RESPONSE TO RESPONDENTS BRIEF

2d Juvenile No. B321633

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
IN AND FOR THE SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

IN THE MATTER OF: S.B. et al.,
Persons Coming Under Juvenile Court
Law.

LASC No.
19CCJP010111A-B

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
M.R.,
Defendant and Appellant.

RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT’S BRIEF
___________________________
Superior Court of California, Los Angeles,
Juvenile Dependency/Adoption Division

No. 19CCJP01011A
Honorable Linda Sun

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
AND AUTHORITIES

M.R
melodyjrodgers@yahoo.com
Appellant mother
Michael Green, Esq.
LADL 5
greenm@ladlinc.org
dca5@ladlinc.org
(Trial Counsel for Father)
Alyson Bashor, Esq.
Children’s Law Center 1
bashora@clcla.org
appeals1@clcla.org
(Trial Counsel for Minor)
Honorable Linda Sun
Honorable Stephen Marpet
Dept. 417
c/o Clerk of the Superior Court
Edmund D. Edelman Children’s Court
JuvJoAppeals@lacourt.org

OFFICE OF THE COUNTY COUNSEL
DAWYN R. HARRISON
Interim County Counsel
KIM NEMOY
Assistant County Counsel
NAVID NAKHJAVANI (234614)
Principal Deputy County Counsel
Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration
500 West Temple Street, Suite 648
Los Angeles, California 90012
Telephone: (213) 808-8775
Facsimile: (213) 633-1915
E-mail: nnakhjavani@counsel.lacounty.gov
Attorneys for Respondent

COMES NOW, Appellant mother M.R., and files this Response to Respondent’s
Brief. In support thereof, Appellant states as follows:
ARGUMENTS
i. The Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal
Interlocutory orders are appealable under C.C.P. Section 904.1(a)(1). Notably,
“Appeals in dependency proceedings are governed by section 395…” In re J.F. (2019) 39
Cal.App.5th 74. “Section 395 provides in pertinent part that `[a] judgment in a
proceeding under Section 300 may be appealed in the same manner as any final
judgment, and any subsequent order may be appealed as an order after judgment.” See
CA Welf. & Inst. Code § 395(a)(1) (2017). See also In re Michael H. (2014) 229
Cal.App.4th 1366, 1373 [178 Cal.Rptr.3d 71].
Appellant argues that the Respondent did not include the order being appealed.
Nothing can be further from the truth. Appellant maintains that she attached the Minute
Order issued on June 9, 2022, which is the Order subject to challenge. (See The
Appellant’s Appeal Brief (Exhibit A- Minute Order)). As proof that Respondent is
aware of the order being challenged, Respondent argues that: “[t]he order mother
indicated she was appealing from was an order her own counsel requested – that mother
be notified of any medical services needed for the children.” (See Respondent’s Brief,
page 23, paragraph 1). The foregoing statement clearly shows that the Respondent was
duly notified of which Order that was being appealed.
Appellant maintains she has a right to challenge said Order. Claims alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel can "appl[y] to claims . . . that counsel was
constitutionally ineffective for failing to file a notice of appeal." Roe v. Flores-Ortega,
528 U.S. 470, 477 (2000). Appellant was deprived of her right to a fair hearing and the
opportunity to be heard. The right to a fair hearing is one of ‘the rudiments of fair play’
assured to every litigant by the 14th Amendment as a minimal requirement. Endler v.
Schutzbank (1968) 68 Cal.2d 162, 169 [65 Cal.Rptr. 297, 436 P.2d 297]. Fair hearing is
violated when there is "an unacceptable probability of actual bias on the part of those
who have actual decision making power over their claims." Nasha v. City of Los Angeles

(2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 483. In the instant case, Appellant asserts that even while she
was represented by her former counsel, her voice was stifled. She, and her interests, could
only be heard through one of the authorized representatives and/or Angela Swan-
Appellant’s former counsel, who appeared to be subject to be biased towards Respondent.
Appellant did not wish to hire Angela Swan but the court mandated she hire someone if
she was to get rid of the attorneys they were appointing to her. Appellant asserts that said
attorney failed to protect her rights. Therefore, said Appellant’s counsel controlling the
entire conversation and only they got to speak. At no point did the Attorney accept to
take instructions from Appellant. If Appellant was allowed to represent herself, she
would object, cross examine, file motions for discovery, and put up a valid defense.
However, her counsel prevented her from doing this by not allowing her so speak. During
the court hearings, said Attorney talked as if Appellant am not even in the room and they
acted like they already knew everything about Appellant’s interests, which is far from the
truth.
The court erred in allowing Respondent to continue their case against Appellant
and endlessly prosecute Appellant because after all this time, Appellant has never been
allowed to put forth a defense and have a fair hearing. They prevent Appellant from
calling witnesses and presenting evidence that is essential. It follows; the hearings that
they have been holding for the past three years are not fair because only one side has the
opportunity to be heard. Notably there is never any debate, discussion, eliciting of
information, or trying of facts. DCFS wins automatically, every time, just based on their
word alone. And their word cannot be challenged. It is further notable that the Trial Court
Judge smiled at DCFS and discussed sports like they are acquaintances, and frowned
when he looked at Appellant, even when Appellant had never spoken.
ii. The Juvenile Court abused its discretion in continuing the Children’s
Permanency Planning Hearing
The California Supreme Court has described abuse of discretion as “whether the
trial court exceeded the bounds of reason.” See Shamblin v. Brittain, 44 Cal.3d 474, 478
(1988). It has also been held that an abuse of discretion occurs when “it can fairly be said

