COMPLAINT FOR DEFAMATIONAND INTENTIONAL INFLICTION

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF XXXX

CIVIL DIVISION

 
 

ROSEMARY KILKENNY,                             

                        Plaintiff,

                        v.                                                    CASE NO.: 2020 CA 0043316 B

EDWARD SARGENT,                                         JUDGE:

                        Defendant.

DEFENDANT’S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT FOR DEFAMATION AND INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

            COMES NOW, Defendant, Edward Sargent, pro se and answers Rosemary E. Kilkenny, Esq.’s complaint for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress and alleges as follows:

NATURE OF CASE

  1. This case is in connection with a contractual dispute regarding Plaintiff’s promise to repay a $20,000 loan in a manner that is clearly delineated in a notarized, legally valid, and enforceable agreement that Plaintiff signed in the District of Columbia, while they were both adults of sound mind.

ANSWER TO THE COMPLAINT

  • Mr. Sargent neither admits nor denies allegations contained in paragraph 1 of the complaint.
  • Mr. Sargent neither admits nor denies allegations contained in paragraph 2 of the complaint.
  • The Defendant admits allegations contained in paragraph 3 of the complaint that Plaintiff resides in Virginia and that she was/has been employed by Georgetown University and currently serves as the Vice President for Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Chief Diversity Officer.
  • The Defendant admits allegations contained in paragraph 4 of the complaint as to Defendant’s residence.
  • The Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 5 of the complaint, and therefore denies them.
  • The Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 6 of the complaint, and therefore denies them.
  • The Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 7 of the complaint, and therefore denies them.  
  • The Defendant admits allegations contained in paragraph 8 of the complaint.
  • The Defendant admits allegations contained in paragraph 9 of the complaint.
  • The Defendant denies allegations contained in paragraph 10 of the complaint.
  • The Defendant admits allegations contained in paragraph 11 of the complaint.
  • The Defendant admits allegations contained in paragraph 12 of the complaint.
  • The Defendant admits allegations contained in paragraph 13 of the complaint.
  • The Defendant neither admits nor denies allegations contained in paragraph 14.
  • The Defendant admits allegations contained in paragraph 15 of the complaint.
  • The Defendant admits allegations contained in paragraph 16 of the complaint.
  • The Defendant admits allegations contained in paragraph 17 of the complaint.
  • The Defendant admits allegations contained in paragraph 18 of the complaint.
  • The Defendant admits allegations contained in paragraph 19 of the complaint.
  • The Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 20 of the complaint, and therefore denies them.
  • The Defendant denies allegations contained in paragraph 21 of the complaint.
  • The Defendant denies allegations contained in paragraph 22 of the complaint.
  • The Defendant admits allegations contained in paragraph 23 of the complaint.
  • The Defendant neither admits nor denies allegations contained in paragraph 24 of the complaint.
  • The Defendant admits allegations contained in paragraph 25 of the complaint.
  • The Defendant partially admits allegations contained in paragraph 26 of the complaint.
  • The Defendant denies allegations contained in paragraph 27 of the complaint to the extent that Defendant’s email amounted to a harassment campaign.
  • The Defendant admits allegations contained in paragraph 28 of the complaint.
  • The Defendant denies allegations contained in paragraph 29 of the complaint.
  • The Defendant denies allegations contained in paragraph 30 of the complaint.
  • The Defendant admits allegations contained in paragraph 31 of the complaint.
  • The Defendant admits allegations contained in paragraph 32 of the complaint.
  • The Defendant denies allegations contained in paragraph 33 of the complaint.
  • The Defendant neither admits nor denies allegations contained in paragraph 34 of the complaint.
  • The Defendant denies allegations contained in paragraph 35 of the complaint.
  • The Defendant denies allegations contained in paragraph 36 of the complaint.
  • The Defendant denies allegations contained in paragraph 37 of the complaint.
  • The Defendant denies allegations contained in paragraph 38 of the complaint.
  • The Defendant denies allegations contained in paragraph 39 of the complaint.
  • The Defendant denies allegations contained in paragraph 40 of the complaint.
  • The Defendant denies allegations contained in paragraph 41 of the complaint.
  • The Defendant denies allegations contained in paragraph 42 of the complaint.
  • The Defendant denies allegations contained in paragraph 43 of the complaint.
  • The Defendant denies allegations contained in paragraph 44 of the complaint.
  • The Defendant denies allegations contained in paragraph 45 of the complaint.
  • The Defendant denies allegations contained in paragraph 46 of the complaint.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

