6500 Motion- Mr Johnson

STATE OF MICHIGAN

THE COURT OF APPEALS

 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

                      Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JERMAINE JOHNSON,

                    Defendant-Appellant

   CASE NO. 343442LC 

   St Clair Circuit Court 

   LC Case No. 17-3111-FH
MICHAEL D. WENDLING

ST. CLAIR COUNTY PROSECUTOR

HILARY GEORGIA (P66226)

Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee

201 McMorran Blvd Suite 3300

Port Huron, MI  48060

(810) 985-2400

   JERMAINE JOHNSON MDOC# 290224

   Oaks Correctional Facility

  1500 Caberfae Highway, 

  Manistee, MI, 49660.

 

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT JERMAINE JOHNSON’S MOTION FOR

RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OF SENTENCE UNDER MCR 6.500

NOW COMES Defendant-Appellant, JERMAINE JOHNSON, pro se, and for his Motion for Relief from Judgment of Sentence, pursuant to MCR 6.502, requests that this Honourable Court vacate the Appellant’s convictions and sentence which Appellant is currently serving, based on additional violations of his State and Federal Constitutional rights. In support of this Motion, Petitioner incorporates the attached brief in support and states as follows:

 

  1. Petitioner was convicted following a JURY trial in front of the Honourable Judge Michael West, St. Clair County 31st Circuit Court Criminal Division, of the following charges: Count 1: Possession with the intent to deliver methamphetamine, MCL 333.7401(2)(b)(i); Count 2: Possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227(b); Count 3: Felon-in-possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224(f); Count 4: Felon-in-possession of ammunition, MCL 750.224f; Count 5: Carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227; Count 6: Carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227; Count 7: Receiving and concealing a stolen firearm, MCL 750.535(b); Count 8: : Receiving and concealing a stolen firearm, MCL 750.535(b); Count 9: Receiving and concealing a stolen firearm, MCL 750.535(b); Count 10: Receiving and concealing a stolen firearm, MCL 750.535(b).   
  2. On or about April 9, 2018, Petitioner was sentenced by Honorable Judge Michael West on:

Count 1: Possession with the intent to deliver methamphetamine: 14-30 yrs.  

Count 2: Possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony: 8-30 yrs.  

Count 3: Felon-in-possession of a firearm: 8-30 yrs.  

Count 4: Felon-in-possession of ammunition: 2 yrs.  

Count 5: Carrying a concealed weapon: 8-30 yrs.  

Count 6: Carrying a concealed weapon: 8-30 yrs.  

Count 7: Receiving and concealing a stolen firearm: 11-30 yrs.  

Count 8: Receiving and concealing a stolen firearm: 11-30 yrs.  

Count 9: Receiving and concealing a stolen firearm: 11-30 yrs.  

Count 10: Receiving and concealing a stolen firearm: 11-30 yrs.  

 

  1. Petitioner, Jermaine Johnson, is currently serving his sentence. 
  2. Appellant Jermaine Johnson has been incarcerated for about 3 years and is currently being held at the Oaks Correctional Facility located at 1500 Caberfae Hwy, Manistee MI 49660.  
  3. A timely notice of appeal was filed, and the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Appellant’s conviction on November 26, 2019. Appellant was represented by Mr. Joel D. Kershaw, who was appointed by the Court.

 

  1. On or about January 16, 2020, Appellant filed a second appeal at the Michigan Supreme Court. On or about June 30, 2020, the Supreme Court dismissed the Appeal. The Appellant was self-represented.

 

  1. At this time, Appellant moves this Court to set aside or modify the judgment.

 

GROUNDS FOR RELIEF AND SUMMARY OF FACTS SUPPORTING RELIEF

 

  1. Appellant can no longer proceed directly by appeal by leave since more than 12 months have elapsed from judgment. Mich. Ct. R. 6.508(D)(1). The judgment may only be reviewed in accordance with Mich. Ct. R. 6.500 et seq. Mich. Ct. R. 6.502 authorizes a motion for relief from judgment. 
  2. Appellant has not previously raised these claims in post-conviction proceedings, and the grounds for relief have never been decided against him on the merits. Mich. Ct. R. 6.508(D)(2). 532.