that no judge would reasonably make the same order under the same circumstances.” In
re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal.App.3d 93, 114 (1974).
Freedom from arbitrary adjudicative procedures is a substantive element of one’s
liberty. See People v. Ramirez, 25 Cal.3d 260, 320 (1979). Due process guaranteed under
Article I § 7 of the California Constitution thus, “presumes that when an individual is
subject to deprivatory governmental action, he always has a due process liberty interest
both in fair and unprejudiced decision-making and in being treated with respect and
dignity.” Id.
Respondent argues that by not objecting to the continuance request, Appellant
forfeited the issue. As already stated above, Appellant could have objected to the
continuance request. Section 31 of the Dependency Proceedings Manual of the Los
Angeles County Superior Court provides in subdivision [41 Cal. App. 4th 446] (B)(4)
that "[t]he participation of parents, children (if appropriate), Department of
Children’s Services Mediation Court Officers, Court-appointed Special Advocates
and all counsel is required at all Mediation Conferences." (Emphasis added). Contrary
to said provision, Appellant was never given an opportunity to speak. It is only that her
court appointed who spoke. Said attorney never took Appellant’s instructions, and never
considered her interests. Appellant further reasserts that if she was allowed to represent
herself, she would have raised a valid defense, and would have objected to said
continuance(s).
Appellant maintains that the issue here is that continuances are disfavored.
“Continuances are discouraged in dependency cases." In re Giovanni F. (2010) 184
Cal.App.4th 594, 604. Further, CA Welf & Inst Code § 352(a)(2) (2021) provides that
"Continuances shall be granted only upon a showing of good cause and only for that
period of time shown to be necessary." It follows; it is not at the discretion of the judge or
the attorneys to break said law, even when opposing counsel or parents counsel consent
to a continuance. Accordingly, Respondent’s argument of consent is moot considering
that Appellant’s attorney forced Appellant’s consent or did not object.

What matters is that the court abused its discretion by granting the continuance, in
blatant disregard to the best interests of the children. Section 30 of the Dependency
Proceedings Manual of the Los Angeles County Superior Court provides: "The best
interests of the child and the legislative intent requires that juvenile dependency
proceedings proceed in a timely manner. Accordingly, it is court policy that matters
proceed as scheduled on the date set.” See In re Dolly D., 41 Cal.App.4th 440, 48 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 691 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
It is also notable that parents have a liberty interest in their relationship with their
children. This interest is fundamental and, therefore, may not be extinguished without
due process. See Santosky v. Kramer (1982) 455 U.S. 745 [71 L.Ed.2d 599]. Family
preservation, of which reunification services constitutes an integral component, is the
"first priority" in dependency proceedings. In re Elizabeth R. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th
1774, 1787.) In dependency proceedings, the parent has the best opportunity he or she
ever will have to make the strongest case possible in favor of returning the child to
parental custody. See In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 307, 308.
Appellant further reasserts that the structural error occasioned by the Trial Court
has been prejudicial to her case. In United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez (2006) 548 U.S. 140,
149, fn. 4 the Supreme Court suggested that some errors must necessarily be deemed
structural, and therefore reversible per se, in light of the “difficulty of assessing the effect
of the error.” The list of "structural errors" includes: inter alia, (1) the total deprivation of
the right to counsel at trial; (2) a proceeding held before a biased judge; (3) the exclusion
of prospective jurors on racial grounds; (4) the denial of the defendant’s right to self-
representation. Appellant maintains that for three and a half years, Respondent has
continued to violate the law on continuance, thus denying Appellant her due process
rights to a fair hearing. Clearly, Respondent’s conduct flies in the face of justice.
iii. Appellant was denied the chance to cross examine, as required under the law
In dependency proceedings, as in other civil proceedings, parties have a due
process right to cross-examine and confront witnesses. See In re Malinda S. (1990) 51
Cal. 3d 368, 383 [272 Cal. Rptr. 787, 795 P.2d 1244]; In re Amy M. (1991) 232 Cal. App.