  • In Paragraph 27 of Plaintiff’s Complaint, she states that Defendant published false statements in multiple emails to various parties. Plaintiff also states in paragraph 44 of the complaint that Defendant’s objective in publishing the information was to cause her emotional distress to pressure her into complying with his demands. In paragraphs 40 and 45, Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages worth $100,000. In paragraphs 41 and 46, Plaintiff seeks punitive damages worth $50,000. 
  • AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES: Upon Defendant’s information and belief, the information in the emails constituted Substantial truth. Under District of Columbia defamation law, truth is a complete defense to libel actions. Edmond v. American Education Services, 823 F. Supp. 2d 28, 35 (D.D.C. 2011). See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and Time Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 411 (1967) where the court explained inter alia that Truth is an absolute defense against defamation.
  1. The statement need not be completely true to constitute substantial truth. Statements which are not entirely true but contain the crux of gist of the sting of a truthful statement are referred to as statements of “substantial truth.” In D.C., substantial truth of a publication constitutes truth, and truth (as noted above) is an absolute defense to defamation claims if the statements are “substantially true.” This was the court’s decision in Jolevare v. Alpha Kappa Alpha Sorority, Inc., 521 F.Supp. 2d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2007). Substantial truth will occur when “the gist of the statement is true or that the statement is true or that the statement is substantially true as it would be understood by its intended audience.” Ye v. Holder, 644 F. Supp. 2d 112, 117-18 (D.D.C. 2009).
  • The statement need not be perfectly accurate to amount to constitute substantial truth. The law does not require that a statement must be perfectly accurate in every conceivable way to be considered “true.” Under the substantial truth doctrine, minor factual inaccuracies will be ignored so long as the inaccuracies do not materially alter the substance or impact of what is being communicated. In other words, only the “gist” or “sting” of a statement must be correct. In that vein, Courts have held that some false statements must be protected for the wider purpose of allowing the dissemination of truthful speech. In Rouch v. Enquirer & News of Battle Creek, the Court considered substantial truth, a statement that a man was charged with sexual assault, when actually he had only been arrested but not arraigned. 440 Mich. 238 (1992). Also, a statement that an animal trainer beat his animals with steel rods, when actually he had beaten them with wooden rods, was considered substantial truth. See People for Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Berosini, 895 P.2d 1269 (Nev. 1995).
  • Defendant has facts to support the truthfulness of the information in the emails. First, the Note (Exhibit A) and the Addenda (Exhibit B and C), are testament of the fact that the Plaintiff entered an Agreement with Defendant to pay settle the debt per the terms of the Agreement. Also, regarding the allegations that Plaintiff asked for sexual favors in return for the loan advancement, Defendant alleges that he witnessed the incidence first-hand. The Plaintiff, in the middle of the day, hurriedly without invitation nor advance notice, walked through the unlocked front door of Defendant’s Northwest Washington, D.C. home. In a bold and immoral manner entered his bedroom, where he was resting from working the night shift at his job, to persuade the defendant to give her money. She knew his work schedule and where to find him at that time day. Ms. Kilkenny was not then his intimate partner.  Nevertheless, she perched herself atop his bed, touched him seductively and proposed that if he gave her $20,000 right away in an unsecured loan, she would “do anything you want me to do. I’m yours. We can have sex anytime you want. Right now, if you want.”  Thus, in Defendant’s opinion, she prostituted herself—not necessarily in an allegedly criminal sense as an alleged common whore perhaps—but in the moral sense. Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th Edition informs defendant’s characterization of the plaintiff’s pitiful act. The document defines prostitution as a person’s voluntary effort to engage “in sexual activity for money or its equivalent … The act of debasing” oneself.
  • AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES: Plaintiff has failed to prove either actual malice or negligence. In the District of Columbia, a private figure plaintiff bringing a defamation lawsuit must prove that the defendant was at least negligent with respect to the truth or falsity of the allegedly defamatory statements. Public officials, all-purpose public figures, and limited-purpose public figures must prove that the defendant acted with actual malice, i.e., knowing that the statements were false or recklessly disregarding their falsity. It is not yet clear whether Plaintiff brings the action as a private figure plaintiff or a public figure plaintiff.
  1. Negligence (for Private figure Plaintiff)

To support a claim for defamation, a private figure must prove negligence by the publisher. A plaintiff must establish negligence on the part of the defendant by showing that the defendant did not act with a reasonable level of care in publishing the statement at issue. See Tasket v. KING Broadcasting Co., 86 Wn.2d 439, 445, 546 P.2d 81 (1976).

