidentiary justifications underlying Chimel’s reaching-distance rule determine Belton’s scope. This means that Belton does not authorize a vehicle search incident to a recent occupant’s arrest after the arrestee has been secured and cannot access the interior of the vehicle. Consistent with the holding in Thornton v. United States, 541 U. S. 615 (2004), and following the suggestion in Justice Scalia’s opinion concurring in the judgment in that case, id., at 632, circumstances unique to the automobile context justify a search incident to arrest when it is reasonable to believe that evidence of the offense of arrest might be found in the vehicle. I
On August 25, 1999, acting on an anonymous tip that the residence at 2524 North Walnut Avenue was being used to sell drugs, Tucson police officers Griffith and Reed knocked on the front door and asked to speak to the owner. Gant answered the door and, after identifying himself, stated that he expected the owner to return later. The officers left the residence and conducted a records check, which revealed that Gant’s driver’s license had been suspended and there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest for driving with a suspended license. When the officers returned to the house that evening, they found a man near the back of the house and a woman in a car parked in front of it. After a third officer arrived, they arrested the man for providing a false name and the woman for possessing drug paraphernalia. Both arrestees were handcuffed and secured in separate patrol cars when Gant arrived. The officers recognized his car as it entered the driveway, and Officer Griffith confirmed that Gant was the driver by shining a flashlight into the car as it drove by him. Gant parked at the end of the driveway, got out of his car, and shut the door. Griffith, who was about 30 feet away, called to Gant, and they approached each other, meeting 10 to-12 feet from Gant’s car. Griffith immediately arrested Gant and handcuffed him. Because the other arrestees were secured in the only patrol cars at the scene, Griffith called for backup. When two more officers arrived, they locked Gant in the backseat of their vehicle. After Gant had been handcuffed and placed in the back of a patrol car, two officers searched his car: One of them found a gun, and the other discovered a bag of cocaine in the pocket of a jacket on the backseat.
Gant was charged with two offenses; possession of a narcotic drug for sale and possession of drug paraphernalia (i.e., the plastic bag in which the cocaine was found). He moved to suppress the evidence seized from his car on the ground that the warrantless search violated the Fourth Amendment. Among other things, Gant argued that Belton did not authorize the search of his vehicle because he posed no threat to the officers after he was handcuffed in the patrol car and because he was arrested for a traffic offense for which no evidence could be found in his vehicle. When asked at the suppression hearing why the search was conducted, Officer Griffith responded: “Because the law says we can do it.” App. 75. The trial court rejected the State’s contention that the officers had probable cause to search Gant’s car for contraband when the search began, id., at 18, 30, but it denied the motion to suppress. Relying on the fact that the police saw Gant commit the crime of driving without a license and apprehended him only shortly after he exited his car, the court held that the search was permissible as a search incident to arrest. Id., at 37.
A jury found Gant guilty on both drug counts, and he was sentenced to a 3-year term of imprisonment. After protracted state-court proceedings, the Arizona Supreme Court concluded that the search of Gant’s car was unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The court’s opinion discussed at length our decision in Belton, which held that police may search the passenger compartment of a vehicle and any containers therein as a contemporaneous incident of an arrest of the vehicle’s recent occupant. 216 Ariz. 1, 3–4, 162 P. 3d 640, 642–643 (2007) (citing 453 U. S., at 460). The court distinguished Belton as a case concerning the permissible scope of a vehicle search incident to arrest and concluded that it did not answer “the threshold question whether the police may conduct a search incident to arrest at all once the scene is secure.” 216 Ariz., at 4, 162 P. 3d, at 643. Relying on our earlier decision in Chimel, the court observed that the search-incident-to arrest exception to the warrant requirement is justified by interests in officer safety and evidence preservation. 216 Ariz., at 4, 162 P. 3d, at 643. When “the justifications underlying Chimel no longer exist because the scene is secure and the arrestee is handcuffed, secured in the back of a patrol car, and under the supervision of an officer,” the court concluded, a “warrantless search of the arrestee’s car cannot be justified as necessary to protect the officers at the scene or prevent the destruction of evidence.” Id., at 5, 162 P. 3d, at 644. Accordingly, the court held that the search of Gant’s car was unreasonable.
Inventory Search (South Dakota V. Opperman, 428 US 364)
After respondent’s car had been impounded for multiple parking violations the police, following standard procedures, inventoried the contents of the car. In doing so they discovered marihuana in the glove compartment, for the possession of which respondent was subsequently arrested. His motion to suppress the evidence yielded by the warrantless inventory search was denied, and respondent was thereafter convicted. The State Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the evidence had been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment as made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth. Held: The police procedures followed in this case did not involve an “unreasonable” search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The expectation of privacy in one’s automobile is significantly less than that relating to one’s home or office, Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583, 590. When vehicles are impounded, police routinely follow caretaking procedures by securing and inventorying the cars’ contents. These procedures have been widely sustained as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. This standard practice was followed here, and there is no suggestion of any investigatory motive on the part of the police. Pp. 367-376
Local ordinances prohibit parking in certain areas of downtown Vermillion, S. D., between the hours of 2 a. m. and 6 a. m. During the early morning hours of December 10, 1973, a Vermillion police officer observed respondent’s unoccupied vehicle illegally parked in the restricted zone. At approximately 3 a. m., the officer issued an overtime parking ticket and placed it on the car’s windshield. The citation warned: “Vehicles in violation of any parking ordinance may be towed from the area.” At approximately 10 o’clock on the same morning, another officer issued a second ticket for an overtime parking violation. These circumstances were routinely reported to police headquarters, and after the vehicle was inspected, the car was towed to the city impound lot. From outside the car at the impound lot, a police officer observed a watch on the dashboard and other items of personal property located on the back seat and back floorboard. At the officer’s direction, the car door was then unlocked and, using a standard inventory form pursuant to standard police procedures, the officer inventoried the contents of the car, including the contents of the glove compartment, which was unlocked. There he found marihuana contained in a plastic bag. All items, including the contraband, were removed to the police department for safekeeping.1
During the late afternoon of December 10, respondent appeared at the police department to claim his property. The marihuana was retained by police. Respondent was subsequently arrested on charges of possession of marihuana. His motion to suppress the evidence yielded by the inventory search was denied; he was convicted after a jury trial and sentenced to a fine of $100 and 14 days’ incarceration in the county jail. On appeal, the Supreme Court of South Dakota reversed the conviction. 89 S. D. -, 228 N. W. 2d 152. The court concluded that the evidence had been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. The U.S supreme court granted certiorari, 423 U. S. 923 (1975), and reversed.
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Expectations for Automobile Exception