3d 849, 864 [283 Cal. Rptr. 788]; § 311, subd. (b). This right is expressed in California
Rules of Court, rule 1412(i), which requires the court to advise the child, parent, and
guardian in section 300 cases of "(2) The right to confront and cross-examine the persons
who prepared reports or documents submitted to the court by the petitioner, and the
witnesses called to testify at the hearing…."
Rule 1449(b) provides that at the beginning of the jurisdiction hearing, the court
must advise the parent or guardian of the right to a hearing by the court on the issues
raised by the petition, as well as "[t]he right to confront and to cross-examine all
witnesses called to testify against the parent or guardian" and "[t]he right to use the
process of the court to compel attendance of witnesses on behalf of the parent or
guardian." Rule 1450 addresses the admissibility of evidence at a contested jurisdiction
hearing. Subdivision (c) provides: "A social worker’s report that contains information
relevant to the jurisdiction hearing shall be admissible if, on request of the parent or
guardian, the probation officer or social worker is made available to be cross-examined
on the contents of the report."
Clearly, Respondent has failed to prove to the court why the children should be
removed from Appellant. Appellant avers that Respondent’s endless continuances are a
dilatory tactic, to cover up for their failure to meet their burden of proof. Notably, the
social workers’ reports are conclusory and incomplete; they do not provide any
substantive value to draw any conclusions or make any determinations on why Appellant
should be deprived of the right to be with Appellant’s children. Respondent did not obey
the Trial Court’s first court order to allow Appellant to cross examine the social worker.
Respondent argues that permanency planning does not include reunification
because the children being returned home has to be assessed as part of the permanency
planning because it is also a permanency option. On the contrary, Respondent can only
permanency plan to adopt children when there is no bond between the children and
parents so that there is no relationship to be lost, and if the parent’s problems still persists
making it a risk of returning the children home. Theses assessment were not made or

commented on. Therefore, Appellant was prejudiced because they did not even consider
Appellant, which they should.
The court improperly delegates its discretion to the department in determining if
the children can be returned home. In page 6 of the Respondent’s Brief, Respondent
argues that that the department was not considering family reunification. However it is
notable that the department and court are separate entities. Even if DCFS is not pursuing
family reunification, the judge must still ascertain by law information regarding if the
children can be returned home and their ages. The judge and court must make this
decision based on the evidence. Here, the biased judge just went along with whatever
DCFS wanted without even requiring solid evidence for any current reason that children
cannot be returned home.
In addition to the foregoing, it is evident that Respondent is relying on the
statements of Kernell Brown who is a seven time convicted felon and former county
employee who was fired for fraud and writing checks from the county treasury. KB is
currently in jail awaiting trial for allegedly sexually molesting his own granddaughter.
These allegations came from Simone’s sister Sade Brown. Sade told the department that
K.B. molested her daughter, and the department covered it up and removed the daughter
from Sade Brown’s care as retaliation for speaking out on the sexual abuse. Appellant
has accused him of being a physical abuser who beat her, but the county of Los Angeles
agents continue to cover it up.
The police would not enforce restraining orders and allow him to come to
Appellant’s house without arresting him. They never prosecuted him for beating
Appellant with a baseball bat. Appellant had to protect herself against K.B.’s trespassing
because she feared for her life and the life of her children. DCFS has knowledge that
Appellant was cleared of all wrong doing by a jury trial who determined she was using
necessary force to defend herself in her own home. It is notable that K.B. works from the
landlord at the apartment complex so he has the keys to everything unit in the building.
They therefore aided K.B. by allowing him to abuse Appellant, never arresting him,

never prosecuting him, and now helping him retaliate against Appellant in juvenile court
for daring to leave him and getting a restraining order.
Respondent has also made false statements regarding Appellant. For instance, it is
false that Appellant did not try to communicate with the social workers. She was talking
to them in the beginning but they kept twisting her words and taking her words out of
context. They would try to get Appellant to say she had some mental health issues when
she clearly do not. Communicating with these toxic agents is impossible and is mentally
and emotionally draining. They caused Appellant to be depressed and anxious by legally
abusing them with abusive discovery practices. They gaslighted her as a victim and tried
to convince her that she was not a victim by retelling her reality in their own version,
which was more salacious and imputed characteristics on Appellant that are not
representative of who Appellant is. Further, they asked Appellant the same questions
repeatedly in an effort to get Appellant to answer questions by repeating what they
wanted Appellant to say instead of expressing the truth. They hurled accusation and
insults with no basis, meanwhile suppressing dissent and actual truth from ever entering
the court record.
Respondent also lies that Appellant locked herself inside the house with the
children when in reality, Appellant always keep her door locked when she was at home
with the children and did not have to just let anyone in. Respondent admits that there
were several calls to the police but did not elucidate what the calls were about. Said
admissions prove Appellant’s point that she called the police several times to protect
herself from K.B. but they did nothing.
The Social Workers also lied that they are attempting to assess Appellant’s
relatives. It is concerning why they would need to asses Appellant’s mother when they
placed Appellant’s first two daughters there. The reason they use that excuse is to make it
seem like they are doing a favor to Appellant in "attempting to assess relatives". They
really are just using this excuse for as long as possible to make the record look legitimate.
It is also notable that the social workers who try to talk to Appellant from DCFS are