The Plaintiff in this case failed to satisfy the burden of proof of Defendant’s negligence. Notably, Defendant’s statements in the emails amounted to substantial truth, as already alleged hereinabove. Besides, Defendant reasonable sent the emails to the recipients in an attempt to get the Plaintiff to respond and enforce her obligation under the Agreement. For instance, in the email sent on July 27, 2020, Defendant intended the Vice President of Georgetown University to help assist Defendant in making Plaintiff enforce her obligation under the Agreement. See Exhibit D and E.  All these communications were made after Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendant’s emails. See Exhibit F.  

  • Actual Malice (for Public figure Plaintiff)

The actual malice standard focuses on the Defendant’s actual state of mind at the time of publication. Unlike the negligence standard discussed later in this section, the actual malice standard is not measured by what a reasonable person would have published or investigated prior to publication. Instead, the Plaintiff must produce clear and convincing evidence that the Defendant actually knew the information was false or entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. Courts have clarified “actual malice” to mean “no honest belief in the truth of the statement”, in effect, making clear that ill will, improper motive, spite or desire to do harm for its own sake, all constituting common law malice, are not sufficient to amount to actual malice. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 88 S. Ct. 1323, 20 L. Ed. 2d 262 (1968).

It follows; the Plaintiff has not provided any proof that Defendant was driven by actual malice in sending the emails. Besides, the statements were substantially true, as already alleged above. The evidence from the Agreement (Exhibit A, B, and C) prove that the Plaintiff was bound by the terms of the Agreement. Also, the Defendant personally witnessed the Plaintiff’s immoral conduct. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff is not entitled to the damages claimed.

  • In Paragraph 40 and 45 of the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she suffered actual injuries, mental anguish, distress, and humiliation.
  • AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES: Plaintiff has failed to prove the alleged damages.  In order to obtain actual damages in Washington D.C., plaintiffs must prove an existence of proximate cause between the alleged harm and the defamatory statement. Conors, Fiscina, Swartz & Zimmerly v. Rees, 559 A.2d 47 (D.C. 1991).
  1. Defendant’s statements do not amount to defamation per se.

Defendant avers and realleges that the statements in the emails fail to qualify as defamation because they are substantially true. Therefore, the Plaintiff is not entitled to the claimed damages.

Besides, the District of Columbia no longer allows presumed damages for defamation per se directed at public figures, following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). See El-Hadad v. United Arab Emirates, 496 F.3d 658 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (affirming unpublished lower court decision implying that presumed damages are no longer available for public figures).

WHEREFORE, Defendant respectfully prays that this Court dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice; declare that the allegations of Plaintiff’s Complaint do not set forth sufficient facts to prove defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and that Plaintiff is not entitled to the damages so claimed;  award fees and litigation expenses to Defendant; and award such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

Respectfully Submitted,

Edward D. Sargent
Pro se
1820 Clydesdale Pl. NW #203
WDC 20009

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Defendant affirms under penalties of perjury that a copy of the above response was served upon the Plaintiff to this action by electronic and/or U.S. mail to her respective address as stated below:

Martinis M. Jackson

Jackson Legal Services PLLC

1629 K Street NW, Suite 300

Washington, D.C. 20006

Telephone: (301) 631-4964

Facsimile: (301) 851-6019

Martinis.jackson@jlegalservices.com

Dated:

Edward D. Sargent
Pro se
1820 Clydesdale Pl. NW #203
WDC 20009

ADDENDUM

EXHIBIT A

EXHIBIT B

EXHIBIT C

EXHIBIT D

EXHIBIT E

EXHIBIT F

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