Arami Cheyenne Walker
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Plaintiff in pro per
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES- CENTRAL DISTRICT
ARAMI CHEYENNE WALKER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BOARD OF REGENTS, UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA,
Defendant(s)
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Case No.: 23STCV04603
PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT’S NOTICE OF DEMURRER
AND DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED
COMPLAINT
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S NOTICE OF DEMURRER AND DEMURRER TO
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
NOW COMES Arami Cheyenne Walker, Plaintiff, and files this Opposition to Defendant’s
Notice of Demurrer and Demurrer to First Amended Complaint, and for cause would show this
Honorable Court as follows:
1. That the Defendant’s Notice of Demurrer and Demurrer to First Amended Complaint is
not meritorious and should be dismissed for the same.
2. That in response to the Defendant’s allegation regarding the cause of action, the Plaintiff
wishes to respond as follows:
A. Breach of Contract
3. As opposed to the Defendant’s contention that the Plaintiff cannot state a viable breach of
contract claim since the Regents used her image consistent with the terms of the Model
Release Agreement and not for defamatory purposes, the Plaintiff maintains that her
claim for breach of contract against the Defendant is viable.
4. The elements of a cause of action for breach of contract include the existence of a
contract; Plaintiff’s performance or excuse of non-performance; Defendant’s breach, and
the resulting damages to the Plaintiff. Reichert v General Insurance Company (1968) 68
Cal. 2d 822, 830 [69 Cal, Rptr. 321, 442 P.2d 377].)
5. There exists a model release executed by the Plaintiff and Elena Zhukova in the presence
of Anastasila Sapon on May 28, 2015 with the Defendant being one of the assigns hence
an existence of a contract
6. The Plaintiff fulfilled all her obligations in the model release. Nonetheless, the Defendant
breached the contract by committing Libel Per Se, insinuating that the Plaintiff was a
response to Covid and the public consequently labeling her as the “Postergirl of Covid.”
7. A statement is libelous "per se" when on its face the words of the statement are of such a
character as to be actionable without a showing of special damage. A libel "per quod," on
the other hand, [32 Cal. 3d 154] requires that the injurious character or effect be
established by allegation and proof. As a result of the Defendant’s breach, the Plaintiff
suffered general and special damages pertaining to the incident.
8. These definitions are embodied in Civil Code section 45a: "A libel which is defamatory
of the plaintiff without the necessity of explanatory matter, such as an inducement,
innuendo or other extrinsic fact, is said to be libel on its face. Defamatory language not
libelous on its face is not actionable unless the plaintiff alleges and proves that he
suffered special damage as a proximate result thereof." Plaintiff contends alternatively
that defendants’ communications either were libelous on their face, without the necessity
of further explanation, or were libelous upon consideration of extrinsic facts showing
inducement, innuendo and colloquium.
9. Moreover, the Defendant should be held liable for using the Plaintiff’s image in 2022
without her consent. Despite the UCLA staff being informed in 2020 that the image and
contract were no longer effective, their employees still proceeded to use the image and
the contract violating Civil Code 3344 on March 12, 2022.
10. Accordingly, the Defendant is liable for breach of contract and ought to pay the Plaintiff
both special and general damages as per Ca Civil Code 48 (a).
B. Appropriation and Invasion of Privacy
11. In opposition to the Defendant’s claim that the appropriation claim should be dismissed
since the Plaintiff consented to the use of her image by executing the Model Release
Agreement, the Plaintiff avers that the Defendant utilized for commercial use, precisely
to raise money for Covid-19 vaccine hence appropriation. See Cal. Civ Code § 3344.1(a).
12. Furthermore, regarding, appropriation claims, the current legal standard in California is
whether: “one who views the photograph [or likeness] with the naked eye [must]
reasonably determine that the person depicted in the photograph [or likeness] is the same
person who is complaining of its unauthorized use.” (Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157
F.3d 686, 693 (9th Cir. 1998).) The Plaintiff asserts that being the complainant, she was
the same person in the publicized image.
13. Most jurisdictions require that a plaintiff prove the defendant had made a commercial use
of the plaintiff’s identity when claiming a violation of the common law right of publicity.