unlicensed. The social worker has never been licensed and the supervisor has an expired
license.
iv. Appellant’s privacy rights have been violated
In California privacy is an inalienable right recognized under Article I section 1 of
the California Constitution. See Cal. Const. Art. I, § 1; see also Hooser v. Superior Court
(App. 4 Dist. 2000) 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 341, 84 Cal.App.4th 997; Garstang v. Superior
Court (App. 2 Dist. 1995) 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 84, 39 Cal.App. 4th 526. California’s right to
privacy is wider than its federal counterpart in that it protects individuals not only against
violations by state and federal government entities, but also against violations by other
individuals and private companies. See lfaro v. Terhune (App. 3 Dist. 2002) 120
Cal.Rptr.2d 197, 98 Cal.App.4th 492; Chantiles v. Lake Forest II Master Homeowners
Assn. (App. 4 Dist. 1995) 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 37 Cal.App.4th 914.
Respondent argues that Appellant would not allow the welfare check team into her
home. Appellant is under no obligation to allow complete strangers in her home at 11:30
pm when she was in bed. She could not allow them come in with their shoes on, and ask
her a bunch of questions while she was in her night gown. Appellant’s refusal to let
people in her home does not prove that she has a mental health problem. Instead, it
proves that Appellant have a healthy sense of boundaries and they do not. It is indecent to
come to a person’s home, especially a woman at that time of night and demand that she
opens the door.
It is notable that Respondent never provided any evidence in support of their
allegations of Appellant’s mental health problems, including that Appellant was suicidal.
They also infringe on Appellant’s right to self-defense when they allege that Appellant is
mentally insane and violent for defending herself against a dangerous criminal. It is not
insane to want to protect oneself from intruders in one’s own home. At all the incidents
that are described, Appellant was in her own home not disturbing anyone. Appellant has a
right to prevent trespass to her property. It follows; Appellant is completely sane and was
deliberate when she decided that she did not want people in her home. Notably, Appellant
is not insane to exercise and demand her right to privacy and right to bear arms.

It is also noteworthy that Respondent wants to have private conversations with
Appellant but would not have an on record conversation in court. Moreover, if Appellant
refused to acquiesce to these private conversations and interviews that are not recorded or
on the record, then they use that as a reason to say Appellant is not cooperating with
them. Appellant’s refusal to interact with DCFS off the record in her private life and not
open up about her personal relationships, family affairs, life and dislikes, thoughts,
beliefs, and preferences, is the reason they are retaliating against Appellant and
continuing the case. Unless Appellant gives up her right to privacy and to allow the
harassment and trespassing in her life, they will continue to hold Appellant’s children
until it is determined that she has the correct way of being according to them. They
retaliate against Appellant in an effort to force her to prove herself to them.
Appellant further avers that Respondent’s conduct also violated her right to free
speech. Appellant must not be compelled to make a statement or express a specific view
point or recount events in the manner that they describe. Also, Appellant must not be
compelled to speak or be prevented from speaking. Therefore, by continuing a case
because she refused to make a statement is a deprivation of Appellant’s right under the
first amendment to be able to speak freely without being censored.

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the Appellant prays this court denies the Respondent’s Brief.
Appellant also prays this Court issue any other order it deems just.

Date:
Respectfully submitted,

______________________
MELODY ROGERS
438 River Ridge Drive Wallace,
NC 28466

DECLARATION OF SERVICE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, County of Los Angeles:
___________ states: I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of
California, over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within action. My
business address is ___________________.
On _________, I served the attached RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT’S BRIEF
IN THE MATTER OF S.B. et al., 2d JUVENILE NO. B321633, LASC NO.
19CCJP01011A-B, to the persons and/or representative of the court as addressed below.
BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE. I served via TrueFiling, and no error was
reported, a copy of the document(s) identified above:

__________________
ENTER NAME

Michael Green, Esq.
LADL 5
greenm@ladlinc.org
dca5@ladlinc.org
(Trial Counsel for Father)
Alyson Bashor, Esq.
Children’s Law Center 1
bashora@clcla.org
appeals1@clcla.org
(Trial Counsel for Minor)
Honorable Linda Sun
Honorable Stephen Marpet
Dept. 417
c/o Clerk of the Superior Court
Edmund D. Edelman Children’s Court
JuvJoAppeals@lacourt.org
California Appellate Project
capdocs@lacap.com

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