EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Washington Field Office
113 M. Street, N.E., Suite 4NW02F
Washington, D.C. 20507
SHAULIEL STOREY,
Complainant,
v.
ALEX AZAR, SECRETARY :
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND :
HUMAN SERVICES :
Office of the Secretary
Agency
EEOC NO. 570-2020-00185X
AGENCY NO. HHS-OS-0012-2019
Administrative Judge: Woodham
COMPLAINANT’S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
NOW COMES this day Complainant SHAULIEL STOREY, proceeding Pro Se, and files
this Memorandum in Support of Complainant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Complainant
alleges as follows:
i. There is no material issues of fact on whether Agency is in violation of the
Equal Pay Act
The Equal Pay Act prohibits an employer from engaging in sex-based wage
discrimination by paying different wages to employees of different sexes within any
establishment for jobs that require substantially equal skill, effort and responsibility, and which
are performed under similar working conditions. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S.
188, 195, 94 S.Ct. 2223, 2228, 41 L.Ed.2d 1 (1974).
“To establish a prima facie case under the Act, a plaintiff must show that an employer
pays different wages to employees of opposite sexes for ‘for equal work on jobs the performance
of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar
working conditions’.” Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976)).
Complainant started his employment on January 1, 2017 as a Human Resource Assistant,
GS-0203-05, with a base pay with locality adjustment amounting to $36,281.00 per year. The
position was a full-time conditional appointment. (Ex. F-15, ROI p. 550). Consequently,
Complainant received a general pay adjustment to $37,113.00 per year, on January 7, 2018. (Ex.
F-15, ROI p. 551). Next, Complainant became a Program Assistant with a base salary and
locality adjustment of $41,369.00 per year, on July 15, 2018 (Ex. F-15, ROI p. 552).
Comparator Tina Williams (“Comparator”) is an Black, African American female; and is
non-disabled (Ex. F-8, ROI pp. 412-413). On June 9, 2019, when she was a GS-8, she transferred
to the Office of Medicare and Appeals and was promoted to a GS-0201-09 (ROI p 414 #18). It is
notable that while Comparator was a GS-08 when she transferred, Complainant was a GS-5, on a
career ladder track where he got promoted yearly (ROI p. 414). Comparator admitted that admit
that she and Complainant did substantially the same work. However, Comparator received a base
salary plus locality pay of $67,093.00 compared to Complainant’s $41,369.00 (ROI pp. 551,
553).
It is also notable that Complainant had more seniority and time in service than
Comparator, yet Comparator received more money than Complainant (ROI p. 11). Besides,
Complainant trained Comparator on how to do the job. As proof thereof, Ms. Green testified that
Complainant trained Comparator well (Tr:124:9-17).
A further incidence of unequal pay happened when Ms. Green only awarded Comparator
James Quin, who is Caucasian, with a cash incentive, and left out Complainant. Complainant and
Comparator James Quin had completed a job together.
The foregoing shows how Agency subjected Complainant to unequal pay. Complainant is
therefore entitled to judgment in his favor.
ii. There is no material issues of fact on whether Complainant was harassed
both sexually and non-sexually
Quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs when an employer alters an employee’s job
conditions as a result of the employee’s refusal to submit to sexual demands. Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), 106 S.Ct. at 2404.
To make out a prima facie case of quid pro quo sexual harassment, the complainant must
show: (1) that [he] was a member of a protected class; (2) that [he] was subject to unwelcome
sexual advances or requests for sexual favors; (3) that the harassment complained of was based
on sex; (4) that the employee’s submission to the unwelcome advances was an express or implied
condition for receiving job benefits or that the employee’s refusal to submit to the supervisor’s
sexual demands resulted in an adverse job consequence; and (5) that Respondeat superior
liability exists. See Gary v. Long, 313 U.S. App. D.C. 403, 59 F.3d 1391, 1396 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
A prima facie case of sex discrimination under Title VII is established when a
Complainant shows: (1) that he is a member of a protected class; (2) that he suffered an adverse
employment action; and (3) that he was treated differently than similarly situated employees who
are not part of the protected class, giving rise to an inference of discrimination. McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
First, Complainant is a member of a protected class based on his gender. He is a male.
Next, Complainant was subjected to an unwanted request for sexual favors when his supervisor,
Ms. Green, made sexual advances towards him. Complainant reasonably believes that Ms. Green
attempted to make sexual advances to Complainant by inviting Complainant to dinner, in the
pretext of discussing credit hours. However, Ms. Green was rebuked by Complainant.