 

  1. These issues could have been raised on appeal, Mich. Ct. R. 6.508(D)(3), but Defendant submits that he is entitled to relief because he had good cause for failure to “properly” raise these issues on appeal, Mich. Ct. R. 6.508(D)(3)(a); namely, ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. See e.g., People v. Reed, 449 Mich. 375 (1995); People v. Hardaway, 459 Mich. 878 (1998); People v. Kimble, 470 Mich. 305 (2004).

 

  1. This motion is based upon violations of Appellant’s Constitutional rights under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Sections Seventeen and Twenty of the Michigan Constitution. 

ARGUMENTS

  • THE APPEAL COURT VIOLATED THE APPELLANT’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS BY ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE CONTENTS OBTAINED ON THE GROUND WITHOUT ESTABLISHING THEIR CONNECTION WITH THE APPELLANT.


  • STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

  1. “The decision to admit evidence is within a trial court’s discretion, which is reviewed for an abuse of that discretion.” People v Bynum, 496 Mich 610, 623; 852 NW2d 570 (2014). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the court chooses an outcome that falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 217; 749 NW2d 272 (2008). “When the decision involves a preliminary question of law however, such as whether a rule of evidence precludes admission, we review the question de novo.” People v Mardlin, 487 Mich 609, 614; 790 NW2d 607 (2010).

 

  1. “Claims of prosecutorial [error] are generally reviewed de novo to determine whether the defendant was denied a fair trial.”  People v Dunigan, 299 Mich App 579, 588; 831 NW2d 243 (2013). 
  1. ANALYSIS
  1. During witness deposition, the Court admitted questionable evidence upon deposition of two witnesses: Deputy Nicholas Singleton and Officer Jeremy Young.  
  2. The exhibit in contention is Exhibit 50 which was found on the ground. The evidence consisted of a black box. EXHIBIT 1. Deputy Singleton testifies that he had no idea where the said exhibit originated from. EXHIBIT 2.

 

  1. Officer Young testifies that he observed what appears to be Crystal meth and Marijuana in the said box. EXHIBIT 3, and EXHIBIT 4.  

 

  1. Accordingly, Appellant opposes the admission of such evidence because the Prosecution could not sufficiently establish the nexus between the Appellant and the contents in the aforementioned box. For instance, Deputy Singleton testifies that he had no idea where the said exhibit originated from. EXHIBIT 2. Besides, there was also an ongoing drug raid around the same time the Appellant was arrested. The evidence may have been dropped by one of the individuals running from law enforcement at that time. It follows; the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Appellant was in possession of the said box. 

 

  1. “The district court must bind over a defendant if the evidence presented at the preliminary examination establishes that a felony has been committed and there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed the crime.” People v Whipple, 202 Mich App 428, 431; 509 NW2d 837 (1993). In the instant case, the Prosecution failed to establish probable cause linking the Appellant to the evidence. Probable cause is a “reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that a person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.” People v Dellabonda, 265 Mich 486, 490; 251 NW 594 (1933). Based on the circumstances in the instant case, none of the police observed the Appellant placing or throwing the said evidence on the ground. Besides, no witness testified that they personally observed the Appellant disposing the said evidence thereby. 

 

  1. “At the preliminary examination, the prosecutor is not required to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt. However, there must be some evidence from which these elements can be inferred.” People v Woods, 200 Mich App 283, 287-288; 504 NW2d 24 (1993). (Emphasis mine). Appellant avers that, by relying on the said evidence, the prosecution failed to satisfy the threshold of proof required for the charges against the Appellant. 

