- EXTENT OF SEARCHES CONDUCTED ON AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTIONS
The scope of any warrantless motor vehicle search is not based on the container’s nature containing the evidence but on the search object and the place where the probable cause could be found. For instance, probable cause that a lawnmower reported stolen could be found in a garage may not justify a warrant to search a bedroom. Furthermore, probable cause that unregistered aliens are being conveyed in a vehicle does not warrant a search without a warrant of the suitcases in the vehicle.[1]
- Containers and Personal Luggage
Most motor vehicles contain compartments, trunks, and bags/suitcases/items/packages/envelopes that the occupants carry along or place next to them, in the trunk, or under their feet. Generally, searches of containers found with the arrestee or within their reach are valid under. However, once the law enforcement officers control the arrested person’s personal property, a later search of the property is not a valid search incident to arrest. Contrastingly, when the police validly arrest the vehicle’s occupant, they can search any containers and compartments within the vehicle.[2]
The scope of the search by the police was discussed in the case of Commonwealth v. Runyan. In this case, the Appelle was charged with possessing drugs. She then filed a motion for suppression of the evidence that was seized by the law enforcement officers. The Superior Court ruled that it is justified for an officer with probable cause to search a container in a vehicle where the evidence of crime or contraband is believed to be concealed, including the appellee’s purse.[3]
Moreover, the scope of search is limited by the motor vehicle exception to the possible areas that could be harbouring evidence of a crime. For example, if a police enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect has a bag full of illegal substances and the suspect hails a cab and puts the suitcase in the cab’s trunk. If the suspect is detained before he gets to the cab, the police officer would have probable care to believe that the drugs are in the cab’s trunk. Thus, under the motor vehicle exception, an officer would have the authority to search the trunk since he would have no probable cause to believe that the evidence of a crime would be in any other section of the cab.[4]
- Trunk, Glove Compartment
As earlier stated, the scope of a search without a warrant is not defined by the character nature of the container where the contraband or evidence of a crime is hidden. Instead, the same is defined by the object of the search and the places where there is probable cause to believe the same is found.
A good instance of the definition of the scope of a warrantless search of a motor vehicle’s compartment and the trunk is the case of Commonwealth v. Scott. In this case, the police officers had probable cause to search the passenger compartment owing to the odor of marijuana. The police officers recovered a container of marijuana that was the main source of the odor of the marijuana the officers had smelt. Nonetheless, the police officers extended their search to the motor vehicle’s trunk. After that, they failed to indicate in the record that they had reasonable belief that there was evidence of a crime in the trunk of the car. The Court held that the odor of burnt marijuana did not create the possibility of recovering the marijuana from the trunk. [5]
In another more obvious case, a law enforcement officer would be in a circumstance where he finds evidence of a crime in a passenger’s compartment in a motor vehicle. In such an instance, it would be reasonable for the police officer to believe that the evidence could be in the vehicle’s trunk.[6] For instance, in Commonwealth v Moses, the Supreme Court held that a gun and drugs found in a passenger’s compartment of a vehicle during the frisk of weapons granted the police officer probable cause to believe that there were more weapons or drugs in the trunk.[7] In ordinary circumstances, an officer could not be allowed to search the trunk while frisking the vehicle for weapons. Nonetheless, once the drugs were found in the passenger’s compartment in the initial search, the frisking of the trunk was allowed under the motor vehicle exception founded on the probable cause that arose from the drugs in the passenger’s compartment. Similar inferences may be drawn from finding guns in the passenger’s compartment becasue such could back an inference that ammunition, weapons, or contraband could be in the vehicle’s trunk.[8]
- Odor of Marijuana
Detecting the odor of marijuana is also considered an exception to the automobile warrant search. Hence when law enforcement officers detect the odor of marijuana in states where marijuana is illegal, they can search without a warrant the vehicle in question. Nonetheless, upon enacting the Medical Marijuana Act, several courts have considered whether probable cause should solely be founded on detecting the odor of marijuana in a motor vehicle.[9] For instance, in the case of Commonwealth v. Barr, the Superior Court highlighted that no solid rule exists that the odor of marijuana is adequate to establish the probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed. However, the Court stated that there exists a rule that the odor of marijuana alone is sufficient in establishing the probable cause of conducting searches in certain contexts.[10] Nonetheless, albeit the Court raised the probability that marijuana could be adequate to establish a probable cause, it is because the law enforcement officers cannot lawfully discern from the unlawful conduct of marijuana odor alone hence the need to rely on other circumstances in establishing the probable cause of believing that the possession of marijuana detected by the odor is criminal.[11] Thus the odor of marijuana alone is not considered adequate by the courts to establish a probable cause to search the entire vehicle.
