Lawrence Paul Federico
35111F Newark Blvd #319,
Newark, CA. 94560
[Date]
[Enter Recipient’s Name
and
Address]
Re: Response to your letter
Dear Ms,
Respectfully submitted,
This letter serves as my response to your letter, dated July 21, 2022.
First, Thank you for extending the time for me to answer so that I could recover from the injury.
It has been a long slow recovery and although not completely healed, I am doing much better
now.
Please note, and I hope you will agree, that I feel much time and money for both sides could be
saved and avoided if we avoided or at least minimize the often pointless legal wrangling.
I fully expect that you are well aware of all of the points that I am about to provide and explain
in this response to your letter but some of the information may be new to you.
As to your letter and message, I respectfully stand in strong opposition and objection to your
message and statements and offer the following in response.
1. The Defendants were sufficiently informed of the action
Research shows that it is trite law that "`if the service is otherwise properly made, and the person
served is aware that he is the person named as a defendant in the erroneous manner, jurisdiction
is obtained.’" See Billings v. Edwards (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 826, 831 [ 154 Cal.Rptr. 453]; see
also Brum v. Ivins (1908) 154 Cal. 17, 20 [ 96 P. 876] ["[I]f . . . it is shown that a person was
served with process in an action brought against him, the judgment will bind him, although he
may have been wrongly named, [¶] . . . There are cases of slight errors in spelling, which do not
destroy the virtual identity of name. . . . Such errors are disregarded entirely."
In this mater, when I filed the suit, I mistakenly named the deceased Defendant instead of his
estate and I apparently got the name of the Trust wrong. However, service was done on the right
agent. The agent then forwarded the services to you. Your appearance and reply to the action
demonstrates knowledge and receipt of the matter. Because of the response, you have already
acknowledged the service. As discussed in the aforementioned law, the court already has
jurisdiction over the case since the errors in the naming do not destroy the identity of the
intended Defendant(s). Besides, your client duly effected the service to you, upon which you
have already made an appearance and issued your response. This shows that you and your clients
are and have been sufficiently informed of the case.
2. In the event the Court finds that the service of process was improper, I am entitled to
an order to perfect service
Research shows that Pro se litigants’ court submissions are to be construed liberally and held to
less stringent standards than submissions of lawyers. If the court can reasonably read the
submissions, it should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal
theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or the litigant’s unfamiliarity with rule
requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 102 S.Ct. 700, 70 L.Ed.2d 551 (1982); Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976)(quoting Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct.
594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972); McDowell v. Delaware State Police, 88 F.3d 188, 189 (3rd Cir.
1996); United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3rd Cir. 1992)(holding pro se petition cannot be
held to same standard as pleadings drafted by attorneys); Then v. I.N.S., 58 F.Supp.2d 422, 429
(D.N.J. 1999).
It is also trite law that “[t]he Court may, in the furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be
proper, allow a party to amend any pleading…” CCP § 473(a)(1); see also McKenney v. Purepac
Pharm Co. (2008) 167 Cal. App. 4 th 72, 78. “T[he] statutory provision giving the courts the
power to permit amendments in furtherance of justice has received a very liberal interpretation
by the courts of this state.” Klopstock v. Superior Ct. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 13, 19; see also Nestle v.
City of Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 939. Courts apply a policy of great liberality in
permitting amendments to the complaint at any stage of the proceedings up to and including trial.
See Mesler v. Bragg Management Co. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 290, 296-97.
In fact, liberal amendment of pleadings has been the established policy of California since 1901.
“That the trial courts are to liberally permit such amendments, at any stage of the proceeding, has
been established policy of this state since 1901.” Hirsa v. Superior Ct. (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d
486, 488-89.
The above jurisprudence from the courts shows that I am entitled to amend the pleadings and to
perfect service at any time. Therefore, in the event that the court finds that the service was in any
way improper, I will move for, and be granted leave to amend the pleadings, to include the
correct parties in the suit.
3. My case is not time-barred
The statute of limitations for breach of a written contract under section 337(a) of the California
Code of Civil Procedure sets the time to file a lawsuit at four years. Further, equitable tolling will
not bar a claim if the plaintiff, despite reasonable care and diligent efforts, did not discover the
injury until after the limitations period had expired. “The equitable tolling of statutes of
limitations is a judicially-created, non-statutory doctrine. It is ‘designed to prevent unjust and
technical forfeitures of the right to a trial on the merits when the purpose of the statute of
limitations – timely notice to the defendant of the plaintiff’s claims – has been satisfied.’ Where
applicable, the doctrine will ‘suspend or extend a statute of limitations as necessary to ensure
fundamental practicality and fairness.’” See McDonald v. Antelope Valley Community College
Dist. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 88, 99[84 Cal.Rptr.3d 734, 194 P.3d 1026].