 

  1.  If an evidentiary error is a nonconstitutional, preserved error, then it ‘is presumed not to be a ground for reversal unless it affirmatively appears that, more probably than not, it was outcome determinative. People v Musser, 494 Mich 337, 348 (2013), quoting People v Krueger, 466 Mich 50, 54 (2002). (Emphasis mine). An error is “outcome determinative if it undermined the reliability of the verdict” and, in making this determination, a court should “focus on the nature of the error in light of the weight and strength of the untainted evidence”. Musser, 494 Mich at 348, quoting Krueger, 466 Mich at 54 (quotation marks and citations omitted). In the instant case, the said evidence was determinative because its contents were used to satisfy the charges against him. Accordingly, the jury was led to believe that the said evidence belonged or was associated with the Appellant.  

 

  • THE APPELLANT’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WERE INFRINGED BY THE RELIANCE OF THE SAID EVIDENCE IN HIS CONVICTION AND SENTENCING 


  • STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

  1. The standard for examining the constitutionality of evidence under the Due Process Clause is whether the evidence violated “the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty”, or “offend[ed] some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937). See also Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). 

 

  1. “… as applied to a criminal trial, denial of due process is the failure to observe that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice. In order to declare a denial of it the Court must find that the absence of that fairness fatally infected the trial; the acts complained of must be of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial”. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).

 

  1. ANALYSIS

 

  1. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment protects the citizens against being deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. Bad evidence may invalidate a Defendant’s conviction on due process grounds. The Court in Brinegar v. United States, held in this regard that, “Guilt in a criminal case must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and by evidence confined to … rules of evidence consistent with that standard.” Brinegar v. United States 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949).  

 

  1. Accordingly, this honorable court should prohibit prosecutorial use of evidence from which factfinders can draw no rational inferences against the defendant. See Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1991). In the instant case, the Appellant alleges the Prosecution deprived him of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution when they used evidence that was not directly related to the Appellant, to obtain his conviction. No reasonable or rational inference can be drawn associating the said evidence (that was obtained from the ground), against the Appellant. It follows, the Prosecution’s reliance on the said evidence was unfair since the Court unfairly admitted the said evidence without establishing its connection with the Appellant. Relevant evidence is excluded when the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. People v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 75; 537 NW2d 909 (1995), mod 450 Mich 1212 (1995). 

 

  1. The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments “[protect] the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged”. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). Accordingly, the error of convicting the innocent should be reduced to the greatest extent possible through the use of the reasonable doubt standard. Id. (Justice Harlan’s concurrence).  In Schmerber v. California, the Court observed that the manner in which evidence is obtained from a suspect is subject to the reasonableness clause of the Fourth Amendment. Schmerber v. California 384 U.S. 757 (1966). The Prosecution failed to state a case beyond reasonable doubt, as required by the Constitution when it relied on the said evidence without sufficiently establishing the Appellant’s connection with it.  

 

  1. Where proof of a “presumed fact” that is a required element of a crime, is established by another fact, the “basic fact”, presumption cannot be sustained if there be no rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, if the inference of the one from the proof of the other is arbitrary because of lack of connection between the two in common experience. Tot v. United States,1197 319 U.S. 463, 467–68 (1943). In the instant case, the Prosecution sought to prove the Appellant’s guilt of possession with intent to sell, by relying on the said evidence. However, the Prosecution failed to sufficiently prove the nexus between the said evidence and the Appellant. 

 

  1. As a result of the Prosecution’s reliance on the said evidence, the jury was led to believe that the Appellant either owned, or had been in possession of the evidence, without sufficient proof of the same. 

III. SUFFICEINCY OF EVIDENCE: THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE IN THE TRUCK TO ESTABLISH IT BELONGED TO THE APPELLANT.

 

  • STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

  1. This honorable Court should “review de novo a challenge on appeal to the sufficiency of the evidence.”  People v Henry, 315 Mich App 130, 135; 889 NW2d 1 (2016), quoting People v Ericksen, 288 Mich App 192, 195; 793 NW2d 120 (2010).  “To determine whether the prosecutor has presented sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction, we review the evidence in the light most favourable to the prosecutor and determine ‘whether a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’”  People v Smith-Anthony, 494 Mich 669, 676; 837 NW2d 415 (2013), quoting People v Tennyson, 487 Mich 730, 735; 790 NW2d 354 (2010).  “The standard of review is deferential: a reviewing court is required to draw all reasonable inferences and make credibility choices in support of the jury verdict.”  People v Bailey, 310 Mich App 703, 713; 873 NW2d 855 (2015), quoting People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000).