For example, in the United States v Nielsen case, a police officer stopped the defendant for overspeeding and then smelt the odor of marijuana from the vehicle’s open window. The officer then obtained the driver’s consent to search the vehicle’s compartment but did not find the odor’s source. From the criminal record, the driver had previously been arrested for a misdemeanor concerning a marijuana offense 15 years prior. The police then removed the car keys from the ignition and checked the trunk, where he found cocaine. The American Court of Appeal for the Tenth Circuit then ruled that the odor alone was insufficient to warrant probable cause to search the vehicle’s trunk.[12]
The Court in the Nielsen case focused on the credibility of an uncorroborated detection by a police officer of the odor of burnt marijuana in the motor vehicle. The Court stated that there should be evidence that corroborates the marijuana odor to sufficiently establish probable cause to search a vehicle’s trunk. Such corroboration ought to be as simple as finding a marijuana cigar in a motor vehicle or the driver’s possession. In the Nielsen case, the Court also distinguished between detecting the smell of marijuana by officers and detecting drugs using a dog that sniffs drugs. The Court stated that such a reliable dog does not require corroboration to establish sufficient probable cause to search a vehicle trunk.[13]
Moreover, the corroboration of the odor of marijuana does not necessarily have to be in the form of physical evidence. Accordingly, in the case of State v Ireland, the officer stopped the defendant because he had his headlights off. The law enforcement officers eventually determined that the driver had a suspended license and arrested him.[14] They then searched the vehicle and detected the smell of burnt marijuana under the driver’s seat. The trunk was also searched, and marijuana was found. In Court, the defendant argued that there was no corroborating evidence of the presence of marijuana in the trunk. However, the Supreme Court ruled that the odor was corroborated by the defendant’s furtive behavior and resistance to opening the trunk.
The cases discussed above revolve around the odor of burnt marijuana. Nonetheless, when the odor of marijuana detected by law enforcement officers is that of fresh and unburnt marijuana, courts have held that there is no need for corroborating evidence for the presence of marijuana before searching a vehicle.[15]
- Use of Drugs
The presence of any illegal drugs would also warrant the police officers to search without a warrant based on probable cause. For instance, in Wimberly v Superior Court of San Bernardino County, the police officers flagged a motorist for reckless driving.[16] The officers then approached the vehicle and noted a smoking pipe, and smelt the odor of marijuana. On examination of the pipe, they found the residue of marijuana in the pipe bowl. The officers then searched the vehicle’s interior and found a plastic bag with marijuana. The Court, however, decided that it was not reasonable for the officers to assume the presence of more drugs in the trunk hence no probable cause to search the trunk.[17] Accordingly, law enforcement officers must have probable cause from the circumstances in question to search a motor vehicle in the event there is a use of drugs in plain view. Otherwise, evidence found in the trunk will not be admissible before the Court and dismissed as illegally obtained evidence.
Despite the preceding holding, the general rule is that if there exists physical evidence of the drugs that have been found in the passenger’s compartment, despite it being a small amount for personal use, it will be considered sufficient to establish a probable cause that there are more drugs in the vehicle.[18] For instance, in the case of United States V Turner, an American police officer stooped a driver for not displaying his license in the front part of the vehicle.[19] Upon the driver rolling down his window, the law enforcement officer smelt a strong odor of marijuana and noticed torn pieces of tobacco cigars. The officer then searched the trunk and found more drugs. The American Court of Appeal quashed the defendant’s argument of not being probable cause to search the trunk for drugs and upheld that there was probable cause from the open display of drugs. Therefore, in circumstances where the use of drugs is open, a police officer has probable cause to believe that there are more drugs in the vehicle and can thus conduct a warrantless search. Such evidence is admissible in Court and cannot be excluded from the court record.
- Stop and Frisk
The stop and frisk refer to a brief and non-intrusive stop made by the police of a suspect. The Fourth Amendment provides that before stopping a vehicle, the police should have reasonable suspicion that a crime is being, has been, or is about to be committed by the suspects.[20] Also, if law enforcement officers have reason to believe that the suspects are armed and thus dangerous, they are allowed to frisk the suspect by giving a pat-down on the outer clothes of the suspect.
The stop-and-frisk doctrine is derived from the Terry v Ohio case.[21] In this case, the Court ruled that a stop and frisk should comply with the Fourth Amendment; hence it should not be unreasonable. As per the Court, a reasonable stop and frisk are when a reasonable and prudent law enforcement officer would be justified to believe that his safety and that of the public are at risk, including a search for weapons believed to be dangerous.[22]
Regarding what amounts to a reasonable stop, the Supreme Court, in the case of Rodriguez v United States held that any police stop that exceeds reasonable time is a violation of the Constitution’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures hence unreasonable.[23] Therefore, a police search that takes too long violates the Constitution. In the Rodriguez case, the police officer completed the terry stop search and then used the police dog to perform a search on the suspect. The Court found that the sniff search violated the Fourth Amendment since it took an unreasonably long time. However, evidence found in unreasonable searches is still admissible. Accordingly, the evidence from the dog sniffing the driver was admissible in the Rodriguez case.