“[T]he effect of equitable tolling is that the limitations period stops running during the tolling
event, and begins to run again only when the tolling event has concluded. As a consequence, the
tolled interval, no matter when it took place, is tacked onto the end of the limitations period, thus
extending the deadline for suit by the entire length of time during which the tolling event
previously occurred.”See Lantzy v. Centex Homes (2003) 31 Cal.4th 363, 370-371 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d
655, 73P.3d 517].
I filed this complaint on or about July 16, 2019. My dismissal happened on or about June 18,
2018. I therefore filed the complaint around a year after the dismissal, which filing was made
within the allowed statutory timeline. Further, I entered an employment agreement with the
decedent. Four years have not yet lapsed since I was wrongfully terminated, and in breach of the
employment agreement.
You should also note that my claims were equitably tolled. Notably, the trust took possession of
Dean’s property on or about 8/31/2019 following probate hearing on 8/30/2019. That property,
which was solely owned by Dean could have and should have been liquidated to pay the debtors.
Daniela Trinh as the wife, manager of Soled, and as the Trustee for the Trust knew this and
knowingly disregarded the many debts and liabilities of Dean Trinh and Soled so as to keep the
property and full value of that asset in her own control.
You should further note that I filed a creditor’s claim and an objection, and I appeared in the
probate court but despite my objections, the probate court ultimately said that allowing the Trust
to take possession and control of the property does not block my claims against the property
because they existed before the transfer.
Further, the California government issued a 6 months extension for the statute of limitations
through the COVID 19 Emergency Rules. The Emergency Rules were set to remain in effect
until 90 days after the Governor declared the end of the COVID-19 state of emergency, or when
they are revoked by the Judicial Council. The judicial council recommended the end of
emergency rules to be June 30, 2022. Therefore, my complaint fell within the 6 months
extension, which rightly applies to toll the statutory time by 6 months.
4. I am entitled to recover from the decedent’s Estate
Under Probate Code section 9830, a personal representative is given broad powers to settle any
claims either against the estate. Accordingly, the representative must handle the decedent’s debts
and deal with creditors who have claims against the estate.
It is also not true that I know that Soled Energy Inc. ceased its business operations. I have no
knowledge that the busines ceased its operations. In fact, I was informed by multiple sources that
Daniela stepped in and took over the operations and was actively managing and running Soled’s
projects. State records show that she is the registered agent. Project records show that she
assumed the controlling position of Soled after Dean’s death. Further, state and project records
show her as the manager of Soled, and in that type of position she undertakes decision making
roles regularly and continuously.
I also aver that Daniela has personal liability for my claims. Notably, she has ownership interests
in and to Soled. She was also the agent for service and took full charge and control of the
business as the senior and controlling manager position (full control) when Dean passed. Plus
she is also the Trustee / Trust manager and representative of the Trust. In that light, and in
addition to other avenues, I assert that I am rightfully and legally entitled to recover from the
Estate.
5. I never received full settlement of my debts
Contrary to your averments, my settlement payment from the bonding company was
approximately 30% of my claim. Any settlement agreement involved (if any) was with the
bonding company alone and nobody else. There may have been a release that involved releasing
the bond and the bonding company only, but that, if it exists, was between the bonding
companies and others. Note: I was not asked to sign any such agreement. Accordingly, my claim
and case here is for the balance of my claim for approximately $45,000 for unpaid wages,
penalties and interest, plus legal fees and any related expenses. I am also seeking damages for
wrongful termination in the form of 30 days of pay, which based on the average number of hours
that I worked in a day (9.3) at the average hourly rate of $139 per hour hourly amounts to an
additional $39,000. Accordingly, I seek a total of $45,000 + $39,000 = $84,000 plus interest and
plus any additional penalties, fees, and legal expenses that may be due or will come due.
Further, your statement that I failed to file a timely claim is completely false. As already
discussed hereinabove, the complaint was served twice. Soled’s representatives including
Daniela were aware of my claim because they were a party to the matter. The defendant and
representatives are also fully aware of (and were involved with) my legal claim in the Trust
matter over the property that the Trust petitioned the court to allow for possession and
ownership. You should also note that the probate court stated that allowing the Trust to take
possession and control of the property does not block my claims against the property because
they existed before the transfer would take place.
Conclusion
In light of the foregoing, I maintain that I have a valid case for wrongful termination and unpaid
wages. I will of course be forced to, in my pursuit of the interest of justice, oppose any
dispositive motion you choose to file.
Alternatively, I remain open to reasonable settlement negotiations.
Sincerely,
_________________
Lawrence P. Federico
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