 

  1. ANALYSIS 
  1. In a circumstantial case, the Prosecution should use fingerprint evidence so the trier of fact can reasonably infer that the defendant’s fingerprints were in fact impressed on the object in question while he was committing the crime and not at some other time. See cases collected at Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d 1154 et seq. (1953), and Annot., 28-31 A.L.R.2d Later Case Service 1115-1158 § 29 at 140 et seq. (1981).

 

  1. In the instant case, fingerprint evidence is the only evidence that could possibly justify a finding of guilt against the Appellant. The identity of Appellant as the perpetrator of the crimes was not sufficiently supported. Identity is an essential element in every criminal prosecution. People v. Yost, 278 Mich App 341, 354; 749 NW2d 753 (2008). Also, a defendant’s identity as the perpetrator of the charged crime must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Kern, 6 Mich App 406, 409-410; 149 NW2d 216 (1967). 

 

  1. There remains reasonable doubt as to the owner of the contents from the truck that were presented as evidence. Appellant could not have knowingly taken possession of stolen property when he regained possession of his vehicle from the individual (Leo Anthony) who picked up the truck from the mechanic at the repair shop when he was given permission by Appellant to use the vehicle to move his possessions from his mother’s house after being kicked out. He was kicked out because his girlfriend (Falysia) and him were using drugs in his mother’s home, and at that time Falysia over-dosed in the bathroom. Falysia has since overdosed and died. Before Appellant’s arrest, Leo Anthony had informed Appellant that he (Leo Anthony) ran out of time to unload his possessions from his vehicle and would do so the next day. Leo Anthony has since been heard among his circle of friends at a party admitting to, bragging about and laughing that all contents in the truck belonged to him and he totally set Appellant up. However, no one is willing to come forward with said information, in fear for their own well being. It has also been said that Mr Johnson is not the only individual that Leo Anthony has set up. Appellant acknowledged possession of a firearm in pocket. The said firearm was found by Appellant under the passenger seat. Appellant had been notified by a friend that Leo Anthony had left a firearm belonging to Percy Tranchemontagne in his vehicle. He picked it up with a rag and placed it in his pocket to return it to Percy Tranchemontagne who was known to be at the home (in police report) where the raid was being conducted. Besides, Appellant told law enforcement he had no knowledge of any other firearms or anything else in the vehicle. All other evidence was found after a search of vehicle.

 

  1. Accordingly, the evidence adduced by the Prosecution from the truck was not sufficient evidence to identify Appellant. Therefore, the evidence cannot sustain Appellant’s conviction. 

 

  1. THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY RELIED ON APPELLANT’S CRIMINAL HIISTORY; AND FAILED TO RECORGNIZE THE POSSIBILITY THAT APPELLANT CHANGED.

 

  • STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

  1.  “Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion” Rule 404 – Character Evidence Not Admissible to Prove Conduct; Exceptions; Other Crimes, Mich. R. Evid. 404.

 

  1. ANALYSIS

 

  1. The Court gave Appellant a Habitual Offender Sentencing pursuant to MCL 769.12. In doing so, the Court failed to consider the fact that Appellant had undergone a significant positive change in his character since his last conviction. Besides, the Court also failed to provide Appellant with reasonable notice of the enhancement of the sentence pursuant to MCL 769.12. 

 

  1. The purpose of the habitual offender Statute is to punish recidivists, the focus being on the status of the defendant. The substance of the offense, not the punishment prescribed, is the primary consideration. Cf. Salgado v United States, 277 F.2d 653 (CA 1, 1960), Taylor v United States, 333 F. Supp. 1067 (ED Miss, 1971). In the instant case, the court erred in conducting the Pre-Sentence Investigation. The court should have noted that the Parole officer reported only one missed appointment to report (at work). Besides, Appellant’s drug tests returned clean. Appellant was no longer associating with individuals of questionable integrity. Leo Anthony reached out to Appellant after a significant time of no communication. Appellant also fulfilled all requirements to regain a driver’s license. He gained employment, and was attending scheduled meetings with mental health counselor, taking all prescribed medication regularly. Lastly, Appellant had recently gotten married.