Moreover, when a motor vehicle is legally stopped for violating the traffic rules, the police officers will not be considered to have unreasonably intruded on the passengers and the driver by instructing them to come out of the car. The officer is also justified to look inside the vehicle and ask for the motor vehicle identification and information regarding the motor vehicle from the driver.[24] Nonetheless, once the driver produces the requisite registration and license, he or she should be allowed to proceed without undue delay. Nonetheless, certain exceptional cases exist where the driver may delay individuals for more questioning. For instance, the police officer may have reasonable suspicion of the illegal transactions of drugs or any other form of criminal activity.[25]
Further, law enforcement officers can lawfully order a passenger to get out of his vehicle when there is reasonable suspicion that the passenger was involved in criminal activity or that the passenger is not only armed but dangerous to the officer and the public.[26] Nonetheless, frisking a person after a legal traffic stop is not reasonable in the event of suspicious conduct that makes the police conclude that the person is armed and poses a threat to the safety of the officer and the public in general.[27]
Additionally, just as a law enforcement officer could order a passenger to get out of a motor vehicle, a passenger of a vehicle that has been legally halted could be ordered to either remain inside the vehicle or get back in. Thus, any forcible stop made by a police officer could include a seizure of the driver and the passengers. The police can also conduct a traffic stop by using their emergency lights, sirens, and equipment. Also, a lawful stop and frisk of any driver that tries to conceal any illegal substance could also justify the passengers’ frisking.[28]
[1] U.S. v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2172, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1982).
[2] Smith v. City of Chicago, 242 F.3d 737, 743 (7th Cir. 2001)
[3] Commonwealth vs. Runyan 160 A. 3d 831
[4] See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579-80 (1991) (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982)
[5] Commonwealth v. Scott, 2019 PA Super 154, 210 A.3d 359, 365 (2019).
[6] Ibid
[7] 557 N.E.2d 14, 19 (Mass. 1990)
[8] See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 334 F.3d 1161, 1171 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (gun found in the car next to suspect, who was “tickling the handle,” after multiple gunshots were fired in the vicinity gave probable cause to search the
trunk for more weapons or ammunition).
[9] Commonwealth v. Scott, 2019 PA Super 154, 210 A.3d 359, 365 (2019).
[10] Commonwealth v. Barr, 2020 PA Super 236, 240 A.3d 1263, 1276 (2020), appeal granted, 1661050 (Pa, 2021)
[11] Commonwealth v. Barr, 2020 PA Super 236, 240 A.3d 1263, 1286 (2020), appeal granted, 2021 WL
1661050 (Pa. 2021).
[12] Ibid
[13] See also United States v. Ludwig, 10 F.3d 1523, 1527-28 (10th Cir. 1993) (dog alert established probable cause to search trunk). Cf. United States v. Williams, 69 F.3d 27, 28 (5th Cir. 1995).
[14] 706 A.2d 597 (Me. 1998)
[15] State v. Wright, 977 P.2d 505, 507-08 (Utah App. 1999); United States v. Downs, 151 F.3d 1301 (10th Cir. 1998). Cf. People v. Kazmierczak, 605 N.W.2d 667 (Mich. 2000)
[16] 16 Cal.3d 557,128 Cal.Rptr. 641,547 P.2d 417
[17] Ibid
[18] United States v. Burnett, 791 F.2d 64, 65 (6th Cir. 1986).
[19] 119 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
[20] Amdt4.5.4.2
[21] 392 U.S. 1 (1968)
[22] Ibid
[23] 575 U.S. __ (2015)
[24] Commonwealth v. Long, 489 Pa. 369, 414 A.2d 113 (1980); Commonwealth v. Rosa, 734 A.2d
412 (Pa. Super.1999), appeal denied 561 Pa. 693, 751 A.2d 189 (2000), and appeal denied 561 Pa. 686, 751
A.2d 184 (2000); Commonwealth v. Bable, 286 Pa.Super. 203, 428 A.2d 643 (1981); Commonwealth
- Sojourner, 268 Pa. Super. 472, 408 A.2d 1100 (1978)
[25] Commonwealth v. Shelly, 703 A.2d 499 (Pa. Super.1997); Commonwealth v. Lopez, 415 Pa. Super.
252, 609 A.2d 177 (1992). See also § 19:37
[26] Commonwealth v. Rosa, 734 A.2d 412 (Pa. Super.1999), appeal denied 561 Pa. 693, 751 A.2d 189
(2000) and appeal denied 561 Pa. 686, 751 A.2d 184 (2000); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 695 A.2d
864 (Pa. Super.1997); Commonwealth v. Elliott, 376 Pa. Super. 536, 546 A.2d 654 (1988).
[27] Commonwealth v. Collini, 264 Pa. Super. 36, 398 A.2d 1044 (1979). See also Commonwealth v.
Chamberlain, 332 Pa. Super. 108, 480 A.2d 1209 (1984). See §§ 19:39 and 19:40 for a more extensive
discussion of frisks.
[28] See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Chamberlain, 332 Pa. Super. 108, 480 A.2d 1209 (1984); United States
- Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985).