Complainant’s action resulted in a series of adverse job consequences. For instance, his job was
eliminated; he was excluded from meetings about telework on the excuse that telework was not
an option for him as an HR Assistant; his arrival and departure times to and from work, and his
lunch times were being tracked; and he was charged with AWOL.
Complainant also asserts that he was sexually discriminated upon when he was paid less
than other similarly placed female employees. Comparator Williams admitted that she and
Complainant did substantially the same work. ROI p. 414. Comparator Williams was being paid
a base salary plus locality pay of $67,093.00 compared to Complainant’s $41,369.00 (ROI pp.
551, 553).
The foregoing shows how Agency sexually discriminated against Complainant.
Complainant is therefore entitled to judgment in his favor.
iii. Complainant was subjected to race discrimination
To establish racial discrimination, a plaintiff must show that (1) he belongs to a protected
class, (2) he was qualified for the position, (3) he was subjected to an adverse employment
action, and (4) similarly situated non-white individuals were treated more favorably. See St.
Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993).
First, Complainant belongs to a protected class. He is a dark-skinned Black/African
American. (SMF # 4; ROI p. 39). Next, Complainant was qualified for all the positions he served
in the Agency. As proof thereof, Complainant was promoted in the course of his employment.
He joined as a GS-0203-05, and was promoted to a Program Assistant. Besides, he trained
Comparator Tina Williams on how to do his job, which training was acknowledged by Ms.
Green (Tr:124:9-17).
Next, Complainant was subjected to adverse employment actions. First, his job was
eliminated after he raised a grievance against the Agency, to the Union (ROI p. 120, 339).
Complainant was also excluded from meetings about telework on the excuse that telework was
not an option for him as an HR Assistant (ROI pp. 120-121). Further, Complainant’s Supervisor
told him his arrival and departure times to and from work, and his lunch times were being
tracked. (ROI p. 39). Complainant was also charged with AWOL after he rejected an invitation
to discuss the issue of additional credit (ROI p. 135
Similarly placed non-whites were treated more favorably than Complainant. For instance,
light-skinned, Black/African American, non-disabled employees were treated more favorably in
that they were not told they did not have other options for transfer and were not forced to take a
position (ROI p. 120); they were not tracked when they arrived at work, took lunch, and left
work for the day; and were not charged with AWOL for taking unscheduled leave (ROI p. 135).
. The foregoing shows how Agency racially discriminated against Complainant.
Complainant is therefore entitled to judgment in his favor.
iv. There is no material issues of fact on whether Complainant was subjected to
reprisal
To establish a valid cause of action for reprisal, "Plaintiff must set forth a prima facie
case by proving that he was engaged in a protected activity which caused an adverse reaction by
the employer taken with the intent or motive to retaliate.” Mitchell v. Secretary of Commerce,
No. 82-3020, slip op. at 4 (D.D.C. Feb. 7, 1984).
Complainant filed a grievance with the Union regarding seat selection and need for
reasonable accommodation. (Ex. 6 ROI pp. 8, 40). However, after filing the grievance, Ms.
Patricia Eversley began reassigning Complainant’s work to other co-workers—works that
Complainant had been doing for months—under the pretext that the work was no-longer Grade-
appropriate. Eversley also began excluding Complaint from meetings with other colleagues,
ignored Complainant’s emails; denied Complainant the ability to share and receive work from
co-workers, only assigning work to Complainant herself. (ROI pp.120-121).
Further, Complainant received a notice from Ms. Green and Eversley on July 2018, that
Complainant’s job was eliminated and the only position available to him was in Ms. Green’s
branch. (ROI p. 120, 339). Complainant’s attempts to turn down the position in Ms. Green’s
branch was followed by a threat that it was the only option available and that the reassignment
would convert him to a career competitive status (ROI p. 6, 339; Ex. 4: Offer Letter).
Complainant was also excluded from meetings about telework on the excuse that
telework was not an option for him as an HR Assistant. (ROI pp. 120-121). When Complainant
raised his concerns to Ms. Eversley that other HR Assistants were not denied telework, Ms.
Eversley told Complainant that HR Assistants in her branch do not telework. (ROI p. 121).
It is notable that light-skinned, Black/African American, non-disabled employees were
treated more favorably in that they were not told they did not have other options for transfer and
were not forced to take a position. (ROI p. 120).
The foregoing shows how Agency retaliated against Complainant for filing a grievance
with the union. Complainant is therefore entitled to judgment in his favor.
v. There is no material issues of fact on whether Complainant was subjected to
a hostile work environment
“Whether an environment is sufficiently hostile or abusive must be judged by looking at
all the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity;
whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it
unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance." Clark County School Dist. v.
Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270-71 (2001)
In the instant action, Complainant’s Supervisor told him his arrival and departure times to
and from work, and his lunch times were being tracked. Notably, Pat Eversley told Complainant
to email her on his arrival and departure time but no other employees were required to meet the
same requirement. (ROI p. 130). Ms. Green also told Complainant that all the managers and
supervisor were told to track when Complainant arrived at work, took lunch, and left work for
the day. (ROI p. 39). No other non-Black, light or dark-skinned African American, disabled
employees were tracked in a similar fashion. (ROI p. 131).
The foregoing shows how Agency created a hostile work environment for Complainant.
Complainant is therefore entitled to judgment in his favor.
vi. There is no material issues of fact on whether Agency subjected Complainant
to disparage treatment
The disparate treatment theory is appropriately employed by aggrieved employees
claiming that they were intentionally treated less favorably because of their race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin under Title VII, Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577,
98 S.Ct. 2943, 2949, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978). Disparate impact cases typically involve
employment practices which, although facially neutral, fall more harshly on one group than
another and cannot be justified by business necessity. See United States Postal Service Board of
Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713 n. 1, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 1481 n. 1, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983).
In the instant action, Agency charged Complainant with AWOL after he rejected an
invitation to discuss the issue of additional credit (ROI p. 135). Accordingly, Complainant
received an email from Ms. Green on December 7, 2018, charging Complainant for taking
emergency leave to see his medical care provider on November 27, 2018 (ROI p. 135). The
email expressly stated that Ms. Green had experience “handling dark-skinned” men.
Other female employees and lighter-skinned Black/African American, or Caucasian
employees were not charged with AWOL for taking unscheduled leave, specifically Magic
“Rain.” (ROI p. 135).
The foregoing shows how Agency treated Complainant less favorably because of his
race, color, sex, or national origin. Complainant is therefore entitled to judgment in his favor.
vii. There is no material issues of fact on whether Agency failed to accommodate
Complainant and subjected him to disability discrimination
An employer commits an unfair employment practice under § 49.60.180 when it
discharges an employee without attempting to make reasonable accommodations to the
employee’s physical, mental, or sensory limitations. Reese v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 107 Wn.2d
563, 578-80, 731 P.2d 497, 506 (1987).
In the instant action, Complainant requested an accommodation from his supervisor, Ms.
Green, and informed her of his disability (ROI p. 115). However, Ms. Green failed to follow
through on Complainant’s accommodation request (ROI p. 330-333). Ms. Green also changed
Complainant’s SF-50 thus changing his tenure with the agency from “competitive” to
“excepted.” (ROI p. 39). Notably, Complainant’s job description, GS-0344-06, stated that the
Complainant’s position was “new”, “nonexempt” and “competitive.” (ROI p. 429).
Also, on December 4, 2018, Complainant again wrote three times to telework to request
for reasonable accommodation as a result of his mental disability, which was supported by
medical documents. Ms. Green acknowledged receiving Complainant’s accommodation request
(Ex. 3: Tr.:156:16-160:17). Agency again failed to engage Complainant in an interactive process
(ROI pp 115,117, 479-483). Complainant was terminated on December 10, 2018, which was
shortly after he requested for reasonable accommodation (ROI pp. 2; Ex. F-11, ROI pp. 443;
485). Ms. Green testified that she had already decided that Complainant would be terminated on
December 10, 20188, when Complainant made the accommodation request on December 7 th (Ex.
3: Tr.162-20-164:1).
On the other hand, other employees were granted their accommodation requests without
being disciplined. For instance, Comparator Tina Williams, Program Assistant, who is a light-
skinned, Black African American female, was granted telework and not disciplined for taking
unscheduled leave (ROI p. 119).
It follows; Agency’s actions as described above amount to an unfair employment
practice. Complainant is therefore entitled to judgment in his favor.
RELIEF REQUESTED
WHEREFORE, the Complainant pray that the court grants his Motion for Summary Judgment
for the aforesaid reasons.
Dated this: _____________
____________________________
SHAULIEL STOREY
Pro se
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, SHAULIEL STOREY, hereby certify that I served Complainant’s Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment on ___________, via email and EEOC Public Portal on the
following parties:
EEOC:
Administrative Judge Alissa D. Rodriguez
Email: Alissa.rodriguez@eeoc.gov
AGENCY:
James Simpson, Agency Representative
Email: james.simpson@hhs.govated This [ENTER DATE].
____________________________
SHAULIEL STOREY
Pro se
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