 

  1. Appellant finally had a positive and stable environment for the first time in his life.

 

  1. The Courts have nullified sentencing that was done under MCL 769.12 where the accused did not receive notice of the sentence enhancement. The court in People v Franciso held in this regard that,

 

“… Having reviewed the record, we agree that the prosecutor failed to provide timely notice of its intent to enhance Fischer’s sentence under MCL 769.12. Therefore, the trial court erred by sentencing him as a fourth-offense habitual offender. Because correction of the error will lead to a different recommended minimum sentence ranger, we vacate Fischer’s sentence and remand for resentencing…” See People v Franciso, 474 Mich 82, 91; 711 NW2d 44 (2006). 

 

Accordingly, the sentence enhancement should be nullified.  

 

V ENTRAPMENT

 

  • STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

  1. The Court should use the Objective test to review whether the actions of the Police constituted entrapment. People v Jamieson, 436 Mich 61; 461 NW2d 884 (1990). The objective test focuses primarily on the investigative and evidence-gathering procedures used by the governmental agents, rather than the subjective test, which focuses on the defendant’s pre-disposition or motivation to commit a new crime. Id, at 72. 

 

  1. ANALYSIS

 

  1. A defendant has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that he was entrapped. People v. D’Angelo, 401 Mich. 167, 182, 257 N.W.2d 655 (1977).

 

  1. Under the current entrapment test in Michigan, a defendant is considered entrapped if either (1) the police engaged in impermissible conduct that would induce a law-abiding person to commit a crime in similar circumstances or (2) the police engaged in conduct so reprehensible that it cannot be tolerated. People v. Juillet, 439 Mich. 34, 56-57, 475 N.W.2d 786 (1991); People v. Ealy, 222 Mich. App. 508, 510, 564 N.W.2d 168 (1997). In the instant case, the Prosecution admits to obtaining and using Confidential informants to help in investigation of crimes. Notably, the Prosecution allegedly used an informant to tie Appellant to the crimes he was accused of. The Prosecution also argue that the informant purchased controlled substances from Appellant.  Accordingly, Appellant is otherwise an innocent individual whom the Government is seeking to punish for an alleged offense which is the product of the creative activity of its own officials. Sorrells v United States, 287 US 435, 451; 53 S Ct 210; 77 L Ed 413 (1932). 

 

  1. When examining whether governmental activity would impermissibly induce criminal conduct, several factors are considered:  (1) whether there existed appeals to the defendant’s sympathy as a friend, (2) whether the defendant had been known to commit the crime with which he was charged, (3) whether there were any long time lapses between the investigation and the arrest, (4) whether there existed any inducements that would make the commission of a crime unusually attractive to a hypothetical law-abiding citizen, (5) whether there were offers of excessive consideration or other enticement, (6) whether there was a guarantee that the acts alleged as crimes were not illegal, (7) whether, and to what extent, any government pressure existed, (8) whether there existed sexual favors, (9) whether there were any threats of arrest, (10) whether there existed any government procedures that tended to escalate the criminal culpability of the defendant, (11) whether there was police control over any informant, and (12) whether the investigation was targeted. People v. Juillet, 439 Mich. 56-57, 475 N.W.2d 786 (1991). 

 

  1. The overall purpose of the entrapment defense is to deter the corruptive use of governmental authority by invalidating convictions that result from law enforcement efforts that have as their effect the instigation or manufacture of a new crime by one who would not otherwise have been so disposed. People v D’Angelo, 401 Mich 167, 174; 257 NW2d 655 (1977); People v Turner, 390 Mich 7, 16; 210 NW2d 336 (1973); People v Sinclair, 387 Mich 91, 116-120; 194 NW2d 878 (1972). 