However, under California common law, a right of publicity claim does not require a
commercial use by the defendant. All that is needed is the defendant’s use of a plaintiff’s
identity, the appropriation of plaintiff’s name and likeness to defendant’s advantage,
commercially or otherwise, a lack of consent and resulting injury. (Solano v. Playgirl,
Inc., 292 F.3d 1078, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002).)
14. Accordingly, despite the Defendant contending that the plaintiff’s image was not used for
any commercial use, the Plaintiff’s image was still used to the Defendant’s advantage
without the Plaintiff’s express or implied consent hence an invasion of her privacy.
15. California courts have recognized privacy causes of action pleaded by the plaintiffs as
follows: (1) public disclosure of private facts, and (2) intrusion into private places,
conversations or other matters. (See Forsher v. Bugliosi (1980) 26 Cal. 3d 792, 808 [163
Cal. Rptr. 628, 608 P.2d 716]; Kapellas v. Kofman (1969) 1 Cal. 3d 20, 35-36 [81 Cal.
Rptr. 360, 459 P.2d 912]; Miller v. National Broadcasting Co. (1986) 187 Cal. App. 3d
1463, 1482 [232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 69 A.L.R.4th 1027]; Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc.
(1983) 139 Cal. App. 3d 118, 126 [188 Cal. Rptr. 762] (Diaz).) Thus, by publishing the
Plaintiff’s image without her consent, the Defendant intruded into her privacy.
C. Promissory Estoppel and Code about Ambiguous Promise
16. The Plaintiff opposes the Defendant’s contention that the unilateral promise to terminate
is not enforceable in the absence of consideration.
17. UCLA’s Executive of External Marketing promised to terminate the contract an remove
the Plaintiff’s images from their library. Moreover, since Ms. Jennifer Wheelock was
working within the scope of her employment, UCLA should be held vicariously liable for
the promise and Duty set forth by Ms. Jenniffer.
18. Additionally, Civil Code § 1649 provides that if a promise is in any respect ambiguous or
uncertain, it ought to be interpreted in the sense in which the promisor believed, at the
time of making it, that the promise understood it. Hence despite the above-referenced
promise being ambiguous or uncertain, it should be construed in favor of the Plaintiff.
Direcv, Inc. v. Imburgia et al. (2015) No. 14-462; Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela 587 U.S.
(more) 139 S. Ct. 1407; 203 L. Ed. 2d 636.
19. Accordingly, the Defendant’s claim that the release agreement signed by the Plaintiff was
overly broad and predatory hence uncertain should be dismissed and the agreement
construed in favor of the Plaintiff.
D. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
20. As opposed to the Defendant’s aversions, the Plaintiff asserts that a claim of negligent
infliction of emotional distress can stand.
21. The Federal Tort Claims Act provides exceptions for certain intentional torts from its
general waiver of sovereign immunity. 28 U.S.C. § 2680. One of these exceptions is “any
claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious
prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit or interference
with contract rights.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).
22. Thus, claims against the government for intentional infliction of emotional distress are
not excepted from the FTCA. Sheehan v. U.S., 896 F.2d 1168 (9th Cir. 1990). Nor has
such an exception been read into the statute.
23. Given the fact that the Defendant committed the tort of libel against the Plaintiff
negligently causing her emotional distress, the same is exempted from the general waiver
of immunity hence the Defendant ought to be held liable for its heinous act.
24. Furthermore, despite the Defendant being immune, its employees are not. MCCarty v
State of California Department of Transportation (20080 164 Cal. App. 4 th 955;
McCorkle v. City of Los Angeles (1969) 70 Cal.2d 252, 261. Also, a public entity is liable
derivatively for an injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the
public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would have given
rise to a cause of action against that employee.
25. The negligent an libelous act of defamation of the Defendant and/or its employees caused
emotional distress to the Plaintiff hence the cause of action is sufficient.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Plaintiff respectfully requests that the court dismisses the
Defendant’s demurer to first amended complaint for lack of merit.
Dated this _____ day of November, 2023.
Respectfully Submitted,
___________________________________
Loren Leon,
Plaintiff in pro per
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