 

  1. There is no evidence that Appellant had been known to commit the crime with which he was charged, inter alia, possession with intent to deliver; Appellant was enticed by money; and government pressure had intensified to ensure the investigation, arrest, and conviction of drug dealers.  

 

  1. Therefore, by using the informant(s), the police induced Appellant to engage in the crime(s).

 

VI CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

 

  • STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

  1. In a purely circumstantial case, the Prosecution should use fingerprint evidence so the trier of fact can reasonably infer that the defendant’s fingerprints were in fact impressed on the object in question while he was committing the crime and not at some other time. See cases collected at Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d 1154 et seq. (1953), and Annot., 28-31 A.L.R.2d Later Case Service 1115-1158 § 29 at 140 et seq. (1981).

 

  1. ANALYSIS

 

  1. Proof by circumstantial evidence alone cannot support a conviction where the inferences therefrom will support other rational conclusions, see, also, People v Jablonski, 70 Mich. App. 218; 245 N.W.2d 571 (1976). If a reasonable theory of innocence can be made of the circumstantial evidence, then there exists a reasonable doubt, and the defendant is entitled to the benefit of that doubt.

 

  1. While a criminal conviction may properly rest entirely upon circumstantial evidence, there is a qualitative difference between direct and circumstantial evidence with respect to the degree of reliability and certainty they provide as proof of guilt.

 

  1. In the instant case, the prosecution wholly relied on circumstantial evidence to convict the Appellant. The prosecution may argue in this regard that the gun found on Appellant was direct evidence. However, the detectives failed to conduct forensic evidence to ascertain whether Appellant owned the gun and to understand the circumstances in which Appellant obtained possession of the gun.  Notably, Appellant acknowledged he carried a firearm in his pocket as he had been notified by a friend that Leo Anthony had left a firearm belonging to Percy Tranchemontagne in the vehicle. Appellant found the Firearm under the passenger seat. He picked up with a rag and placed in his pocket to return it to Percy Tranchemontagne who was known to be at the home (in the police report) where the raid was being conducted.
  2. Therefore, the Court erred in relying on the evidence presented by the prosecution, which was purely circumstantial. 

 

CONCLUSION

  1. Appellant submits that he has demonstrated “actual prejudice” in that but for the alleged errors, he would have had a reasonably likely chance of acquittal. Mich. Ct. R. 6.508(D)(b)(i).

 

  1. For these reasons and those set forth herein, Appellant asks that this Court grant relief from judgment and set aside or modify the judgment in this case.

 

     Respectfully Submitted, 

 

                                                                                                   Signature

                                                                                    _________________________

 

          JERMAINE JOHNSON MDOC# 290224

                                                                                   Oaks Correctional Facility

                                                                                   1500 Caberfae Highway, 

                                                                                   Manistee, MI, 49660.

 

Dated: ___________

 

PROOF OF SERVICE

Today Appellant’s Motion for Relief from Judgment of Sentence Under MCR 6.500 and the attached Addendum were served on the Prosecution on the following address, by prepaid first-class U.S. mail.

 

                             MICHAEL D. WENDLING

  1. CLAIR COUNTY PROSECUTOR

                             HILARY GEORGIA (P66226)

                             Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee

                             201 McMorran Blvd Suite 3300

                             Port Huron, MI  48060

                             (810) 985-2400

 

                                                                                                   Signature

                                                                                    _________________________

 

          JERMAINE JOHNSON MDOC# 290224

                                                                                   Oaks Correctional Facility

                                                                                   1500 Caberfae Highway, 

                                                                                   Manistee, MI, 49660.

 

Dated: ___________

 

ADDENDUM

EXHIBIT 1

 

EXHIBIT 2: Deputy Singleton’s Deposition.
Pages 214 and 215 of the transcripts to the Jury Trial (Vol. 1). 

 

EXHIBIT 3: Officer Young’s Deposition
Pages 346 of the transcripts to the Jury Trial (Vol. 2). 

 

EXHIBIT 4: Officer Young’s Deposition
Pages 350 of the transcripts to the Jury Trial (Vol. 2). 

 

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